Jones v. Cornutt , 100 F. App'x 251 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 1, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10302
Summary Calendar
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
M. CORNUTT; L. WELLS; T. HART;
NIXION; S. FARMER; JEFFERY OWENS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:01-CV-202
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Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christopher Jones, Texas prisoner # 656546, appeals from the
district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants following a
bench trial and the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil right
complaint with prejudice as frivolous. Jones argues that the
district court erred in determining that he had failed to
establish a claim of excessive force and deliberate indifference
to his safety and medical needs. He also argues that the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-10302
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district court committed various procedural errors at trial.
Jones has filed a motion to amend his brief following the newly-
prepared transcript which this court ordered at government
expense. Jones’s motion is GRANTED.
Standard of review
Factual findings made in a bench trial are reviewed
for clear error, while legal issues are reviewed de novo.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Seal v. Knorpp, 957 F.2d 1230, 1234
(5th Cir. 1992). For a factual finding to be clearly erroneous,
an appellate court must have a firm conviction, based on a review
of the entire record, that a mistake has been made. Justiss Oil
Co., Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., 75 F.3d 1057, 1062, 1067
(5th Cir. 1996).
Excessive force
Jones argues that the evidence introduced at trial
establishes that the defendants exercised excessive force against
him at the prison infirmary. A district court’s ruling on
excessive use of force is reviewed for clear error. Baldwin v.
Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1998). To prevail on an
Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force, a plaintiff must
establish that the force was not applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm, and that the plaintiff suffered an
injury. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).
No. 03-10302
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The record reflects that the district court did not clearly
err in determining that Jones failed to establish a claim of
excessive force. The documentary evidence as well as the
testimony introduced at trial supports the district court’s
decision to find credible the defendants’ assertion that Jones
struck his own head against the infirmary wall, requiring an
officer to restrain him with a reasonable use of force. Justiss
Oil Co., 75 F.3d at 1062, 1067. Accordingly, the district court
did not clearly err in dismissing Jones’s excessive force claims.
See Baldwin, 137 F.3d at 839.
Deliberate indifference
Jones argues that several of the defendants chose to
disregard their knowledge that a corrections officer in the
infirmary posed a substantial risk to his safety. He also argues
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical
care because they falsified use-of-force injury and medical
reports.
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he
knows that an inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm
and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures
to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
 No. 03-10302
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Jones’s arguments that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his safety by sending him to the infirmary and
by falsifying documentation of the use of force are entirely
conclusional and speculative. See Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524,
530 (5th Cir. 1990). Jones provides no specific evidence to
support his assertion that the supervising officer who sent
him along with an escort to the infirmary knew that Jones faced
a risk of harm. Similarly, Jones fails to establish with
specificity what portions of the defendants’ statements were
falsified. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err
in dismissing Jones’s deliberate indifference claims. See
Justiss Oil Co., 75 F.3d at 1062, 1067.
District court rulings
Jones argues that the district court erred by failing to
appoint counsel, impose discovery sanctions on the defendants,
and permit him to make opening and closing arguments.
Jones argues that the district court erred by failing to
appoint counsel. The court is not required to appoint counsel
for an indigent plaintiff raising a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in
the absence of “exceptional circumstances.” Ulmer v. Chancellor,
691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). Based on our review of the
record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion because Jones has not shown such exceptional
circumstances are present in this case.
No. 03-10302
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Jones’s remaining issues related to the district court’s
discovery and trial rulings are reviewed for plain error
due to Jones’s failure to object to these rulings at trial.
See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Jones cannot demonstrate that the
district court committed plain error in failing to issue
discovery sanctions to the defendants where the record reflects
that Jones requested personnel files based upon pure speculation
and conclusional assertions. Similarly, although the district
court did not offer Jones an opportunity to make an opening
statement, the record clearly reflects that the district court
afforded Jones every deference during the proceedings to
establish his case. Finally, in contrast to Jones’s assertion,
the district court did permit him to make a closing argument
prior to rendering its decision. Accordingly, Jones cannot
establish plain error with respect to these arguments. See
Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429. For the foregoing reasons, the
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.