United States v. Gonzales ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-10549
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PETE GONZALES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(2:00-CR-23-3)
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February 28, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Pete Gonzales appeals his conviction,
contending that the district court erred in refusing to allow him
to cross-examine government witness Ann Marie Lustgraaf about her
state court indictment, thereby violating Gonzales’s Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
“A trial court, based upon its sound discretion, may limit the
scope and extent of cross-examination, and its decision will not be
disturbed on review unless an abuse of discretion is present.”
United States v. Ramirez, 622 F.2d 898, 899 (5th Cir. 1980). “This
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
discretion, however, is subordinate to the defendant’s right of
cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause of
the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The exposure of a witness's motivation
in testifying is a proper and important function of the
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986). “The relevant inquiry is
whether the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias
and motives of the witness.” United States v. Tansley, 986 F.2d
880, 886 (5th Cir. 1993).
There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the
government had the ability to influence the prosecution of the
state drug case against Lustgraaf. Furthermore, Lustgraaf’s
motives for testifying against Gonzales were brought into question
by virtue of her admissions on cross-examination that (1) she had
entered into a plea agreement with the government under which she
was allowed to plead guilty to one federal charge in exchange for
her testimony against Gonzales, and (2) she was awaiting sentencing
on her federal case.
In light of the foregoing, the district court’s limitation of
the cross-examination of Lustgraff did not violate Gonzales’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause or otherwise constitute an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Thorn, 917 F.2d 170,
175-76 (5th Cir. 1990). Gonzales’s conviction is
AFFIRMED.
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