Young v. Cain ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 16, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30109
Summary Calendar
ROBERT YOUNG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
Respondent-Appellee.
---------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CV-3162-B
---------------------
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Robert Young, Louisiana prisoner # 115638, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus
petition as procedurally barred. In dismissing the petition, the
district court determined that Young’s motion to quash his
indictment based on the racial composition of the grand jury was
untimely filed, and that Young otherwise waived his grand jury
challenge by failing to pursue a ruling on the motion at his jury
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-30109
-2-
trial. On appeal, Young focuses on the latter theory of
dismissal, arguing that he expressly reserved the right to raise
his equal protection claim in post-conviction proceedings. The
Respondent relies on the theory of dismissal finding Young’s
motion untimely filed.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of
federal habeas relief based on a state procedural ground. Martin
v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1996). Federal courts "will
not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if
the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is
independent of the federal question and adequate to support the
judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). “[A]
federal district court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
raise a habeas petitioner’s procedural default sua sponte and
then apply that default as a bar to further litigation of
petitioner’s claims.” Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 358
(5th Cir. 1998).
We hold that the district court did not err in dismissing
Young’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as procedurally barred since
Young failed to file his motion to quash in a timely manner under
Louisiana law. See State v. Hampton, 687 So. 2d 505, 508 (La.
Ct. App. 1996); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 521 & 535D. Young does not
renew his cause and prejudice argument on appeal; therefore, he
fails to overcome the procedural bar. Smith v. Johnson, 216 F.3d
521, 524 (5th Cir. 2000). Since we affirm on the timeliness
No. 03-30109
-3-
issue, we need not address whether Young’s failure to pursue a
trial court ruling on the motion to quash constituted a waiver of
his equal protection claim.
AFFIRMED.