Rivera v. Barnhart ( 2003 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 02-10527
    _____________________
    ANNA A. RIVERA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:01-CV-171-C
    _________________________________________________________________
    March 12, 2003
    Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Anna Rivera appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
    Commissioner’s determination that she is not entitled to disability
    insurance benefits.   Rivera’s hypertension, hip and leg pain, and
    glaucoma did not meet the requirements of any listed impairment.
    A vocational expert testified and the administrative law judge
    (ALJ) found that while Rivera could not perform her past work, she
    retained the functional capacity to perform light work available in
    the national economy, specifically work as a silver wrapper, cloth
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    folder     and    folding   machine    operator.        Rivera   argues     the
    determination that she had the residual functional capacity to do
    other work is not supported by substantial evidence because the
    hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert did not
    include the glaucoma which she alleged in her written submissions.
    She argues that because the ALJ explicitly found that her glaucoma
    was a severe impairment, he was required to include a visual
    limitation description in his hypothetical.           We affirm.
    Judicial      review   of   the   Commissioner’s    decision    to   deny
    benefits    is    limited   to   determining   whether    that   decision   is
    supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal
    standards were applied.          Harris v. Apfel, 
    209 F.3d 413
    , 417 (5th
    Cir. 2000).       A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate
    only where no credible evidence or medical findings support the
    decision.        
    Id.
       This court will not re-weigh the evidence or
    substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.              
    Id.
    An ALJ may properly rely on the testimony of a vocational
    expert in determining that a claimant can perform other work if the
    hypothetical posed to the vocational expert incorporates reasonably
    all disabilities recognized by the ALJ, and the claimant or his
    representative is afforded the opportunity to correct deficiencies
    in the ALJ’s question by mentioning or suggesting to the vocational
    expert any purported defects in the hypothetical.            Boyd v. Apfel,
    
    239 F.3d 698
    , 706-07 (5th Cir. 2001).              Rivera argues that the
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    vocational expert’s testimony was not reliable because it did not
    include any limitations caused by her glaucoma.           Although Rivera
    has a slight impairment in far acuity and an unspecified field loss
    due to glaucoma, which the ALJ acknowledged, there is no testimony
    or medical evidence that the glaucoma caused limitations on her
    ability to work.      When questioned as to what caused her to be
    unable to work, Rivera did not mention her glaucoma.            Rivera was
    given an opportunity to cross-examine the vocational expert and
    introduce visual limitations into the hypothetical.             Her cross-
    examination did not include any references to her glaucoma or to
    the fact that the hypothetical should have contained a visual
    limitation.
    Rivera argues that despite her failure to set forth testimony
    concerning    her   glaucoma   at    the   hearing,     the   ALJ    bore   a
    responsibility to fully and fairly develop the record concerning
    the glaucoma.    She argues that because the ALJ found her glaucoma
    to be a severe impairment, a residual functional capacity finding
    which   included    no   visual     limitations   was    “patently     self-
    contradictory.” Rivera’s argument fails, however, because “not all
    ‘severe’ impairments are disabling.”        Harrell v. Bowen, 
    862 F.2d 471
    , 479 (5th Cir. 1988); Shipley v. Secretary, 
    812 F.2d 934
    , 935
    (5th Cir. 1987).     Moreover, although the ALJ has a duty to fully
    develop the facts, the claimant has the burden of proving his
    disability.     Leggett v. Chater, 
    67 F.3d 558
    , 566 (5th Cir. 1995).
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    Rivera did not meet that burden.     The determination that Rivera
    retains the ability to do light work is supported by the credible
    testimony of the vocational expert and the medical evidence.
    Even if the ALJ had erred in not including a visual limitation
    in the hypothetical, this court will not reverse the ALJ’s decision
    for failure to fully and fairly develop the record unless Rivera
    can show that she was prejudiced by such error.        See Carey v.
    Apfel, 
    230 F.3d 131
    , 142 (5th Cir. 2000).   To establish prejudice,
    Rivera must demonstrate that she could and would have adduced
    evidence that might have altered the result.   
    Id.
       The vocational
    expert testified that Rivera could perform work as a silver wrapper
    or folding machine operator.   Neither of these jobs requires far
    acuity, depth perception, color vision, or field of vision.   There
    is no evidence in the record that Rivera’s glaucoma would affect
    her ability to perform these jobs.    Given the record before the
    court, Rivera has not shown that she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s
    failure to include a visual limitation in his hypothetical.
    For the foregoing reasons the judgment below is
    AFFIRMED.
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