United States v. Iredia ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-21000
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MINISTER DAVID IREDIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-95-CR-24-1
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November 26, 1999
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Minister David Iredia appeals the revocation of his term of
supervised release following a conviction for illegal reentry
after deportation. 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Iredia raises the
following arguments: (1) the district court abused its discretion
when it revoked his term of supervised release, (2) the district
court erred when it failed to inform Iredia that the illegal
reentry conviction would support revocation, (3) the district
court erred when it failed to advise Iredia of his right to
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 98-21000
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remain silent at the revocation hearing, (4) the district court
should not have imposed an upward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines, (5) the district court should have reformed the
written judgment to match the oral pronouncement of sentence,
(6) the district court should have inquired into Iredia’s request
for substitute counsel, (7) the district court erred when it
denied him the opportunity to present mitigating evidence
suggesting that the violation of the terms of supervised release
did not warrant revocation.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
revoked Iredia’s term of supervised release based on his
admissions. See United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 219
(5th Cir. 1995). Iredia failed to cite any authority supporting
his contention that the district court erred when it failed to
advise him that the illegal reentry conviction would support
revocation; therefore, the issue will not be considered on
appeal. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.
1993). The district court did not err by failing to warn Iredia
of his right against self-incrimination at the revocation
hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1. It did not err when it
imposed the maximum sentence allowable for revocation of Iredia’s
term of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4; United States
v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 89-93 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Headrick, 963 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1992). It did not err when
it declined to reform the written judgment to reflect the oral
pronouncement of sentence. See United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d
1522, 1529-30 (5th Cir. 1985). The district court did not abuse
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its discretion when it denied Iredia’s request for appointment of
substitute counsel. See United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993,
995 (5th Cir. 1973). Finally, contrary to Iredia’s assertion on
appeal, the district court considered the alleged mitigating
circumstances but found Iredia’s reason for violating the terms
of his supervised release to be unpersuasive.
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.