United States v. Jones ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-41488
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DANIEL JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:98-CR-70-2
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November 18, 1999
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Daniel Jones has appealed the sentence he received upon his
guilty plea of assaulting a postal employee with intent to rob
her, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114. We AFFIRM.
Jones contends, first, that the district court erred by
increasing his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(B), arguing that the injury inflicted upon the
postal employee during the robbery was not serious. There was
reliable evidence in the presentence report and the record that
the post traumatic stress disorder which the postal employee
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 98-41488
-2-
suffered was a serious bodily injury within the meaning of
§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(B). United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523, 530-31
(5th Cir. 1994). Thus, this contention lacks merit.
Jones also contends that the district court reversibly
misapplied U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(D) in finding that the
resultant monetary loss exceeded $250,000. This finding was
based on a determination that the 600 blank money orders stolen
in the robbery were worth $700 each, that being the maximum
amount for which they could legally be filled in and cashed. As
a result, the court increased Jones’s offense level by three
levels. We review this factual finding for clear error. See
United States v. Wimbish, 980 F.2d 312, 313 (5th Cir. 1992).
Guideline § 2B3.1, comment. (n.3) provides that valuation of
loss under that section is determined by reference to the
Commentary to § 2B1.1. Note 3 of the latter section states in
part that “[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of
the loss, given the available information.”
The presentence report states, without contradiction, that
prior to Jones’s agreeing to participate in the robbery, he was
aware that Knott had stolen blank money orders from other post
officers and had cashed them for significant amounts. Knott
confessed to having cashed stolen money orders for $900, even
though the legal limit is $700. These findings support the
district court’s calculation of the value of the stolen blank
money orders. See United States v. Oates, 122 F.3d 222, 225 (5th
Cir. 1997).
AFFIRMED.