Religious Technology Center v. Liebreich , 98 F. App'x 979 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED
May 10, 2004
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-41447
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DELL LIEBREICH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lisa
McPherson,
Defendant-Appellee.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
No. 03-41575
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DELL LIEBREICH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lisa
McPherson,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(No. 00-CV-503)
Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This appeal is just the latest skirmish in the protracted war
between these litigants. Consolidated before us are two appeals
that are, in effect, cross-appeals by the combatants and their
respective attorneys, each side seeking to shift attorney’s fees
and costs to the other in the form of sanctions. Indeed, that is
the sole issue remaining in the instant appeal, the merits having
long since been determined.
I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
This is the second time that the question of sanctions has
been before us in this ongoing dispute between the Plaintiff-
Appellant, Religious Technologies Center (“RTC”) and the Defendant-
Appellee, the estate of Lisa McPherson (the “Estate”). In the
first appeal (“RTC I”), we vacated the entire judgment of the
district court —— including its award of sanctions in RTC’s favor
—— for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Estate.1 We heard
RTC I after RTC prevailed in the merits trial of its breach of
contract claim.
In addition to the compensatory damages awarded to RTC by the
jury, the district court had awarded RTC attorney’s fees totaling
$327,654 and costs of $10,675 pursuant to the fee-shifting
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Liebreich, 339 F.3d 369, 376
(5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1085 (2004).
2
provision of the underlying contract. In ruling on cross-motions
for sanctions, the district court found that counsel for the
Estate, Thomas and Kennan Dandar (the “Dandars”), had violated 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and ordered them personally to pay $98,296, being 30
percent of the total attorney’s fees awarded to RTC. The district
court declined to sanction RTC’s counsel.2
In RTC I, we did not address the merits of the Dandars’
challenge to the district court’s award of sanctions, because the
issue of personal jurisdiction was dispositive.3 In responding to
a motion to clarify, however, we explained that “the sanctions
award is vacated and not reversed. The vactur of the sanctions
award is appropriate in light of our determination that there is no
jurisdiction against the Estate of Lisa McPherson. The district
court can reconsider the sanction issue in light of said
determination.”4 On remand following our ruling and clarification,
the district court summarily denied RTC’s renewed motion for
sanctions and attorney’s fees, stating only that its ruling was
“[i]n accordance with the directions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.” The district court also denied the
Estate’s post-remand motion for sanctions against RTC and its
counsel.
2
Id. at 373.
3
Id. at 371 n.2.
4
Emphasis added.
3
In the instant appeal (“RTC II”), RTC contends that the
district court misconstrued our RTC I decision and subsequent
clarification as prohibiting the imposition of sanctions against
the Dandars for the conduct that the district court had previously
adjudged to be sanctionable. For its part, the Estate advances
four challenges, viz., (1) the district court’s refusal to award
the Estate attorney’s fees and costs under the contractual fee-
shifting provision; (2) the denial of costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1919;
(3) the denial of costs authorized under the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure for the RTC I appeal; and (4) the district
court’s refusal to sanction RTC and its counsel under 28 U.S.C. §
1927, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and Florida law.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s imposition or denial of sanctions
for abuse of discretion.5 We review de novo a district court’s
interpretation of the terms of a contract, including the
interpretation and application of a fee-shifting provision.6
B. THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULINGS —— BEFORE AND AFTER REMAND
5
Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 548, 549
(5th Cir. 2001).
6
See, e.g., L & A Contracting Co. v. So. Concrete Svcs.,
Inc.
17 F.3d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1994).
4
Before RTC I vacated the judgment and award of damages to RTC,
the district court, in ruling on RTC’s motion for sanctions under
§ 1927, had expressed the following findings:
The court finds that Plaintiff’s request to have
Defendant’s attorneys sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1927 is well taken in part. These proceedings were
unnecessarily and vexatiously multiplied by arguments
repeated over and over again by the defense after their
merit was initially found lacking by the court early in
the litigation. The court finds the conduct of Thomas
and Kennan Dandar in filing these repeated, frivolous
motions to be both unreasonable and vexatious. However,
the Court also finds that Plaintiff’s litigation posture
in this case was overzealous and that Plaintiff advanced
strident and specious arguments in its characteristic
“overkill” mode of conducting this litigation. This
action was also vexatious and unnecessarily complicated
this case. Accordingly, the court orders that 30% of the
attorney’s fee award to be paid by Thomas and Kennan
Dandar as a sanction for their unreasonable and vexatious
conduct.
In essence, the district court originally concluded that, even
though the Dandars had engaged in sanctionable litigation conduct
on behalf of the Estate, counsel for RTC likewise employed tactics
that unnecessarily multiplied the proceedings. Thus, as sanctions
under § 1927, the court ordered the Dandars to pay personally a 30
percent share of the attorney’s fees awarded under the fee-shifting
provision in the underlying contract. But, as we subsequently
vacated the underlying attorney’s fee award in RTC I for lack of
personal jurisdiction over the Estate, we effectively vacated the
quantum of the § 1927 sanction award against the Dandars as well.
We later clarified, however, that we were not reversing the
imposition of sanctions vel non, only the quantum of the award
5
because of the methodology employed by the district court in
assessing a portion of the contractual attorney’s fees against the
Dandars.
We are admittedly puzzled by the district court’s ruling on
remand as to RTC’s renewed motion for § 1927 sanctions. We
speculate that the district judge either misconstrued our mandate7
or, frustrated by the contumacious conduct of both parties and
their respective counsel, threw up his hands and denied all of the
parties’ post-remand motions in an effort to terminate this
unseemly litigation once and for all. The district court was
certainly acting within its authority to reconsider whether § 1927
sanctions were justified in light of our decision in RTC I.8 Our
primary problem in dealing with that decision today, however, is
the court’s failure to provide any explanation for denying RTC’s
renewed motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees. “Although an
award of attorney’s fees, like an award of costs, is committed to
the discretion of the trial court and can only be reversed for an
7
We are not sure what to make of the district court’s
notation that its denial of RTC’s renewed motion for sanction and
attorney’s fees was “[i]n accordance with the directions of” this
Court.
8
For example, it is conceivable that the district court
could have determined on remand that our decision in RTC I
significantly undermined the justification for § 1927 sanctions.
After all, we have explained that a finding of “unreasonable” and
“vexatious” multiplicative proceedings necessitates “evidence of
bad faith, improper motive, or reckless disregard of the duty
owed to the court.” Mercury Air Group, 237 F.3d at 549 (quoting
Edwards v. General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir.
1998)).
6
abuse of discretion, the trial court must give reasons for its
decisions regarding attorney’s fees; otherwise, we cannot exercise
meaningful review.”9
The district court’s denial of RTC’s renewed motion for
sanctions without giving any explanation whatsoever is reversible
error. Under normal circumstances, we would reverse and remand for
more detailed findings and a fuller explanation of the district
court’s ruling. Tragically, though, the district judge who
presided over this action passed away shortly after the parties
filed their notices of appeal in RTC II. Thus, were we again to
remand the sanctions issue to the district court, any judge who
would draw the assignment would have no first-hand knowledge of the
behavior at issue and, like us, would have to consider the motion
afresh on the basis of the cold record. Given the history of this
litigation, we have no doubt that a third panel of this court would
then be required to confront yet another appeal (or cross-appeals)
containing myriad assertions of error, regardless of the district
court’s ruling.
Under these circumstances, we are no less capable of engaging
in such a record review than would be a newly assigned district
judge. The peculiar posture of this case has led us to eschew
another remand and instead to conduct our own independent review of
9
Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 133 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted). See also Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella &
Co., Inc., 278 F.3d 472, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2002).
7
the history of this action as reflected by the record on appeal.
Having done this as carefully as practicable, we are led to the
analysis and rulings that follow.
C. RTC’S APPEAL: § 1927 SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DANDARS
Section 1927 of the Judicial Code authorizes the imposition of
sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees and costs against an
attorney who engages in improper litigation conduct:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof
who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court
to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and
attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.10
“Underlying the sanctions provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is the
recognition that frivolous appeals and arguments waste scarce
judicial resources and increase legal fees charged to parties.”11
The Supreme Court has observed that Ҥ 1927 does not distinguish
between winners and losers or between plaintiffs and defendants.
The statute is indifferent to the equities of a dispute and to the
values advanced by the substantive law.”12 As explained by the
Fourth Circuit, the statute is designed to curb litigation abuses
by counsel, irrespective of the merits of the client’s claim:
10
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
11
Baulch v. Johns, 70 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 1995).
12
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762, 100 S.
Ct. 2455, 2462 (1980). See also DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499,
511 (4th Cir. 1999).
8
[A]n attorney who files a meritorious claim and wins a
substantial verdict may still be assessed sanctions under
§ 1927 if, during the case, he “multiplies the
proceedings ... unreasonably and vexatiously.” Likewise,
an attorney who files a meritless claim may not be
sanctioned under § 1927 if he does not engage in such
conduct. Section 1927 focuses on the conduct of the
litigation and not on its merits.13
We nevertheless remain mindful that § 1927 sanctions are
“penal in nature, and in order not to dampen the legitimate zeal of
an attorney in representing his client, § 1927 is strictly
construed.”14 Therefore, sanctions against the Dandars are
justified only if their conduct was both “unreasonable” and
“vexatious”; and even then, counsel may be ordered to pay
personally only the “excess” costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees
generated by their conduct.
1. The Dandars Filed Numerous Motions Containing
Frivolous and Redundant Arguments
In its first order on the § 1927 issue, the district court
found that “a significant portion of the number of hours spent by
Plaintiff’s counsel on this simple breach of contract case was due
to the repeated, frivolous arguments made by [the Dandars] in
needless and pointless motions.” The record supports this
conclusion: The Estate, through pleadings signed by the Dandars,
repeatedly filed motions that reiterated many of the same
assertions and arguments. The record makes clear that the Estate
13
DeBauche, 191 F.3d at 511.
14
Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp., 38 F.3d 1414, 1416
(5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
9
frequently rehashed previously-rejected arguments, and that the
court issued several cautionary rebukes before imposing sanctions.
For example, in ruling against the Estate on one motion, the
district court remarked, “Defendant reargues several issues of law
on which the Court has previously ruled and provides no authority
which requires a revisit of those issues.” The Dandars took no
heed. In another instance, the district court stated that “[t]he
Court has addressed Defendant’s arguments in its previous rulings.
Defendant presents no new arguments or newly discovered evidence
showing the need to correct manifest errors of law or fact.”
It is expected and required that an attorney preserve error
and represent his client vigorously. And it is certainly true that
courts sometimes make legal and factual mistakes, which is what the
appellate process corrects, as illustrated in RTC I by our reversal
of the district court on the issue of personal jurisdiction. But
attorneys do a disservice to their clients as well as to the court
and the judicial system when they repeatedly file essentially
identical motions that do little more than waste their opponent’s
and the courts’ time and resources. Such tactics overburden the
courts and frustrate the administration of justice; they simply
will not be tolerated.
We can never know precisely what motivated the Dandars to
pursue such contumacious tactics.15 In any event, the Dandars’
15
Perhaps the Dandars believed that their motion practice
was the only way to confront RTC, an affiliate of the Church of
10
continued engagement in improper motion practice after repeated
warnings by the district court was “reckless disregard” of the duty
they owed to the court.16 Such conduct is unreasonable and
vexatious beyond cavil, and therefore warrants § 1927 sanctions.
2. The Proper Amount of the Sanctions
In determining the appropriate quantum of sanctions against
the Dandars, the district court made the important observation that
RTC itself was not blameless in this respect. The court also
concluded that the three law firms representing RTC billed hours
that were excessive:
There was no need to have three law firms duplicating
work on a simple case wherein the court found the
liability issue on summary judgment for [RTC] before
trial. Numerous, overly zealous arguments were advanced
by [RTC] in needlessly voluminous fashion in response to
weak, frivolous, and brief motions of [the Estate]. Also
it appears there was much billing for conferences between
attorneys at different firms, rereading of pleadings by
three different sets of lawyers, and some needless
duplication.
Our review of the record confirms the accuracy of this finding.
Because of the district judge’s ensuing death, we are at a
disadvantage in setting the amount of the sanction with the
precision that could have been accorded by the judge who observed
the sanctionable conduct of the Dandars first-hand.
Scientology, which has acquired a “reputation for extremely
aggressive litigation tactics.” J.P. Kumar, “Fair Game”:
Leveling the Playing Field in Scientology Litigation, 16 REV.
LITIG. 747, 747-48 (1997). It goes without saying, though, that
this is no excuse for counsel’s behavior.
16
Mercury Air Group, 237 F.3d at 549.
11
The principal fact issue in § 1927 cases——the state of
mind of the offender——may perhaps best be described as a
mixed question of law and fact. It is one which “is
informed by the district court’s intimate familiarity
with the case, parties, and counsel, a familiarity [that
an appellate court] cannot have. Such a determination
deserves substantial deference from a reviewing court.”17
Nevertheless, we have audited RTC’s counsel’s billing records
and supporting documentation, which comprise nearly 500 pages in
the record on appeal, and we conclude that the Dandars should be
ordered personally to pay $27,304.50, being one-twelfth (or 8.33%)
of RTC’s total amount of attorney’s fees that the district court
had determined to be reasonable.18
Our admittedly-imprecise sanction is grounded in our estimate
that at least one-sixth of the hours expended by RTC’s lawyers was
the “excess” product of sanctionable conduct by the Dandars. Under
the facts of this case, though, we cut this amount in half for two
reasons. First and most importantly, we must account for RTC’s own
blameworthiness in multiplying the proceedings here. Second,
although RTC’s legal basis for suing in Texas —— the Estate’s
representative residing there —— was not a legal position taken in
bad faith,19 RTC’s tactical decision to file this suit in Texas made
little practical sense. Because Florida was geographically the
17
Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc.,
210 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.12 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting O’Connell v.
Champion Int’l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987)).
18
We agree with the district court’s calculation of
$327,654 as a reasonable lodestar.
19
See RTC I, 339 F.3d at 374-76.
12
true locus of this dispute, RTC appreciably increased both parties’
costs of litigation and wasted judicial resources by suing in
Texas. Thus, we do not penalize RTC for advancing that which, in
RTC I, proved to be a losing theory of personal jurisdiction. We
decline, though, to reimburse attorney’s fees that RTC would not
have incurred if its counsel had filed suit in Florida, the most
logical and convenient forum and one with obvious jurisdiction.
In sum, even though in RTC I the Estate might have ultimately
prevailed, we still cannot condone and reward the Dandars’ grossly
excessive multiplication of the district court proceedings. Our
sanction reflects what is probably a conservative estimate of the
net “excess” attorney’s fees generated by the Dandars’ conduct.20
D. THE ESTATE’S CROSS-APPEAL
For its part, the Estate advances four issues on appeal. None
has merit.
1. Attorney’s Fees and Costs under the
Contractual Fee-Shifting Provision
The only non-frivolous point advanced by the Estate on appeal
is its contention that the district court erroneously denied its
motion for attorney’s fees and costs under the fee-shifting term of
20
Although we sit in the shoes of a district court as we
render our decision today, under the circumstances, we simply
cannot bring to this case the perspective of a district judge who
presides over a case from start to finish. For that reason, we
have not designated this opinion for publication, and we caution
district courts from relying on this decision’s methodology in
the future for the imposition of § 1927 sanctions.
13
the contract that underlies this litigation. This provision states
that, “[i]n the event of a breach of this agreement, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.” The
contract also provides that it “shall be construed in accordance
with Florida law.”
The Estate contends that our ruling in RTC I, concluding that
personal jurisdiction over the Estate was wanting, renders the
Estate the “prevailing party” and thus entitles it to attorney’s
fees and costs under the contract. The Estate relies on state
court decisions from Florida which hold generally that if
attorney’s fees are provided for by statute or by the parties’
contract, such fees are properly awarded after a voluntary
dismissal of the case.21 These cases cannot carry the day for the
Estate for the obvious reason that RTC did not voluntarily dismiss
the case: Our judgment in RTC I did that.
The Estate is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees for
a more rudimentary reason: The plain language of the contract’s
fee-shifting provision limits the award of attorney’s fees and
costs to breaches of that agreement. Under Florida law, agreements
21
Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914,
919 (Fla. 1990); Landry v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 731 So.
2d 137, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Prescott v. Anthony, 803
So. 2d 835, 836-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Ajax Paving
Indus., Inc. v. Hardaway Co., 824 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
14
providing for the award of attorney’s fees are strictly construed.22
Before there can be an award of attorney’s fees and costs, there
must be a determination that the contract was breached. After RTC
I’s vacature, no such determination exists. For this reason, the
Estate is foreclosed from seeking attorney’s fees and costs under
the contract.
2. Costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1919The Estate next asserts that it was improperly denied costs
under 28 U.S.C. § 1919.23 Section 1919 permits district courts to
order the payment of “just costs” when an action or suit is
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There is nothing in § 1919,
however, that requires such an award: Orders under this statute are
purely permissive.24 In light of the conduct of the Estate’s
22
See Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, Employers Svc. Corp., 277
So. 2d 265, 266 (Fla. 1973); Ohio Realty Inv. Corp. v. So. Bank
of West Palm Beach, 300 So. 2d 679, 682-83 (Fla. 1974); Venetian
Cove Club, Inc. v. Venetian Bay Developers, Inc., 411 So. 2d
1323, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). See also Sholkoff v. Boca
Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 693 So. 2d 1114, 1117-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (explaining that “perhaps it is more accurate to say
that the rule is that if an agreement for one party to pay
another party’s attorney’s fees is to be enforced it must
unambiguously state that intention and clearly identify the
matter in which the attorney’s fees are recoverable”).
23
28 U.S.C. § 1919 (2000) (“Whenever any action or suit is
dismissed in any district court, the Court of International
Trade, or the Court of Federal Claims for want of jurisdiction,
such court may order the payment of just costs.”).
24
Miles v. California, 320 F.3d 986, 988 n.2 (9th Cir.
2003). This follows from the plain text of the statute, which
states that a court “may order the payment of just costs.” 28
U.S.C. § 1919 (emphasis added).
15
counsel described above, we cannot conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in denying the Estate costs under § 1919.
3. The Estate’s Appellate Costs from RTC I
As part of our mandate in RTC I, we ordered that “the costs on
appeal are to be taxed against” RTC.25 The Estate, however, failed
timely to file its bill of costs as required by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 39(d)(1). As a result, the district court on
remand denied the Estate its costs incurred in RTC I, a decision
the Estate now appeals. The Estate’s attempt on appeal to lay the
blame for its own failings at the doorstep of the district court is
pure sophistry.26 The district court committed no reversible error
in denying appellate costs to the Estate.
4. The Estate’s Motion for Sanctions
Lastly, the Estate contends that the district court should
have sanctioned RTC and its counsel under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, § 1927, and a Florida frivolous litigation statute.27
The essence of the Estate’s argument is that RTC I demonstrated
25
See FED. R. APP. P. 39.
26
On appeal, the Estate failed even to mention that its
costs were denied for failure to file its bill of costs on time.
We disapprove of this lack of candor with the Court. See United
States v. City of Jackson, 359 F.3d 727, 732 n.9 (5th Cir. 2004)
(reminding counsel that they are expected to bring directly
before the Court all those conditions and circumstances relevant
to a given case).
27
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West 2004). See generally
Visoly v. Security Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So. 2d 482, 490-91
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (construing § 57.105).
16
conclusively that RTC’s breach of contract claim was baseless. As
such, argues the Estate, RTC and its counsel should be sanctioned
and required to pay the Estate’s attorney’s fees and costs.
We recognize that the district court failure to provide any
explanation for its denial of the Estate’s post-remand motion for
sanctions was an abuse of discretion.28 We need not, however,
belabor consideration of the merits of that motion here. Just
because the Estate prevailed on appeal on jurisdictional grounds
does not mean that RTC’s conduct in bringing the claim was
sanctionable under Rule 11 or otherwise.29 Lack of personal
jurisdiction is not synonymous with lack of a substantive basis for
a claim. We have already acknowledged that RTC (and its counsel)
do not have clean hands; they, too, improperly multiplied the
proceedings. As we have explained, though, the sanctions imposed
against the Dandars has been reduced concomitantly to the extent
that we have judged RTC to have engaged in conduct which
unnecessarily multiplied the proceedings. The district court’s
28
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
29
The Estate’s reliance on Fla. Stat. § 57.105 is feckless.
“Because section 57.105 is patterned after Federal Rule 11,”
Florida courts “construe it as its prototype has been construed
in federal courts, insofar as such construction is harmonious
with the spirit and policy of Florida legislation on the
subject.” Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003). In this case, § 57.105 sanctions would be
inappropriate for the same reasons that Rule 11 sanctions are
unwarranted.
17
denial of the Estate’s post-remand motion for sanctions is
affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
By failing to articulate the reasons for its ruling, the
district court abused its discretion when it denied RTC’s renewed
motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees following our remand in
RTC I. Under the unusual posture of this case, though, we decline
to remand this case only to have it assigned to another district
judge who, like us, would be compelled to examine a cold record
from scratch so as to calculate the proper quantum of sanctions.
Instead, we have conducted our own thorough examination of the
district court record and of the parties’ contentions on appeal.
Based on this review, we reverse the district court’s ruling and
render an award of $27,304.50 in favor of RTC as a sanction of the
Dandars for their unreasonable and vexatious litigation conduct in
derogation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.30 All other rulings of the district
court are affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and RENDERED.
30
This sanction is assessed against Thomas Dandar, Kennan
Dandar, and their law firm of Dandar & Dandar, P.A., jointly and
severally.
18