Drake v. City of Haltom City , 106 F. App'x 897 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 10, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10594
LAKENYA S DRAKE
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
CITY OF HALTOM CITY; ET AL
Defendants
CITY OF HALTOM CITY
Defendant - Appellee
No. 03-10595
JANE DOE 2
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
CITY OF HALTOM CITY; ET AL
Defendants
CITY OF HALTOM CITY
Defendant - Appellee
1
No. 03-10598
ATARA MARIE HUBBARD
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
CITY OF HALTOM CITY; ET AL
Defendants
CITY OF HALTOM CITY
Defendant - Appellee
No. 03-10632
PATRICIA LYNN SANDERS
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
CITY OF HALTOM CITY, ET AL
Defendants
CITY OF HALTOM CITY
Defendant - Appellee
No. 03-10636
JANE DOE #7
Plaintiff - Appellant
2
v.
CITY OF HALTOM CITY, ET AL
Defendants
CITY OF HALTOM CITY
Defendant - Appellee
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
No. 4:02-CV-0733-A
No. 4:02-CV-0767-A
No. 4:02-CV-0768-A
No. 4:02-CV-0769-A
No. 4:02-CV-0899-A
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
LaKenya Drake, Jane Doe No. 2, Atara Hubbard, Patricia
Sanders, and Jane Doe No. 7 (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal
the district court’s orders dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims against the City of Haltom City and the district court’s
orders denying their motions for leave to file amended
complaints. Their existing complaints allege that the City’s
failure to institute adequate training and/or supervision of its
jailers caused one of the jailers to sexually assault them while
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
3
they were in the City jail.1
We review de novo dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6). Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999). We
note that motions to dismiss are disfavored and are rarely
granted. Id. Dismissal should not be granted “‘unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Id.
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
The City argues that the district court correctly dismissed
Appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because Appellants failed
to allege a “non-conclusory” ground for holding the City liable
for their injuries. First, we disagree that Appellants’
allegations are “conclusory”; their complaints meet Rule 8’s
requirement of a “short and plain statement of the claim” and the
complaints gave the City fair notice of the Appellants’ claims
and the grounds upon which their claims rest. FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)
(quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). Second, although the City is
correct that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on
a theory of respondeat superior, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), both the Supreme Court and this court
1
Appellants’ complaints contained a number of other
allegations against the City. Appellants have not appealed the
district court’s decisions to dismiss these claims, however.
4
have recognized that a municipality is subject to § 1983
liability when the municipality’s policies regarding employee
training and/or supervision were obviously inadequate, and the
resulting lack of training and/or supervision was likely to (and
actually did) lead to a constitutional violation. E.g., City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Brown v. Bryan County, 219
F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000).2
The City cites Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir.
1998), for the proposition that sexual assault of detainees is
not an obvious consequence of a City’s failure to train or to
supervise its jailers. Barney, however, was decided on a motion
for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss, and the summary-
judgment record in Barney showed that the jailer who committed
the assaults had received instruction on “offenders’ rights,
staff/inmate relations, sexual harassment, and cross-gender
search and supervision.” Id. at 1308. We are unwilling to say,
at this point, that it is not obvious that male jailers who
receive no training and who are left virtually unsupervised might
abuse female detainees. Thus, we hold that Appellants have
2
We agree with the City that Appellants’ other theories
of municipal liability are inadequate. The City cannot be liable
for its single decision not to train or to supervise the jailer
who perpetrated the sexual assault because Appellants did not
allege that there was anything special about that jailer that
should have put the City on notice of a particular need to train
or to supervise him. Cf. Brown, 219 F.3d at 458-60.
Furthermore, a theory of “ratification” is inapplicable on the
facts of this case. Cf. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion).
5
stated cognizable claims against the City under § 1983.3
We conclude, however, that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Appellants’ motions for leave to file
amended complaints. The district court has already permitted
Appellants to file amended complaints, and most were permitted to
file three amended complaints. Furthermore, Appellants did not
seek leave to file their amended complaints in a timely manner.
See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also McLean v.
Int’l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1224 (5th Cir. 1987).
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s orders
dismissing Appellants’ § 1983 claims against the City for failing
to train or to supervise its jailers, AFFIRM the district court’s
orders denying Appellants’ motions for leave to amend, and REMAND
each of these cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
3
We express no opinion regarding who the City’s final
policymakers are. The district court should decide this question
in the first instance.
6