United States v. Patton ( 2001 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-10132
    Conference Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JOEL DARNELL PATTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 6:00-CR-29-1-C
    --------------------
    June 15, 2001
    Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Joel Darnell Patton appeals from his guilty-plea conviction
    and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm.      See
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1).
    Patton challenges his sentence by arguing that his 210-month
    sentence is illegal because the indictment failed to charge an
    offense pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1); the indictment charged
    only an offense pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1), for which
    punishment is limited to ten years’ imprisonment.    He contends
    that 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) is a separate offense from 18 U.S.C.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 01-10132
    -2-
    § 922(g)(1).     Patton acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed
    by the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United
    States, 
    523 U.S. 224
     (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue
    for Supreme Court review in light of the decision in Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000).
    Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres.       See Apprendi,
    
    530 U.S. at 489-90
    ; United States v. Dabeit, 
    231 F.3d 979
    , 984
    (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 1214
     (2001).      Patton’s
    argument is foreclosed.
    For the first time on appeal, Patton challenges the
    constitutionality of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).      Patton argues that
    the statute is beyond the bounds of the Commerce Clause under
    which Congress has authority to enact federal criminal law.         He
    notes that this court has decided the issue against him in United
    States v. Kuban, 
    94 F.3d 971
    , 973 (5th Cir. 1996), and United
    States v. Rawls, 
    85 F.3d 240
    , 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996).      However,
    he asserts that the recent analysis by the Supreme Court in Jones
    v. United States, 
    529 U.S. 848
    , 852-59 (2000), and in United
    States v. Morrison, 
    529 U.S. 598
    , 607-17 (2000), should compel
    this court to reconsider its holdings in Kuban and Rawls.          Under
    the plain error standard, Patton fails to carry his burden in
    demonstrating clear or obvious error.       See United States v.
    Jackson, 
    220 F.3d 635
    , 636 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, (U.S.
    Apr. 16, 2001) (No. 00-9006); United States v. Calverley, 
    37 F.3d 160
    , 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
    AFFIRMED.