United States v. Skelton ( 2001 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 00-20268
    _____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    MARK R SKELTON
    Defendant - Appellant
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-97-CR-169-1
    _________________________________________________________________
    April 4, 2001
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and JONES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The district court did not err in refusing to reconsider the
    four-level upward adjustment under the Sentencing Guidelines of
    the sentence of Defendant-Appellant Mark R. Skelton.        See U.S.
    SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(b)(7)(A) (1998).   This court’s
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
    47.5.4.
    opinion in Skelton’s initial appeal limited the district court on
    resentencing to recalculation of the special assessment and the
    amount of restitution.    “[T]he resentencing court can consider
    whatever this court directs – no more, no less.    All other issues
    not arising out of this court’s ruling and not raised before the
    appeals court, which could have been brought in the original
    appeal, are not proper for reconsideration by the district court
    below.”    United States v. Marmolejo, 
    139 F.3d 528
    , 531 (5th Cir.
    1998).    We are not persuaded that Skelton could not have raised
    in his initial appeal the issue of whether affirmance of his
    conviction on less than all counts required reconsideration of
    the determination that Skelton’s offense substantially
    jeopardized the soundness of Westheimer Bank.
    Skelton’s further argument that, under the Supreme Court’s
    decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    (2000), facts
    affecting his sentence were required to have been proved to a
    jury beyond a reasonable doubt is foreclosed by this court’s
    opinions in United States v. Keith, 
    230 F.3d 784
    , 787 (5th Cir.
    2000) (stating that Apprendi is “limited to facts which increase
    the penalty beyond the statutory maximum, and does not invalidate
    a court’s factual finding for the purposes of determining the
    applicable Sentencing Guidelines”), and United States v. Meshack,
    
    225 F.3d 556
    , 576-77 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 834
    (2001), amended on reh’g in part, --- F.3d ----, 
    2001 WL 224656
    (2001).
    2
    Skelton’s sentence is therefore AFFIRMED.
    3