Krause v. Merk-Medco RX Svcs ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-10286
Summary Calendar
_____________________
CHERYL L. KRAUSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MERCK-MEDCO RX SERVICES OF TEXAS, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(4:98-CV-220)
_________________________________________________________________
October 5, 1999
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
E. Grady Jolly:*
Cheryl L. Krause appeals the district court’s granting of a
summary judgement in favor of her former employer Merck-Medco Rx
Services of Texas (“Merck”). Krause alleges that Merck terminated
her employment because she suffered from a mental impairment known
as bipolar disorder. Such a mental impairment, she alleges, limits
one or more major life activities, and thus falls within the ambit
of the Americans with Disability Act. The district court held that
Krause failed to demonstrate that she has an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. Finding that Krause
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
has failed to allege any facts sufficient to show that the bipolar
disorder has limited a major life activity, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
A
We review the district court’s granting of a summary judgment
de novo, applying the same legal standard as did the district
court. Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment is proper when the record establishes that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A
dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When determining
whether or not a dispute is genuine, the court will view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
B
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether Krause qualifies as
a person with a disability under the Americans with Disability Act
(“ADA”). The ADA is a federal anti-discrimination statute designed
to remove barriers that prevents qualified individuals with
disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that
are available to persons without disabilities. Taylor v. Principal
Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 1996), citing 29
C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1995). The ADA expansively prohibits
2
discrimination in employment against persons with a disability,
providing that: “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 1211(a). The term
“disability” is defined as: (a) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits1 one or more of the major life activities2
of such individual; (b) a record of such impairment; or (c) being
regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Merck contends, and the district court held, that Krause does
not have a legally cognizable “disability” under the ADA. Merck
points to the deposition testimony of Krause, and to case law in
support of its contention. During the course of her deposition,
Krause admitted that she can walk, see, hear, breath, learn, and
1
"Substantially limits” generally means: (1)unable to perform
a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or (2) significantly restricted as to the
condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can
perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average persons in
the general population can perform the same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(1995), see also Pryor v. Trane Co., 138
F.3d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1998).
2
”Major life activities” are defined as: “functions such as
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(i); see also, Dupre v. Harris County Hospital Dist., 8
F. Supp. 2d 908, 917 (S.D.Tex. 1998).
3
perform manual tasks.3 She admitted that her bipolar disorder does
not prevent her from working, and there is no particular kind of
job or class of jobs, that she is unable to perform because of her
disability.4 Further, she testified that she has worked her entire
adult life with no impairment, and that she began working in
3
During the course of Krause’s deposition, she made the
following admissions:
Q. And obviously you can care for yourself, physically
care for yourself just fine?
A. Yes.
Q. And you can perform manual tasks just fine?
A. Manual tasks can include periods of episodes.
Q. Can you walk?
A. Yes.
Q. You can see?
A. Yes.
Q. You can hear?
A. Yes.
Q. You can speak?
A. Yes.
Q. You can breathe?
A. Yes.
Q. And you can learn as well as someone with your skills and
education?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. When I say manual tasks, I mean you could
open the door, you could move that chair back, you can
perform manual tasks, you could sweep the floor, you
could drive a car, those kinds of tasks. You can perform
those kinds of tasks, can you not?
A. Yes.
4
During deposition, Krause admitted that there were no jobs or
classes of jobs that she could not perform:
Q. So its fair to say, isn’t that your bipolar condition
does not prevent you from working?
A. No, it doesn’t prevent me from working.
Q. And is there-is there any kind of job or class of job
which you feel like you are unable to do because of your
bipolar condition?
A. No.
4
excess of forty hours a week as an independent contractor for
another company two months after her termination from Merck.5
Additionally, Merck points to the one case within the our
circuit to address directly a plaintiff’s claim that she is
disabled under the ADA as a result of her bipolar condition. Dupre
v. Harris County Hospital District, 8 F. Supp. 2d 908 (S.D.Tex.
1998). In Dupre, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
the employer, holding that the plaintiff did not qualify as a
person with a disability under the ADA because of her bipolar
condition. Id. at 928. The court noted that Dupre’s disability
did not prevent her from caring for herself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, or learning. The
court concluded by stating:
[I]t is apparent that [Dupre’s] disability does not
preclude her from working or from continuing to work in
her chosen profession . . . [thus] Dupre has failed to
adduce summary judgment evidence that she has a record of
having an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity.
Id. at 918.
5
During deposition, Krause made the following admissions:
Q. So you haven’t had to take off any work from DSI
(Krause’s current employer) because of your bipolar
condition?
A. I guess not.
Q Well, you’ve worked, I take it your entire adult life
it sounds like?
A. Mostly, yes.
5
After a careful review of the facts and the authority cited by
the parties,6 we hold that Krause has failed to adduce probative
summary judgment evidence that her bipolar condition substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities. Furthermore, as
the district court correctly noted, she concedes that her condition
does not preclude her from working an entire class of jobs, or
broad range of jobs. See Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1998)(stating a disability does
not substantially limit a major life activity if the plaintiff is
able to perform a class or broad range of jobs). While it is true
that Krause’s bipolar condition may cause her some difficulty, and
may restrict her capacity to perform some daily tasks, in the light
of her own deposition testimony; she has failed to show that her
impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Thus,
Krause’s bipolar condition does not fall within the scope term
“disability” as defined by the ADA.7
6
Krause asserts that every appellate court which has
considered the question of whether bipolar disorder is a mental
disability covered under the ADA has answered in the affirmative.
After a review of the cases that Krause cites in support of her
position, it is clear that her reading of those cases was
erroneous, that the extent to which the disorder affected the
plaintiffs in those cases differed substantially from the effect
the disorder has had on her own life, or that the decision has been
vacated. See Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir.
1997), Taylor v. Phoenixville School District, __ F.3d __, 1999 WL
184138 (3rd Cir. 1999), Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d
310 (8th Cir. 1997), Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 100
F.3d 1281 (7th Cir. 1996), Taylor v. Principal Financial Group,
Inc., 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996).
7
In holding that Krause’s bipolar condition does not rise to
6
C
In conclusion, we hold that Krause’s condition does not rise
to the level of a disability covered under the ADA. As such, the
judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor
of the defendant is
A F F I R M E D.
the level of a disability covered under the ADA, the court is not
foreclosing the possibility that in a different circumstance the
affects of a bipolar disorder may be so severe as to substantially
limit a major life activity. See Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1081 (stating
whether or not bipolar disorder is covered by the definition of
“disability” depends on the severity of the disorder in each
individual case). As such, the court’s decision is limited to the
specific facts of this case.
7