United States v. Mackay ( 1994 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 93-1406
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMIE REAY MACKAY,
a/k/a/ Kevin Neil Carpenter,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
__________________________________________________
(September 20, 1994)
Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Jamie R. Mackay ("Mackay") appeals his conviction
for (1) conspiracy to transport stolen goods interstate, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988); and (2) knowing transportation
of stolen goods interstate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314
(1988). We reverse Mackay's conviction on the conspiracy count for
lack of sufficient evidence and affirm his conviction for
interstate transportation of stolen goods.
I
In early June of 1991, Mackay transported a 580 Super E
backhoe from Missouri to Dallas, where he hoped to sell it for
$16,500. Before arriving in Dallas, he called a former college
roommate who lived in East Dallas named Daniel Lyon and asked if he
knew anyone who might be interested in buying the backhoe. He then
called again a few days later to ask if he could use the Lyons'
phone number for a classified advertisement he planned to run in a
Dallas newspaper. When Lyons told Mackay that he did not think it
would be a good idea to use their number (because his wife was in
the midst of a difficult pregnancy), Mackay revealed that he had in
fact already placed the advertisement in the Dallas Morning News
earlier that day.
Mackay arrived in Dallas in a pickup truck with the backhoe on
a trailer and called Lyons, who met him at a fast-food restaurant.
Mackay was accompanied by a man whom he introduced as "Kevin."
Lyons asked Mackay if he owned the backhoe, and Mackay told him he
did. Lyons then led Mackay and "Kevin" from the restaurant to the
Lyons' home. Mackay and his companion later left to find a motel
and a storage area for the backhoe.
Two days later, Mackay called the Shurgard Storage Center in
Irving, Texas to inquire about renting space for his backhoe and
trailer. Mackay and an unidentified man arrived at the storage
facility about an hour later with the backhoe. The two men
unhitched the trailer and parked the backhoe and trailer in two
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separate spaces. They then went to the office to complete the
necessary paperwork, and Mackay leased the spaces under the name
"Kevin Carpenter," presenting a Florida driver's license as
identification.
Mackay also asked the rental facility manager to let people in
to see the backhoe. The manager agreed, provided they came during
business hours and Mackay called to notify him first. Pursuant to
their agreement, Mackay called a couple of times, and the manager
allowed people to see the backhoe.
Tony Foreman, a used construction equipment dealer, was among
the prospective buyers who came to see the backhoe. The
circumstances of the backhoe's sale and his inspection of the
backhoe's identification number plates led Foreman to believe the
backhoe was stolen, so he called Bruce Tabor, a lieutenant with the
Texas Department of Public Safety Motor Vehicle Theft Service.
Tabor traced the backhoe's identification numbers to Bill Cole in
Missouri.1 Tabor called Cole, who told him he still owned the
1
The evidence at trial showed that in March of that year, Jamie Mackay
and Michael Duncan had visited a man named Bill Cole at a jobsite in Springfield,
Missouri. Duncan inquired about buying some construction equipment, but Cole did
not have any for sale. Cole did, however, have a truck for sale at his home in
Fleistatt, and he took the two men to see it. While there, Mackay and Duncan
expressed an interest in Cole's skiploader and 580 Super E backhoe. At one
point, Cole left Mackay and Duncan alone with the equipment while he took a phone
call. When he returned, Duncan negotiated with Cole to buy the truck.
Almost a year after this meeting, Cole met Mackay and Duncan on a
highway in Missouri. Duncan told Cole he could not buy Cole's truck because he
was in some trouble with the law and mentioned that they were on their way to
Dallas for court. Duncan and Mackay also said, "If the authorities call you,
don't tell them anything." Cole responded, "I don't know anything to tell them."
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backhoe, but that it should have been on a jobsite in Tennessee.2
Based on his conversation with Cole, Tabor impounded the
backhoe. He also called the number listed in Mackay's classified
ad. The woman who answered gave him a telephone number and
extension for "Jamie," which a dispatcher then traced to Mackay's
motel. When Tabor went to the motel room, he discovered that the
occupants of the room had already checked out. In the room's trash
can, he found a room receipt for "Kevin Carpenter, 328 North Cedar
in Nevada, Missouri."
About this time, Mackay called Lyons to inquire whether anyone
had called about the backhoe. During this conversation, Mackay
told Lyons the backhoe was missing, saying: "It's gone and just
don't say any more about [it]." Mackay also said, "Yeah,
somebody's playing games with us down here."
Several days later, Cole called Tabor and told him that he had
located his backhoe and that the identification plates were intact.
The police then investigated the impounded backhoe more closely and
discovered the original identification numbers, which they traced
to Lester Marlatt. Marlatt's 580 Super E backhoe had been stolen
from Raytown, Missouri two months earlier.
Mackay was indicted for conspiracy to transport stolen goods
interstate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and knowing
transportation of stolen goods interstate, in violation of 18
2
At trial, Cole denied telling anyone the backhoe was in Tennessee and
testified that in fact the backhoe was in Cassville, Missouri.
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U.S.C. § 2314. Following a jury trial, Mackay was convicted on
both counts. The district court sentenced him to a term of
imprisonment of 21 months and two concurrent 3-year terms of
supervised release.
Mackay appeals his conviction, contending that (1) the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy
to transport stolen goods; (2) the prosecutor impermissibly
commented in his closing argument on Mackay's failure to testify;
and (3) the district court erred in assessing a two-level increase
in Mackay's sentence for being "a person in the business of
receiving and selling stolen property."3
II
A
Mackay challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
his conviction for conspiracy to transport the stolen backhoe. He
claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove an
agreement by two or more individuals to knowingly transport stolen
goods interstate. We view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the jury verdict and will affirm if a rational trier of fact
could find that the Government proved all essential elements of the
3
Mackay also argued in his original brief that his convictions should
be reversed because the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the
definition of reasonable doubt. As Mackay acknowledges in his reply brief to
this Court, we have recently affirmed in all relevant respects the same
definition of reasonable doubt on which the district court instructed the jury
in this case. See United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125 (5th Cir. 1994).
Consequently, Mackay has preserved this issue for further appeal, but we see no
need to address it further here.
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Castro, 15
F.3d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1994). If, on the other hand, "the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution
gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of
guilt and a theory of innocence, the conviction should be
reversed." United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir.
1994).
"A conviction for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 requires
that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt 1) an agreement
between two or more persons, 2) to commit a crime against the
United States, and 3) an overt act committed by one of the
conspirators in furtherance of the agreement." United States v.
Schmick, 904 F.2d 936, 941 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067, 111 S. Ct. 782, 112 L. Ed. 2d 845
(1991). "The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant knew of the conspiracy and that he voluntarily became
a part of it." United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S. Ct. 3258, 50 L. Ed. 2d
292 (1989). While the government may prove the existence of a
conspiracy through circumstantial evidence, and the agreement need
not be formal or spoken, United States v. Williams-Hendricks, 805
F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 1986), it "must do more than ``pile
inference upon inference upon which to base a conspiracy charge.'"
Id. (quoting United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1063 (5th Cir.
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1981), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Zuniga-Salinas,
952 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1992)).
The record must contain sufficient evidence that Mackay
conspired with someone to transport stolen goods in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2314. A violation of § 2314 requires the prosecution to
show that (1) the defendant transported stolen goods in interstate
commerce; (2) the defendant knew the goods were stolen; and (3) the
goods were worth more than $5,000. See United States v. Parziale,
947 F.2d 123, 127 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112
S. Ct. 1499, 117 L. Ed. 2d. 638 (1992).
The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, fails to support the reasonable inference of even a
tacit agreement between Mackay and anyone else to knowingly
transport the stolen backhoe to Texas. Although Mackay's
conspiracy conviction does not depend on the identification of his
co-conspirators for its validity, see, e.g., United States v. Winn,
948 F.2d 145, 157 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112
S. Ct. 1599, 118 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1992), to convict Mackay of
conspiring with unknown persons, the evidence must support "the
proposition that such a co-conspirator did exist and that the
defendant did conspire with him." United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d
1329, 1332 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Pruett, 551
F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1977)).
The evidence suggests three possible co-conspirators:
Mackay's unidentified companion, Michael Duncan, and Bill Cole.
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The most likely of the three is Mackay's unidentified companion.
The evidence shows that this individual:4 (1) travelled to Texas
with Mackay, (2) was present when Mackay introduced him to the
Lyons as "Kevin," (3) helped unload the backhoe at the storage
facility, and (4) was present in the room when Mackay used a false
driver's license to rent storage space under the alias "Kevin
Carpenter." These facts establish an association between Mackay
and his companion during their trip to Texas, but to sustain a
conspiracy conviction, they must also prove an agreement to commit
a crime. See United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th
Cir.) ("[O]ne does not become a coconspirator simply by virtue of
knowledge of a conspiracy and association with conspirators. The
essence of a conspiracy is the agreement to engage in concerted
unlawful activity." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
956, 101 S. Ct. 363, 66 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1980).
The government argues that the evidence surrounding Mackay's
companion established that he "actually participated in the
transport of the backhoe." However, evidence that the companion
helped transport the backhoe does not prove that he agreed with
Mackay to transport a stolen backhoe. A conspiracy conviction
requires proof of an agreement to commit a crime. See Schmick, 904
F.2d at 941. There is no evidence in the record to support a
4
There is no evidence that each of the unidentified men whom witnesses
observed with Mackay are one and the same person. We assume arguendo, however,
that the jury inferred that Mackay's companion was one person, making the
possibility of an agreement between the two men to commit a crime more likely.
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finding that Mackay's companion knew the backhoe was stolen, let
alone that he agreed to transport a stolen backhoe.
The government further argues that Mackay's use of a false
driver's license in the name of "Kevin Carpenter" in the presence
of his companion was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could
reasonably infer knowledge of criminal activity. We disagree.
This argument requires several prior inferences. First, the jury
must have inferred from the companion's presence in the office that
he knew Mackay used a driver's license bearing the name "Kevin
Carpenter." Second, the jury must have inferred that the companion
knew this name to be false. The jury must then have inferred that
the companion deduced from Mackay's use of an alias that he was
transporting a stolen backhoe. Finally, the jury must have
inferred that the companion joined Mackay to effectuate the crime.
Although the government may prove the existence of a conspiracy
through circumstantial evidence, it "must do more than ``pile
inference upon inference upon which to base a conspiracy charge.'"
Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d at 502; see also United States v.
Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981)
(reversing conviction for conspiracy to import heroin where
evidence showed that defendant knew an individual in Iran whose
telephone number appeared on a package from Iran containing heroin,
visited the man in Iran shortly before the heroin arrived in the
United States, and called the man after learning the heroin had
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arrived in the United States), overruled on other grounds, United
States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1992).
We similarly find insufficient evidence to prove that Michael
Duncan conspired with Mackay. Cole testified that he left Duncan
and Mackay alone in the vicinity of his construction equipment two
months before Mackay's trip to Dallas. Among the equipment that
Duncan and Mackay inspected was Cole's 580 Super E backhoe, the
same model as the stolen backhoe Mackay transported to Texas. The
identification number on Cole's backhoe also coincided with the
number on the stolen backhoe that Mackay transported to Texas.
This evidence is probative that Mackay knowingly transported stolen
goods, but it does not raise an inference that Duncan agreed with
Mackay to transport the stolen backhoe. Even if Mackay did copy
the backhoe's identification numbers on Cole's property that day,
this does not prove Duncan assisted in this enterprise, let alone
that Duncan later agreed to transport another, stolen backhoe
interstate. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support a finding
that Duncan accompanied Mackay to Dallas.
The government emphasizes that when Cole encountered Mackay
and Duncan driving to Dallas they told him (1) not to speak to the
authorities, and (2) that Duncan could not buy Cole's truck because
he was in some trouble with the law. Duncan's trouble with the law
may or may not have been related to this case.5 Again, Duncan's
5
The government notes in its brief that Duncan was not indicted for
conspiracy to transport the backhoe because of a lack of evidence against him.
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mere association with Mackay, without an agreement to commit a
crime against the United States, does not suffice. See Grassi, 616
F.2d at 1301.
Finally, the Government argues that Bill Cole could have
conspired with Mackay. Defense counsel did suggest in her opening
statement at trial that she would show Mackay had an agreement with
Cole to sell the backhoe. The only evidence even remotely
supporting this theory, however, is the testimony of Mackay's
father that his son told him he purchased the backhoe from Cole.
When Cole testified, he made no mention of an agreement with Mackay
and explicitly denied selling Mackay a backhoe. Based on this
evidence, a rational trier of fact could not find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Cole and Mackay agreed to transport a stolen
backhoe interstate. See Castro, 15 F.3d at 419.
B
Mackay next contends that the prosecutor violated Mackay's
Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on Mackay's failure to
testify. The Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from
commenting directly or indirectly on a defendant's failure to
testify. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct.
1229, 1233, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965); United States v. Dula, 989
F.2d 772, 776 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct.
172, 126 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1993). This protection extends to "oblique
comments on a defendant's failure to testify, if sufficiently
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suggestive." United States v. Driscoll, 454 F.2d 792, 800 (5th
Cir. 1972).
"The test for determining whether a prosecutor's remarks
constitute a comment on a defendant's silence is a twofold
alternative one: ``(1) whether the prosecutor's manifest intent was
to comment on the defendant's silence or (2) whether the character
of the remark was such that the jury would naturally and
necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant's silence.'"
United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1406 (5th Cir. 1992)
(quoting United States v. Jones, 648 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir.
1981)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1812, 123 L. Ed. 2d
444 (1993). "Both the intent of the prosecutor and the character
of the remarks are to be determined by reviewing the context in
which they occurred." Jones, 648 F.2d at 218.
"As to the first possibility, the prosecutor's intent must be
``manifest'; in other words, the test is not met ``if some other
explanation for his remark is equally plausible.'" Collins, 972
F.2d at 1406 (quoting United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1249
(5th Cir. 1977)). "As to the second, ``the question is not whether
the jury possibly or even probably would view the challenged remark
in this manner, but whether the jury necessarily would have done
so.'" Collins, 972 F.2d at 1406 (quoting United States v.
Carrodeguas, 747 F.2d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 816, 106 S. Ct. 60, 88 L. Ed. 2d. 49 (1985).
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During his closing, the prosecutor argued as follows:
Well, you know that Mr. Mackay skipped out of town pretty
quick. But he called. He made a telephone call, didn't
he, with this lawyer, curiously enough, from Missouri,
not Dallas. You know he didn't go over to Larry Sandri
or the other FBI people and say, hey, wait a minute, you
guys just took my backhoe. Here's the piece of paper
I've got that I purchased this from. Here's the person.
Call this person. He says I got it from him. You
haven't even heard that today, have you? You haven't
heard that testimony today. Nobody has come here and
said this is where Jamie Mackay got this from. Here's
the piece of paper, folks.
Record on Appeal, vol. 4, at 62 (emphasis added). After the court
overruled defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor continued:
"Here's the piece of paper that shows he purchased it. No. He
calls with his lawyer from Missouri to Billy Davis." Mackay
contends that these remarks "were manifestly intended to comment
upon Mackay's failure to testify and could only be interpreted by
the jury as a comment on Mackay's failure to testify." We
disagree.
Placed in context, the prosecutor's comments do not manifest
an intent to comment on Mackay's failure to testify, and a jury
would not necessarily have construed the remarks to refer to
Mackay's failure to testify. The sentences immediately preceding
the highlighted comments clarify the antecedent of "that" and "that
testimony." Mackay interprets "that" to mean testimony by the
defendant, but as the context of the remarks makes clear, "that"
refers to testimony by "this person." "This person," in turn,
refers to the person who sold Mackay the backhoe.
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Read in context, the prosecutor's remarks simply argue to the
jury that the defense failed to produce evidence, such as a sales
receipt or testimony of the seller, to establish the origin of the
backhoe. "It is not error to comment on the defendant's failure to
produce evidence on a phase of the defense upon which he seeks to
rely." United States v. Dula, 989 F.2d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 172, 126 L. Ed. 2d 131
(1993). Here, the defense theory was that Mackay purchased the
backhoe from Cole,6 and it was not improper for the prosecutor to
point out that the defense offered no direct evidence to prove that
theory. In this respect, this case resembles Dula. The
defendant's theory in Dula was that the questionable activity was
instigated and directed by a rival corporation, and the prosecutor
argued in closing, "There's been nobody on this witness stand that
really knows about what happened between PRC and Accrabond
Corporation." Id. at 776. We explained that "the government's
argument to the jury that ``no one has given you any reasonable
explanation' in response to the defendant's contentions is not
error." Id. at 777. Similarly here, the government's argument
that Mackay failed to produce evidence of the legitimate sale to
6
In her opening statement at trial, defense counsel explained that
"Jamie Mackay entered into an agreement with an individual to sell a backhoe. .
. . Jamie got the backhoe from Bill Cole. The evidence will show that Jamie
carefully checked into the status of the backhoe. He wanted to be sure that it
wasn't hot. He had some problems before. We're going to talk all about that
during trial." Record on Appeal, vol. 3, at 43.
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which defense counsel referred in her opening statement did not
impermissibly comment on Mackay's failure to take the stand.7
C
Finally, Mackay challenges the district court's assessment of
a four-level enhancement under former U.S.S.G. § 2B1.2(b)(4)(A)
(Nov. 1992).8 He contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding that Mackay was "in the business of receiving and
selling stolen property" as required by the guideline. We review
challenges to factual findings under the guidelines for clear
error. See United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir.
1994). The district court may base the findings underlying its
sentence on facts in the record that have been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Castro, 889
F.2d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092, 110 S.
Ct. 1164, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1990).
Mackay argues, and the government agrees, that the enhancement
provision applies only to "fences," i.e. those in the business of
7
Our holding in this case does not mean that if the defense offers a
theory that is unsupported by the evidence, the prosecutor can argue to the jury
that because the defendant failed to testify in support of that theory he must
be guilty. The crucial distinction here is between comments on the failure by
the defense to offer evidence (including testimony of third persons) and the
failure of the defendant to testify. See United States v. Wade, 931 F.2d 300,
305 (5th Cir. 1991) ("It is well settled that, while the ``fifth amendment
prohibits a prosecutor from commenting directly or indirectly on a defendant's
failure to testify,' a ``prosecutor may comment . . . on the failure of the
defense, as opposed to the defendant, to counter or explain the evidence.'")
(quoting United States v. Borchardt, 809 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987)).
8
Section 2B1.2(b)(4)(A) was deleted by consolidation with § 2B1.1
effective November 1, 1993. See Amendment 481, U.S.S.G. App. C at 304-05. The
new provision provides: "If the offense involved receiving stolen property, and
the defendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen
property, increase by 4 levels." U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(5)(B) (Nov. 1993).
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receiving and selling property stolen by others. See United States
v. Esquivel, 919 F.2d 957, 960 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 217, 116 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1991) ("It is because
someone else stole the shoes sold by Esquivel that . . . the
fencing operation falls within the intended purview of the
background to and text of former section 2B1.2(b)(3)(A).")
(emphasis in the original).9 We have also held that an offense
level enhancement under former § 2B1.2(b)(4)(A) does not require a
finding that the defendant previously engaged in fencing
activities. See Esquivel, 919 F.2d at 961 ("We hold that a finding
that a defendant has previously engaged in fencing activities is
not a prerequisite for offense level enhancement under former
sentencing guideline section 2B1.2(b)(3)(A)."). In Esquivel, we
emphasized the sophistication of Esquivel's sales in concluding
that evidence of prior fencing activities was not required. Id. at
960.10 In this case Mackay transported the backhoe to Dallas to
sell it, advertised the sale, and arranged for the goods to be
shown to interested buyers. These activities are sufficient to
9
Former § 2B1.2(b)(3)(A), interpreted in Esquivel, was renumbered as
§ 2B1.2(b)(4)(A), but not substantively changed, effective November 1, 1990. See
Amendment 312, U.S.S.G. App. C at c.167 (Nov. 1990).
10
We also noted that Esquivel's sales were to multiple customers.
Esquivel, 919 F.2d at 960. Esquivel took possession of a shipment of 350 boxes
of sneakers and sold the sneakers by the pair. Selling one lot of stolen
sneakers in small bunches to many customers does not differ in any relevant
respect from selling a large piece of stolen construction machinery to one
customer. Mackay is no less in the business of fencing stolen property than he
would be had he disassembled the backhoe and sold it to various customers as
spare parts to multiple customers.
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support a finding that Mackay was "in the business of" fencing
stolen property.11
Mackay argues that the record does not support a finding that
he sold the backhoe without stealing it himself: "The implication
of the government's case against Mackay was that Mackay himself
stole, or was involved in the theft of, the equipment at issue."
This implication is not sufficient, however, to constitute proof
that Mackay stole the backhoe himself. Although the issue was
contested, there was sufficient evidence on which the district
court could find that Mackay bought the backhoe from Bill Cole,
knowing it to be stolen, before transporting it to Texas.12
The uncertain origin of the backhoe distinguishes this case in
one respect from the two cases on which Mackay primarily relies.
In United States v. Braslawsky, 913 F.2d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1990),
11
The government cites statements in Mackay's Presentence Report that
describe Mackay's career as a dealer in stolen construction equipment. Although
we have held that a presentence report generally bears sufficient indicia of
reliability to be considered as evidence by the trial judge in making factual
determinations required by the sentencing guidelines, see United States v.
Alfaro, 919 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1990), Mackay attacks the reliability of
those statements on a variety of grounds. We do not reach these contentions,
however, because we find sufficient evidence in the trial record alone to support
the judge's findings.
12
Mackay's father testified that Mackay told him he purchased the
backhoe from Bill Cole. Our holding that sufficient evidence supported a finding
that Mackay bought the backhoe from Bill Cole may seem inconsistent with our
holding, supra, that Mackay did not conspire with Cole. The holdings are not
contradictory, however, for two reasons. First, at sentencing, the Government
must prove facts only by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v.
Casto, 889 F.2d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092, 110 S. Ct.
1164, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1990). In contrast, under our standard for sufficiency
of the evidence supporting a conviction, we require that a rational trier of fact
could find that the Government proved all essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Castro, 15 F.3d 417, 419 (5th Cir.
1994). Second, the testimony of Mackay's father that Mackay told him he bought
the backhoe from Cole directly supports the finding that Mackay bought the
backhoe, but it does not support even an inference that Cole and Mackay agreed
to transport the stolen backhoe interstate.
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the record was clear that the defendants themselves stole the goods
they sold, and the court held that the guideline does not apply to
thieves who sell their own stolen goods. In Esquivel, we followed
Braslawsky and upheld a sentence enhancement in a case in which the
record showed that the defendant bought the stolen goods from
another person. 919 F.2d at 959-60. In this case, where evidence
both supported and contradicted the conclusion that the defendant
acquired the stolen backhoe from a third person, the district court
did not commit clear error in finding that Mackay was "in the
business of receiving and selling stolen property" under former
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.2(b)(4)(A).
III
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE Mackay's conviction for
conspiracy to transport stolen goods and AFFIRM his conviction for
knowing transportation of stolen goods.13
13
We do not remand for resentencing because Mackay's two counts merged
under the guidelines. See Record on Appeal, Presentence Report, at 4; U.S.S.G.
§ 3D1.2(d) (Nov. 1992).
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