United States v. Watts ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 6, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
No. 02-31174
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES L. WATTS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
(USDC No. 02-CR-50027-1)
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Charles L. Watts, Jr., challenges his guilty-plea conviction
for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He argues,
for the first time on appeal, that the district court failed to
comply with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) at rearraignment by not ensuring
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
that he understood the nature of the charges against him and by
misleading him regarding the application of the sentencing
guidelines to his case. The arguments are reviewed for plain error
only, and thus will not require reversal unless there is a clear or
obvious error which affects Watts’ substantial rights.1 This court
will find that a “substantial right” has been violated only if “the
defendant’s knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct
information would have been likely to affect his willingness to
plead guilty.”2
Although the district court did not specifically read the
indictment or set forth the elements of the crime charged, it
paraphrased the indictment, questioned Watts whether he understood
the charge against him, ensured that Watts had had the opportunity
to discuss the charge with counsel, and provided the opportunity
for questions from Watts. The district court therefore did not
commit any clear or obvious error under Rule 11.3 Moreover,
because Watts has not affirmatively stated or demonstrated that the
alleged Rule 11 variance affected his decision to plead guilty, he
1
See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S. Ct. 1043,
1046 (2002); United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc).
2
United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993)
(en banc).
3
See Vonn, 122 S. Ct. at 1046; United States v. Reyes, 300
F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Cuevas-Andrade, 232 F.3d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 2000).
2
has not shown that his substantial rights were affected, and the
claim fails.4
Watts’ claim that the district court misled him regarding the
application of the sentencing guidelines, in violation of Rule 11,
is equally unavailing. Watts was aware of how the guidelines would
operate in his case, including the possibility that he would be
considered a career offender under the guidelines, as he was so
advised at sentencing and in the written plea agreement. Even if
the district court’s explanation of the sentencing chart appended
to the guidelines could be considered a misleading prediction of a
lesser criminal history (and thus lesser sentence) than Watts
actually faced under the guidelines, the court’s statement cannot
be considered a material factor in Watts’ decision to plead guilty.
Without his plea, he faced a mandatory life sentence, which was
substantially more severe than the 262-month sentence he received.
It cannot be said that a full understanding of the correct criminal
history score he faced under the guidelines would have affected his
willingness to plead guilty to avoid a mandatory life sentence.5
Watts has not demonstrated any plain error in the district
court’s judgment. Accordingly, that judgment is AFFIRMED.
4
See Johnson, 1 F.3d at 302; see also United States v. Smith,
184 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1999).
5
See Johnson, 1 F.3d at 302.
3