Seltz v. Intercargo Ins Co ( 2003 )


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  •                                                            United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                     June 16, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    _______________________                      Clerk
    No. 02-20853
    Summary Calendar
    _______________________
    TEXAS SOIL RECYCLING, INC; ET AL,
    Plaintiffs,
    BOBBY E. SELTZ; JOE R. CALVERT; LISA G. CALVERT,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants
    versus
    INTERCARGO INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    Civil Docket #H-98-CV-278
    _________________________________________________________________
    Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    In    1998,   the   appellants   filed    an   action    against
    Intercargo Insurance Company.      Intercargo filed a counterclaim,
    alleging that   the appellants breached an indemnity contract.           The
    indemnity contract provides for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    any suit on the agreement.      On March 28, 2000, the district court
    granted Intercargo summary judgment on its indemnity contract
    counterclaim and awarded Intercargo $86,563.95 in damages and
    $45,635.25 in attorneys’ fees.
    On April 7, 2000, the appellants filed a notice of
    appeal.   On May 8, 2000, about five weeks after the district court
    entered   judgment,      Intercargo   filed   an    untimely    motion    for
    clarification    and     attorneys’   fees.        See   F.R.C.P.   54(d)(2)
    (requiring motions for attorneys’ fees to be filed within 14 days
    after entry of judgment).          Intercargo requested $79,517.19 in
    additional attorneys’ fees for the work its counsel performed
    between the time it filed its motion for summary judgment and the
    court entered its final summary judgment order. The district court
    denied Intercargo’s motion because the case was on appeal before
    this court.
    This court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Intercargo and recognized Intercargo’s right
    to proceed under Rule 60(a) in the district court.              In December
    2001, Intercargo filed a motion to supplement its prior motion to
    clarify; Intercargo requested $26,146.72 in attorneys’ fees to
    cover the appeal in addition to the relief previously requested.
    The   district   court   granted   Intercargo’s     motion,    revising   its
    previous order to award Intercargo $86,563.95 in damages and
    $151,299.16 in attorneys’ fees.
    The appellants argue that the district court erred in
    2
    granting Intercargo’s motion.    We disagree in part.   Under Rule
    6(b)(2), the district court properly allowed Intercargo to file its
    motion outside the 14-day time limit because Intercargo’s failure
    to act was due to “excusable neglect.”     Through no fault of its
    own, Intercargo did not receive notice of the district court’s
    final judgment.2 When it discovered the error, Intercargo promptly
    contacted the district court and filed its motion within a few
    days.3
    Moreover, insofar as Intercargo’s motion sought to gain
    fees incurred before the trial court’s entry of judgment, the court
    properly corrected an error “arising from oversight” under Rule
    60(a).4   Rule 60(a) allows the district court to modify a judgment
    2
    Prior to the entry of judgment, the district court clerk
    erroneously terminated Intercargo from the case when the court
    dismissed an intervenor’s claims. Intercargo therefore did not
    receive notice of the district court’s final summary judgment until
    it received a copy of the appellants’ transcript order on April 26,
    2000.
    3
    The appellants’ reliance on In re Morrow, 
    502 F.2d 520
     (5th
    Cir. 1974), to argue that failure on the part of a court’s clerk to
    notify a party of the entry of judgment, without more, does not
    permit the court to expand the time for a party under Rule 6(b) is
    misplaced. Morrow’s holding applies only to the time for a party
    to appeal and is controlled by Rule 77(d), which provides that
    “lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time
    to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for
    failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted in
    Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
    4
    Rule 60(a) provides:
    Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders
    or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
    from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court
    at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
    3
    to reflect the actual intention of the court.               United States v.
    Kellogg, 
    12 F.3d 497
    , 504 (5th Cir. 1994).       Here, the district court
    intended to award Intercargo attorneys’ fees; the absence of the
    additional attorneys’ fees in the final judgment was due to an
    oversight by the court. The additional attorneys’ fees included in
    the modified judgment do not affect the substantive rights of the
    parties.    
    Id.
        The evidence supporting the additional award of
    attorneys’ fees is identical in form to the evidence supporting the
    first award of attorneys’ fees and is sufficient to support the
    modified award.
    On the other hand, Intercargo’s request for attorneys’
    fees   generated   by   the   appeal   is   untimely   in    two   ways.     No
    prospective request for such fees was included in Intercargo’s
    initial fee motions in the district court, and Intercargo failed to
    request such fees during the first appeal.             The district court
    abused   its   discretion     in   awarding   appellate     attorneys’     fees
    pursuant to Rule 60(a).
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court judgment is
    affirmed, as modified to eliminate the request for attorneys’ fees
    incurred on appeal by Intercargo.
    AFFIRMED as MODIFIED.
    party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
    During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
    corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate
    court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be
    so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
    4
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-20853

Filed Date: 6/18/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014