Llerenas-Ceballos v. INS ( 1995 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ______________
    No. 95-60290
    Summary Calendar
    ______________
    GUSTAVO LLERENAS-CEBALLOS,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
    Respondent.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (A34 011 098)
    _________________________________________________________________
    December 20, 1995
    Before KING, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM*:
    Petitioner   Gustavo    Llerenas-Ceballos   ("Llerenas-Ceballos")
    petitions for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge's order of
    deportation.   We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Llerenas-Ceballos, a thirty-eight year old Mexican citizen,
    was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in
    *
    Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
    that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
    cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
    needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
    profession."
    Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published.
    1973.     He pleaded guilty and was convicted in federal court of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled
    substance in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 864
    , 841(a)(1).          On April
    10, 1989, he was sentenced to serve 151 months imprisonment and
    five years of supervised release.         Llerenas-Ceballos has remained
    in federal prison since his sentencing.
    In 1992 Llerenas-Ceballos requested transfer to a Mexican
    prison pursuant to the United States-Mexico Prisoner Transfer
    Treaty.     His request was denied on December 23, 1992 by the
    Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice based on his
    "substantial    ties   to   the   U.S."     Respondent   Immigration   and
    Naturalization Service ("INS") issued a detainer against Llerenas-
    Ceballos on December 10, 1993.
    On December 16, 1993, the INS issued an Order to Show Cause
    charging Llerenas-Ceballos with deportability under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1251
    (a)(2)(A)(iii) and (a)(2)(B)(i), for having been convicted of
    an aggravated felony and a controlled substance violation.         After
    a hearing was conducted before an Immigration Judge ("IJ") on
    November 14, 1994, the IJ found Llerenas-Ceballos deportable.          The
    IJ further found Llerenas-Ceballos ineligible for a waiver of
    deportation under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    ("INA"), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (c), because he had been convicted of an
    aggravated felony, for which he had been incarcerated for over five
    years.     The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed the
    decision of the IJ, finding that Llerenas-Ceballos's deportability
    had been established, and that he was ineligible for relief from
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    deportation, and dismissed the appeal.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The issue in the instant case is whether Llerenas-Ceballos is
    statutorily ineligible for a waiver of deportation under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (c) because he had served more than five years in prison for
    his aggravated felony conviction prior to the IJ's consideration of
    his case in deportation proceedings.                The BIA found that the
    statute barred Llerenas-Ceballos from applying for a waiver of
    deportation as mandated by Congress when it enacted the aggravated
    felony bar.   Our review of the BIA's decision is very limited.
    Rodriguez v. I.N.S., 
    9 F.3d 408
    , 410 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal
    citations   omitted).      We    must       give   deference    to   the    BIA's
    interpretation   of     immigration         statutes   unless   there      exists
    compelling indications that the BIA's interpretation is incorrect.
    Campos-Guardado v. I.N.S., 
    809 F.2d 285
    , 289 (5th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    484 U.S. 826
    , 
    108 S.Ct. 92
    , 
    98 L.Ed.2d 53
     (1987) (citing
    Guevara Flores v. I.N.S., 
    786 F.2d 1242
    , 1250 n.8 (5th Cir. 1986),
    cert. denied, 
    480 U.S. 930
    , 
    107 S.Ct. 1565
    , 
    94 L.Ed.2d 757
     (1987)).
    DUE PROCESS
    Llerenas-Ceballos contends that the INS denied him due process
    by not proceeding with his deportation proceedings until after he
    became ineligible for a waiver of deportation due to having served
    five years in prison. We find Llerenas-Ceballos was not denied due
    process because he is not eligible to apply for a waiver.                  Indeed,
    "he is not entitled to any process because he is not eligible under
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    the statute to apply for discretionary relief."        Rodriguez, 
    9 F.3d at 413
    .    The language of § 1182(c) clearly precludes eligibility
    for relief to Llerenas-Ceballos, as it plainly states that the
    discretionary waiver "shall not apply to an alien who has been
    convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has served a term
    of at least five years."       
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (c).         Once Llerenas-
    Ceballos was imprisoned for five years, he became ineligible for a
    waiver of deportation.
    EQUAL PROTECTION
    Llerenas-Ceballos next contends that the INS denied him equal
    protection by its uneven enforcement of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (c).            He
    argues that § 1182(c) creates two classes of convicted aliens:
    those who are brought before the IJ before they have served five
    years on their sentences, and thus can apply for a waiver of
    deportation and; those, like Llerenas-Ceballos, who do not have the
    opportunity to appear before the IJ until after they have served
    five years or more, and thus cannot apply.            "Congress is not
    required to treat all aliens alike; it is only required to give a
    facially   legitimate   and   bona   fide   reason   for   treating   them
    differently."   Rodriguez, 
    9 F.3d at
    414 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 
    430 U.S. 787
    , 794-95, 
    97 S.Ct. 1473
    , 
    52 L.Ed.2d 50
     (1977)).          Congress
    enacted the aggravated felony bar in § 1182(c) to deny relief to
    those aliens who commit serious crimes and who serve five years in
    prison, representing a legitimate exercise of Congress' authority
    to "expel or exclude aliens" who have egregiously violated the
    hospitality of the United States, and who pose a danger to the
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    community.     Fiallo, 
    430 U.S. at 792
    . Even if, as Llerenas-Ceballos
    argues, the timing of the commencement of deportation proceedings
    creates two classes of aliens under the statute, we find, as did
    the BIA, that Congress has mandated such a result.
    ESTOPPEL
    Alternatively, Llerenas-Ceballos contends that the INS and the
    Immigration      Court       should       be    estopped       from      denying    the   IJ
    jurisdiction to address the merits of his claim of waiver from
    deportation due to the INS's conduct in delaying the initiation of
    his   deportation       proceedings.            In   support        of   his   contention,
    Llerenas-Ceballos argues that the INS failed to act expeditiously
    in initiating his deportation proceedings, and failed to advise him
    that he would lose his right to apply for a waiver after five years
    of incarceration.        He claims that he has made a prima facie showing
    of    his    eligibility      for     a    waiver       due    to     his   hardship      and
    rehabilitation, and the Department of Justice's recognition of his
    "substantial ties to the U.S." in denying his request for transfer
    to Mexico.
    "[T]o   state     a   cause    of       action    for    estoppel       against    the
    government, a private party must allege more than mere negligence,
    delay,      inaction,    or    failure         to    follow     and      internal    agency
    guideline."     Fano v. O'Neill, 
    806 F.2d 1262
    , 1265 (5th Cir. 1987).
    This "affirmative misconduct" cannot be proven by a showing of mere
    delay.      See I.N.S. v. Miranda, 
    459 U.S. 14
    , 18-19, 
    103 S.Ct. 281
    ,
    
    74 L.Ed.2d 12
     (1982).           Llerenas-Ceballos has offered no evidence
    that tending to show that he was targeted or singled-out in any way
    5
    by the INS, nor has he offered evidence that any immigration
    official engaged in misconduct.   We find no conduct by the INS or
    the Immigration Court that can even arguably be characterized as
    affirmative misconduct.   Thus, we decline to consider Llerenas-
    Ceballos's estoppel claim.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons articulated above, the final order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals is AFFIRMED.
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