Bennett v. Allstate Ins Company ( 1996 )


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  •                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _______________________
    No. 95-30970
    Summary Calendar
    _______________________
    EDWARD L. BENNETT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    (94-CV-2755)
    _________________________________________________________________
    January 16, 1996
    Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Edward   L.   Bennett    (“Bennett”)   appeals   the   district
    court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his insurer, Allstate
    Insurance Company (“Allstate”), on Bennett’s claims that Allstate
    breached its insurance agreement with him, failing to pay him the
    full amount of his uninsured motorists (“UM”) coverage.             After
    reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bennett, this
    court affirms.
    *
    Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
    BACKGROUND
    In   October     of   1989,   Bennett    obtained    an    automobile
    liability insurance policy through Allstate that provided liability
    limits of $25,000/$50,000/$25,000 and UM limits of $10,000/$20,000.
    At Bennett’s request, the couple's liability coverage was increased
    as of April 11, 1990 to $100,000/$300,000/$100,000.             However, less
    than one month later, Bennett’s wife, Ms. Handy-Bennett, signed her
    husband’s name to a form entitled “Uninsured Motorist Insurance
    Selection of Coverages and Limits” (“UM Form”). This form provided
    the Bennetts with three options: option 1 allowed the insured to
    choose UM limits equal to the policy’s liability limits; option 2,
    to choose UM limits below the corresponding liability limits; and
    option 3, to choose no UM coverage at all.             The UM Form signed by
    Bennett’s wife selected option 2 and specified that the UM limits
    were to be $10,000/$20,000.1
    Bennett    was    later   involved      in   a   serious   automobile
    accident with a motorist who carried an insurance policy with a
    $10,000 limit on liability coverage. After being paid $10,000 from
    the motorist’s insurance, Bennett sought to supplement his recovery
    by collecting $100,000 in UM coverage from Allstate.             Because Mrs.
    Handy-Bennett had signed the UM Form, however, Allstate paid
    Bennett what it considered to be the applicable limits of his UM
    coverage, $10,000.
    1
    Specifically, a typewritten “X” was placed in the box
    next to option 2 and the UM limits were typewritten on the UM Form
    as well.
    2
    Because Bennett contends that the applicable coverage was
    $100,000, he filed suit to collect the $90,000 balance.                     After the
    parties conducted discovery, the district court granted Allstate
    summary judgment against all of Bennett’s claims.
    DISCUSSION
    This court reviews the district court's grant of summary
    judgment de novo, employing the same criteria used in that court.
    Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 
    51 F.3d 583
    , 588 (5th Cir.
    1995).   Summary     judgment    is     proper     only     "if     the    pleadings,
    depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
    together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
    issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law."             Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).          Factual
    questions and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to
    the nonmovant. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 
    18 F.3d 1268
    , 1272
    (5th Cir. 1994).
    Although   Rule   56(c)        requires     the     moving    party    to
    demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, a
    dispute about a material fact is genuine only if the evidence is
    such   that    a   reasonable   jury    could     return    a     verdict    for    the
    nonmovant.     See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323, 
    106 S. Ct. 2548
    , 2552 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248, 
    106 S. Ct. 2505
    , 2510 (1986).                    If the moving party
    demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, then
    the nonmovant is burdened with establishing the existence of a
    genuine issue for trial.         Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
    3
    Radio, 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 585-87, 
    106 S. Ct. 1348
    , 1355-56 (1986).   This
    burden requires the nonmovant to do more than merely raise some
    metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.   Matsushita, 
    475 U.S. at 586
    , 106 S. Ct. at 1355.
    As discussed earlier, Bennett alleges that his applicable
    UM limit is $100,000, not $10,000 as Allstate contends.          In
    general, in Louisiana, Allstate and other automobile insurers must
    provide UM coverage equal to or greater than the liability limits
    provided for in the policy, unless the insured specifically rejects
    such coverage or selects lower limits in writing.     See La. Rev.
    Stat. Ann. § 22:1406D (West 1995). The policy rationale underlying
    this legislation is to encourage sufficient UM coverage so that
    victims of automobile accidents like Bennett will be fully insured.
    See, e.g., Washington v. Savoie, 
    634 So. 2d 1176
    , 1179 (La. 1994).
    Interpreting this legislation, the Louisiana Supreme
    Court has delineated an acceptable method by which an insured can
    either reject UM coverage or select a lower limit.   Specifically,
    when an insured selects lower UM limits, the Louisiana statute
    imposes three requirements for this selection to be valid: (1) the
    insured must be informed of his options in a way that allows him to
    make a meaningful choice among these options;2 (2) the insured’s
    selection must be clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable; and (3) any
    waiver of UM coverage must be in writing and signed by either the
    2
    As discussed earlier, the three options are to have UM
    coverage equal to the liability limits in the policy; to have UM
    coverage that is less than the liability limits; or to have no UM
    coverage whatsoever. See, e.g., Tugwell v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
    
    609 So. 2d 195
    , 198 (La. 1992).
    4
    insured or    his authorized representative.           See, e.g., Henson v.
    Safeco Ins. Cos., 
    585 So. 2d 534
    , 538 (La. 1991); Giroir v.
    Theriot, 
    513 So. 2d 1166
    , 1168 (La. 1987).                   When such a UM
    selection is contested, the insurance company has the burden of
    establishing the waiver’s validity. See Henson, 
    585 So. 2d at 538
    ;
    Tugwell, 
    609 So. 2d at 197
    ;
    As the district court concluded, the UM Form in the
    present case     is   valid   and   comports   with    all   requirements   of
    Louisiana law.    After all, the UM Form described UM coverage and
    gave the Bennetts an opportunity to make a meaningful choice from
    the three statutory options.          The UM Form also clearly marked
    option 2, providing for UM coverage of $10,000/$20,000, less than
    the policy’s general liability limits.         Furthermore, it was dated
    and signed by Bennett’s wife in his name.3            For all these reasons,
    it validly modified Bennett’s UM coverage to select the lower limit
    of $10,000/$20,000.4
    Since Bennett was entitled to recover only $10,000 in UM
    coverage from Allstate, the district court properly concluded that
    Allstate has already satisfied its obligations to Bennett under
    their insurance agreement by tendering that amount to him.
    3
    Ms. Handy-Bennett signed her husband’s name to the UM
    Form.    She admits that the signature on the UM Form is hers.
    4
    Bennett’s argument that the UM Form is somehow invalid
    because his wife never intended to sign such an agreement is
    specious. Bennett has no evidence whatsoever to challenge the fact
    that his wife signed the UM Form and, as a result, also attested to
    reading it.   Bennett cannot survive summary judgment merely by
    speculating or raising some metaphysical doubt about the legitimacy
    of the UM Form. Matsushita, 
    475 U.S. at 586
    , 106 S. Ct. at 1355.
    5
    CONCLUSION
    For   the   foregoing   reasons,   this   court   AFFIRMS   the
    district court's grant of summary judgment to Allstate against
    Bennett’s claims.
    6