Coleman v. Grapevine, City of ( 1996 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 95-10333
Summary Calendar
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RUSSELL ALLEN COLEMAN, on behalf of
Andrea Coleman, on behalf of
Christopher Coleman, Individually;
and CYNTHIA BURDINE COLEMAN, on
behalf of Andrea Coleman, on behalf
of Christopher Coleman,
Individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
GRAPEVINE, CITY OF; VERNON WRIGHT;
DONNA HAWKINS,
Defendants,
and
GREGG BEWLEY; TOM MARTIN
Defendants-Appellants.
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No. 95-10385
Summary Calendar
_______________
RUSSELL ALLEN COLEMAN, on behalf of
Andrea Coleman, on behalf of
Christopher Coleman, Individually;
and CYNTHIA BURDINE COLEMAN, on
behalf of Andrea Coleman, on behalf
of Christopher Coleman,
Individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
GRAPEVINE, CITY OF; GREGG BEWLEY;
Defendants-Appellees,
and
DONNA HAWKINS;
Defendant,
and
TOM MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(4:94-CV-370-A)
_______________________________________________
May 8, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Russell Allen Coleman and Cynthia Burdine Coleman ("the
Colemans") appeal the district court's grant of judgment as a
matter of law dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the
City of Grapevine, Texas, Chief of Police Tom Martin and Officer
Gregg Bewley. We affirm.
I
Based upon allegations that the Colemans had sexually abused
a four-year-old girl, Officer Bewley sought and executed warrants
to arrest the Colemans and search their home. After a grand jury
refused to indict them on criminal charges, the Colemans filed a
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
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§ 1983 suit against Chief of Police Martin, Officer Bewley and the
City of Grapevine, alleging a violation of their right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The case advanced to
trial; however, at the close of the Coleman's case, the district
court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the City of
Grapevine, Chief of Police Martin and Officer Bewley. The Colemans
filed a timely notice of appeal.
The Colemans contend that the district court erred in finding
that the individual Defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on grounds of qualified immunity. We review the
district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo,
considering all of the evidence presented, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
movant. London v. MAC Corp. of America, 44 F.3d 316, 318 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 99, 133 L. Ed. 2d 53(1995). Judgment as a matter of law is properly granted when the
facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of the movant that
a rational jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Id.; FED.
R. CIV. P. 50(a).
In assessing a claim of qualified immunity, the court must
first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of
a clearly established constitutional right. Rankin v. Klevenhagen,
5 F.3d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1993). If so, the court must then decide
whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in order
to determine whether he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id."There is no cause of action for false arrest under § 1983 unless
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the arresting officer lacked probable cause." Brown v. Bryan
County, Okla., 67 F.3d 1174, 1180. (5th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 5, 1996) (No. 95-1100).
In evaluating whether probable cause existed, we must consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Id.Officers have probable cause to arrest if, at the time of arrest,
"the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that [the arrested] had
committed or was committing an offense." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Proof of probable cause requires less evidence
than would be required for conviction))that is, less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt))but more evidence than a "bare
suspicion." United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir.
1989). "Only where the warrant application is so lacking indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable will the shield of immunity be lost." Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1098, 89 L. Ed. 2d
271 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the facts and
circumstances, of which Chief of Police Martin and Officer Bewley
had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to allow a
person of reasonable prudence to believe that the Colemans had
committed an offense. Evidence supporting probable cause at the
time Officer Bewley submitted the application for the arrest and
search warrants included written statements from the four-year-
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old's mother recounting her child's testimony regarding graphic
details of sexual abuse. The officers were also in possession of
a videotaped interview conducted by authorities at Child Protective
Services, in which the four-year-old girl described sexual abuses
occurring at the Coleman's house. We find that the evidence in the
record points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the
existence of probable cause that a rational jury could not arrive
at a contrary verdict. Accordingly, the district court did not err
by granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Chief of
Police Martin and Officer Bewley on grounds of qualified immunity.1
II
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.2
1
Because the police officers had probable cause, the Colemans have
failed to establish that they suffered a constitutional injury. We must
therefore also affirm the grant of judgment as a matter of law with respect to
the City of Grapevine. See Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402,
1407 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that to maintain a § 1983 action against a
municipality, plaintiff must first show an underlying constitutional violation,
only then do we ask whether the city is responsible for that violation).
2
Appellees cross-appeal, claiming that the trial court improperly
denied their motion for summary judgment. Because we hold that the district
court's judgment as a matter of law was proper, Appellees' cross-appeal is hereby
dismissed as moot.
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