Simoneaux v. New York Life Ins Co ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 02-30348
Summary Calendar
_____________________
EDWARD J. SIMONEAUX
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 00-755-B
__________________________________________________________________
October 29, 2002
Before JOLLY, PARKER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
After being fired from his job, fifty-five year old plaintiff
Edward J. Simoneaux (Simoneaux) brought suit against his former
employer New York Life Insurance Company (New York Life) for age
discrimination in violation of Louisiana’s Age Discrimination Act.1
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of New York
Life. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact, we
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:311, et seq. (West 2002).
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I.
For the last twelve of his twenty-three years of employment
with New York Life, Simoneaux was the managing partner of its Baton
Rouge office. In 1998, the performance of the Baton Rouge office,
as measured by New York Life’s “G.P.A.” rating system, fell below
the company standard. This decline in performance was partially
due to problems with the leasing of office space and the promotion
of several sales personnel to different New York Life offices. New
York Life requested that Simoneaux raise the “G.P.A.” of the Baton
Rouge office or be placed on an individual “performance program”
with specific performance goals to be attained during a defined
period. The record contains several letters from New York Life to
Simoneaux regarding the specific performance problems of the Baton
Rouge office, including drop-offs in recruitment, retention and
commissions.
In August 1999, Simoneaux met separately with Michael Reeves
(Reeves) and Gerald Tinsley (Tinsley), Senior Vice President and
Vice President of New York Life’s West Central Zone, to discuss the
performance of the Baton Rouge office. At some point during the
meeting between Tinsley and Simoneaux, Tinsley asked Simoneaux how
old he was and how long he planned on working. During the meeting
between Reeves and Simoneaux, Reeves placed Simoneaux on a
performance plan, outlining specific personal performance goals to
be met by July 30, 1999. Reeves told Simoneaux that a failure to
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complete the performance plan would result in his dismissal from
employment with New York Life. Simoneaux failed to meet the
performance plan goals by the deadline date. Reeves, without a
request from Simoneaux, extended the deadline to the end of
December 1999 and revised the performance plan goals. When
Simoneaux failed to meet the revised goals in the performance plan
by December 31, 1999, he was fired. His replacement as managing
partner of the Baton Rouge office was a thirty-eight year old man.
Simoneaux brought suit alleging violations of Louisiana’s Age
Discrimination Act in the 19th Judicial District Court for the
Parish of East Baton Rouge. New York Life properly removed the
case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1332(a)(1). The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of New York Life, and
Simoneaux timely appealed the judgment to this court.
II.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Bodenheimer
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993). Summary judgment
is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the
court draws all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.Because the prohibitions on age discrimination under Louisiana
law and federal law are the same, Louisiana courts look to federal
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law for guidance in applying the Louisiana Age Discrimination Act.
LaBove v. Raftery, 802 So.2d 566, 573 (La. 2001). A plaintiff
makes a prima facie case of age discrimination if he demonstrates
that: (1) he was dismissed; (2) he was qualified for the position
from which he was dismissed (3) he was within the protected class
of individuals who are at least forty years of age; and (4) he was
replaced by someone outside the protected class or someone younger
or was otherwise dismissed because of his age. Fields v. J.C.
Penney Co., 968 F.2d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 1992). If the plaintiff
makes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises
and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by
showing, through admissible evidence, a non-discriminatory reason
for the dismissal. Once a non-discriminatory reason has been
shown, the presumption of discrimination dissolves and the burden
is on the plaintiff to prove that the proffered non-discriminatory
reason is a pretext for age discrimination. Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at
957.
Simoneaux established a prima facie case of age
discrimination: he was dismissed from a position for which he is
clearly qualified; he was fifty-five years old when he was
dismissed; and, his replacement was thirty-eight years old. The
burden then shifted to New York Life to show a non-discriminatory
reason for Simoneaux’s dismissal. New York Life proffered
substantial admissible evidence of Simoneaux’s poor performance,
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including several letters to Simoneaux and testimony regarding the
performance of the Baton Rouge office, the institution of the
performance plan and Simoneaux’s admitted failure to meet the
prescribed goals. This well-documented non-discriminatory reason
for dismissing Simoneaux dissolved the presumption of age
discrimination and placed the burden on Simoneaux to prove that the
reason given by New York Life is a pretext for age discrimination.
Whether Simoneaux raised a genuine issue of material fact as
to the existence of pretext determines whether summary judgment was
proper. Because we are reviewing a summary judgment, we need not
determine whether Simoneaux actually proved that New York Life’s
proffered reasons were a pretext for age discrimination, but
whether he has tendered sufficient evidence that would lead a jury
to find pretext. Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 958. He has not done so.
Simoneaux does not deny his poor performance and failure to
meet his individual performance plan goals, but argues that his
poor performance was created by New York Life as a pretext for age
discrimination. “It is more than well-settled that an employee’s
subjective belief that he suffered adverse employment action as a
result of discrimination, without more, is not enough to survive a
summary judgment motion, in the face of proof showing an adequate
non-discriminatory reason.” Douglass v. United Services Automobile
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citations omitted).
Simoneaux alleges that New York Life intentionally caused problems
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with his office lease and promoted several agents from the Baton
Rouge office in order to impede his performance and create a
pretext for his dismissal because of his age. Although Simoneaux
may believe that the promotion of some agents and the troubles in
negotiating the office lease were part of an orchestrated effort by
New York Life to create a pretext for age discrimination, he offers
no evidence of this supposed malicious intentional conduct by New
York Life other than his own speculative testimony. Without other
evidence, his testimony regarding his belief that his performance
was sabotaged because of his age is insufficient to support a
finding of age discrimination.
Simoneaux also relies on two age-related comments made by
Reeves and Tinsley at different times to support his assertion that
his dismissal was motivated by age discrimination. “In order for
an age-based comment to be probative of an employer’s
discriminatory intent, it must be direct and unambiguous, allowing
a reasonable jury to conclude without any inferences or
presumptions that age was an impermissible factor in the decision
to terminate the employee.” E.E.O.C. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc.,
100 F.3d 1173, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996). Simoneaux recalls that Reeves
inquired about his age and his retirement plans during a
conversation sometime in 1997 or 1998. That Reeves made this
inquiry in a past conversation which was wholly unrelated to the
employment action at issue does not shed any light on whether
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Simoneaux’s age played a role in Reeves’ decision to dismiss him.
Simoneaux also offers Tinsley’s similar inquiry during their 1999
meeting as evidence of age discrimination. While closer in time to
the dismissal of Simoneaux, such an inquiry is not direct and
unambiguous evidence that Simoneaux’s age was a factor in Reeves’
decision to dismiss him from employment. These comments prove
nothing more than an interest in Simoneaux’s future plans and, by
themselves, are not sufficient to support a finding of pretext in
the decision to dismiss Simoneaux.
Simoneaux failed to offer sufficient facts to support a
finding of pretext in New York Life’s decision to dismiss him;
therefore, he did not establish a genuine issue of material fact
that would allow him to survive summary judgment.
III.
Summary judgment in favor of New York Life was appropriate.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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