Raz v. LSU Med Ctr Sport ( 2002 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-31340
    Summary Calendar
    YORAM RAZ,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
    MEDICAL CENTER SHREVEPORT;
    ROBERT JACKSON; LAWRENCE
    W. JOHNSON; AMIRA S. ASSI,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 01-CV-381
    --------------------
    September 6, 2002
    Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Yoram Raz, a pro se litigant, argues that the district court
    erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss his complaint
    based on Raz’s failure to file his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
    within the one-year statute of limitations.    Raz argues that he
    did not have sufficient knowledge that the defendant doctors had
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 01-31340
    -2-
    violated his constitutional rights during an October 1998
    hospitalization until discovery was conducted in February 2001.
    Because there is no specified federal statute of limitations
    for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits, federal courts borrow the forum
    state’s general personal injury period.    Owens v. Okure, 
    488 U.S. 235
    , 249-51 (1989).   The applicable prescriptive period in
    Louisiana for personal injury claims is one year.    Elzy v.
    Roberson, 
    868 F.2d 793
    , 794-95 (5th Cir. 1989).   “Under federal
    law, a section 1983 action generally accrues when a plaintiff
    ‘knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of
    the action.’”   Harris v. Hegmann, 
    198 F.3d 153
    , 157 (5th Cir.
    1999) (citation omitted).
    Raz’s allegations reflect that he was in possession of
    critical facts showing that the defendants had employed medical
    procedures which he deemed objectionable and abusive within one
    year of his hospitalization.   Because Raz’s cause of action was
    clearly prescribed, the district court did not err in dismissing
    the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
    be granted.
    Raz has not challenged the district court’s dismissal of his
    claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.   Thus, he has
    abandoned that claim on appeal.   See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Raz has not shown that the district court erred in denying
    his motion to recuse the magistrate judge and the district court
    No. 01-31340
    -3-
    judge from presiding in his case.   He failed to show the judicial
    officers were biased against him because the officers dismissed
    his prior cases as frivolous; adverse rulings alone do not call
    into question a judge’s impartiality.     See Liteky v. United
    States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Raz’s motion to file a second amended complaint.    Such amendment
    would have been futile because it would have also been subject to
    dismissal based on the one-year statute of limitations.
    Raz’s appeal has no arguable merit.    The appeal is DISMISSED
    as frivolous.   See Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-20 (5th Cir.
    1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
    APPEAL DISMISSED.