Daniels v. Cockrell , 73 F. App'x 26 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS           July 30, 2003
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT             Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-20236
    Summary Calendar
    LEE DANIELS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
    JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; GARY L. JOHNSON; FRED BECKER,
    Head Warden Jester III Unit; COLLINS, Assistant Warden
    Jester III Unit; B. WRIGHT, Craftshop Supervisor Jester III
    Unit; PERRYMAN, Head Warden Powledge Unit; E. A. WESTFALL,
    Assistant Warden Powledge Unit; CHICO, Lieutenant Powledge
    Unit; CRAFTSHOP SUPERVISOR, Powledge Unit; CARMONA, Head
    Warden Wallace Pack Unit; S. POOL, Correctional Officer 4
    Craftshop Supervisor Wallace Pack Unit; D. JOHNSON, Unit
    Property Officer Wallace Pack Unit; M. WARNER, Coach Wallace
    Pack Unit; LARRY LARGENT, Dr.; E. FONTENOTE; V. PORTER;
    MARTINEZ-CARDONA; DAVID TILLERY; Correctional Officer WEBB;
    KELLI WARD; M. HALL, Administrative Warden; LEO QUINN;
    W. SMITH, Investigator,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-03-CV-361
    --------------------
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 03-20236
    -2-
    Lee Daniels, Texas state prisoner # 00721531, appeals the
    district court’s dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action for
    failure to state a claim pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii).
    When a plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of his property
    without due process of law by the negligent or intentional actions
    of a state officer that are “random and unauthorized,” a
    postdeprivation tort cause of action in state law is sufficient to
    satisfy the requirements of due process.    Parratt v. Taylor, 
    451 U.S. 527
    , 541-44 (1981) (overruled in part not relevant here,
    Daniels v. Williams, 
    474 U.S. 327
     (1986)); Hudson v. Palmer, 
    468 U.S. 517
    , 533 (1984); see also Murphy v. Collins, 
    26 F.3d 541
    , 543-
    44 (5th Cir. 1994).    Because Texas has adequate postdeprivation
    remedies for the confiscation of prisoner property, Daniels does not
    have a cognizable claim under 42 U.S. C. § 1983.    See Murphy, 
    26 F.3d at 543-44
    ; Thompson v. Steele, 
    709 F.2d 381
    , 383 (5th Cir.
    1983).   Because Daniels has not shown that he could have amended his
    complaint to allege any facts which would assert a cognizable 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claim concerning the deprivation of his property, he
    has not shown that the district court erred in dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action without providing notice and an opportunity to
    amend his complaint.    See Jones v. Greninger, 
    188 F.3d 322
    , 326-27
    (5th Cir. 1999).
    To the extent that Daniels contends on appeal that the property
    included “legal materials,” he did not raise this claim in his
    original complaint and did not otherwise raise a claim of the denial
    No. 03-20236
    -3-
    of access to the courts in his original complaint.   Likewise, to the
    extent that Daniels argues that he should have been allowed to
    pursue a deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim,
    Daniels did not raise this claim in his original complaint, which
    was limited to a claim of deprivation of property.   Daniels may not
    make claims for the first time on appeal.
    Daniels argues that the district court should have ruled on his
    various postjudgment motions before accepting his notice of appeal
    for filing.   Generally, as Daniels acknowledges, the filing of a
    timely notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction over matters involved
    in the appeal from the district court to the court of appeals and
    divests the district court of jurisdiction.   See United States v.
    Hitchmon, 
    602 F.2d 689
    , 692 (5th Cir. 1979)(en banc).   Daniels does
    not argue that his postjudgment motions were in aid of appeal.    His
    argument that the district court should have postponed filing his
    notice of appeal until ruling on his postjudgment motions, filed
    after he submitted to the court his notice of appeal, is without
    legal support and is factually untenable.
    Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of Daniels’s
    complaint is AFFIRMED.   The district court’s dismissal for failure
    to state a claim and this court’s affirmance of the district court’s
    dismissal count as a single strike for purposes of 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g).   See Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 387 (5th Cir.
    1996).   Daniels is warned that if he accumulates three strikes, he
    may not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal
    No. 03-20236
    -4-
    while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is in
    imminent danger of serious physical injury.   See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g).
    AFFIRMED; SANCTIONS WARNING ISSUED.