Sookma v. Millard ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 4, 2005
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
04-20342
Summary Calendar
JULIA ANN SOOKMA, Individually, and as Mother
and Next Friend to Katherine E. Sookma, a Minor
Child, and as USA ex rel “Relator,”,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LISA A. MILLARD; DANIEL LEMKUIL; JAMES D. SQUIER; JOHN A.
SOOKMA; DALE STOKES; DANIEL C. KEELE, Attorney, and his
Professional Liability Insurance Carrier; CYNTHIA T. DIGGS,
Attorney, and her Professional Liability Insurance Carrier; THE
LAW FIRM OF HOLMES, WOODS & DIGGS, and its Professional Liability
Insurance Carrier; DONNA TEEL; JILL TOKUMOTO, and CPS Employees;
BETTY HABLE; LORETTA PATTERSON; MALEETA WATSON; DEBORAH EMERSON;
ARLENE OLIVER; DAPHNE CAMBELL, and their Texas State Bond of
Insurance; ROBERT HOLMES, JR.; D. KAY WOODS; FRANCES MILLARD;
BONNIE ZENDEJAS; KANITHA SOREL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(4:02-CV-4911)
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Julia Ann Sookma appeals, pro se, the dismissal of her
complaint, claiming defendants conspired with each other and state
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
court judges presiding over divorce and custody proceedings between
Sookma and her ex-husband John Sookma to deprive her of various
civil rights. Sookma sought damages and to enjoin defendants from
enforcing the state court divorce decree.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court
dismissed this action as a collateral attack on the state court
decree. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The district
court also determined Sookma’s service of process was defective
and, for various reasons, dismissal was appropriate on the merits
of her claims.
We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. E.g., Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex., 32 F.3d 942,
945 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1103 (1995). We also
review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss being granted for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 536 U.S. 960 (2002).
Sookma asserts conclusionally that the district court applied
Rooker-Feldman erroneously. Based on our review of the record and
briefs, the district court did not err in applying this doctrine,
in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22
(2005) (applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and confining it to
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“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments”); see Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas,
18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 906 (1994). In
any event, Sookma has failed to address the alternate bases for
dismissal, including defective service of process, issues of
absolute and qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. By
failing to brief these issues, Sookma has abandoned them; it is the
same as if she had not appealed the judgment. See Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas
County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987);
FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9).
The appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. See
Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the
appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
DISMISSED
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