Ryburn v. Potter ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 7, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
____________________
No. 05-30134
Summary Calendar
____________________
RHONDA L. RYBURN
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
JOHN E. POTTER
Defendant - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:03-CV-275
_________________________________________________________________
Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Rhonda Ryburn appeals the district
court’s summary-judgment dismissal of her claim that she was
discriminated and retaliated against with respect to promotion
opportunities on the basis of her race, sex, and disability in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
1
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000), and the Rehabilitation Act of
1978, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). For the following
reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Rhonda Ryburn, a Caucasian female, began working for the
Postal Service at the Remote Encoding Center (“REC”) located in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1996. After the REC closed, Ryburn
moved to the General Mail Facility in August 2000. In accordance
with ordinary practice, the Postal Service posted a vacancy
announcement in January 2001 for a position as a Flat Sorter
Machine Operator (“FSM operator”), and Ryburn bid on the position
and began working as a Level 5 FSM operator on February 10, 2001,
under her immediate supervisor Sean Fleury, an African-American
male. Flat mail operations also involved the Video Coding System
(“VCS”), the Automated Flat Sorter Machine (“AFSM”) 100, and the
Flat Sorter Machine (“FSM”) 1000. Ryburn’s primary job duties
consisted of keying in the address information from the flat mail
into the FSM 1000. Fleury implemented a seniority-based rotation
system that assigned the FSM operators to work on the various
machines depending on need and the number of employees that a
particular machine could accommodate.
While working as an FSM operator, Ryburn decided that she
wanted to become a supervisor. On March 8, 2001, the Postal
2
Service posted Vacancy Announcement No. 2001-16 for the Associate
Supervisor Program (“ASP”).1 Ryburn applied to the ASP but
received a letter on October 5, 2001, from Patti Stonicher,
coordinator of the ASP for the Louisiana District, disqualifying
her from suitability based upon deficiencies in her attendance,
safety, and discipline records.2 The letter indicated, however,
that Ryburn had received qualifying scores on the business
mathematics, reasoning, and writing tests, which would remain
valid for two years from the date of testing.3
Despite this setback, Ryburn submitted a written request to
Fleury on October 24, 2001, stating that she wanted to volunteer
to work in the VCS room. In her deposition, Ryburn explained
1
The Postal Service initiated the ASP in 1996 to offer
employees an opportunity to become first-line operational
supervisors. The primary purpose of the program is to attract,
select, and train the best possible candidates for first-line
operational supervisory positions.
2
The review committee for Ms. Ryburn’s application
consisted of Stonicher (Caucasian female), Kelly Smith (Caucasian
female), Joyce Banks (African-American female), and Ken Arceneaux
(Caucasian male).
3
If the ASP review committee disqualifies an applicant
based upon established benchmarks and guidelines, the candidate
can reapply for the program when the next vacancy announcement is
posted. The following suitability benchmarks for attendance were
used when Ryburn submitted her application: (1) no more than
three unscheduled absences in the one-year period prior to date
of posting; or (2) no more than three tardies in the one-year
period prior to the date of posting; or (3) no more than forty
hours of unscheduled non-Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) sick
leave and/or leave without pay (“LWOP”) in lieu of sick leave in
the one-year period prior to the date of posting. The record
demonstrates that Ryburn’s attendance record during the relevant
period fell short of these requirements.
3
that she pursued such training opportunities as a means to
advance her career in the Postal Service. Because a training
class had just taken place on the previous day, Ryburn was not
able to receive VCS training until the next training session in
March 2002. Meanwhile, in February 2002, Ryburn began working as
a Small Parcel Bundle Sorter (“SPBS”) under the supervision of
Charles West.4 About one month later, Ryburn successfully bid on
a position to work on the AFSM 100 machine. The additional
training improved Ryburn’s chances to work as a 204(B) supervisor
beginning in February 2002. Unlike a front-line supervisor who
successfully completes the ASP, a 204(B) supervisor merely serves
as a temporary replacement for an absent first-line supervisor
and cannot be directly promoted to a permanent supervisor role.5
Ryburn worked as a 204(B) supervisor on at least fifteen separate
occasions between March and September 2002.
On October 17, 2002, Ryburn alleged that West had a
“discussion” with her on the workroom floor in the presence of
4
Although the record is not entirely clear, Ryburn does
not contend that Fleury ordered or even requested that she
transfer to a different position within the Postal Service.
Rather, the record seems to indicate that employees frequently
bid for different positions when their supervisors post vacancy
announcements, possibly because of a high rate of turnover or
overlapping skill sets among the personnel.
5
The Postal Service maintains that no particular formal
training is necessary to serve as a 204(B) supervisor. The
record shows, however, that experience in the various sectors is
one of the factors used to determine which employee will be
selected to replace an absent front-line supervisor.
4
other craft employees concerning her work performance. Although
the precise nature of the interaction remains unclear from the
record, Ryburn maintains that because it took place on the
workroom floor, it was unprofessional and it unnecessarily
belittled her in front of her colleagues. Shortly thereafter,
Ryburn filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging unfair treatment in the
rotation system implemented by Fleury and wrongful retaliation as
evidenced by the discipline on the workroom floor.
In November 2002, Ryburn suffered a left shoulder sprain
from the repetitive activity associated with working on the SPBS
machine. Her physician restricted her from lifting activities in
excess of twenty-five pounds and performing any fine
manipulation, including keying entries on the sorter machines.
The Postal Service accommodated these restrictions with a
limited-duty assignment.
On April 8, 2003, Ryburn filed a complaint alleging that the
Postal Service discriminated against her on the basis of race
(Caucasian) and sex (female). The complaint also asserted that
the Postal Service unlawfully retaliated against Ryburn by
failing to process her disability claims in a timely fashion and
treating her unfairly after she filed the EEO complaints.
Specifically, Ryburn alleged that she was subjected to an unfair
rotation that gave junior employees more work opportunities and
that she was denied “upward mobility” as a 204(B) supervisor.
5
The district court found that Ryburn failed to demonstrate that
the Postal Service’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons were
pretexts for race, sex, or disability discrimination or
retaliation. Accordingly, the district court granted the Postal
Service’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Ryburn’s
claims with prejudice on December 29, 2004. Ryburn filed a
timely appeal of this judgment.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507
(5th Cir. 2003). We view the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
that party’s favor. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Therefore, summary judgment is warranted
when the non-moving party fails to establish facts supporting an
essential element of his prima facie claim. See Mason v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 274 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2001).
B. Ryburn’s Discrimination Claims Under Title VII
The primary issue on appeal is whether the district court
6
erred in granting summary judgment to the Postal Service on
Ryburn’s complaints of race and sex discrimination. Ryburn
alleges that the denial of the opportunity to work as a 204(B)
temporary supervisor constitutes an actionable “adverse
employment action” under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d)
(2000) (prohibiting unlawful discrimination with respect to on-
the-job training programs). The crux of Ryburn’s claim centers
on the fact that she worked as a 204(B) supervisor on only
fifteen separate occasions between February and September 2002,
whereas three of her African-American co-workers each served in
that capacity for more than 100 days during the same time period.
The district court focused on alleged differences in mail
processing experience among the employees and a planned
downsizing at the Postal Service to account for the disparity in
204(B) opportunities. Finding no error in the district court’s
reasoning, we affirm.
The district court analyzed Ryburn’s Title VII claims under
the framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny. In order to survive
summary judgment in a Title VII lawsuit, the plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To do so, the
plaintiff must produce evidence that: (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she
was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) others
similarly situated were treated more favorably. Id. at 802.
7
Although this evidentiary requirement is not particularly onerous
under the burden-shifting framework,6 the district court found
that Ryburn failed to establish even a prima facie case of race
or sex discrimination in the conduct of the Postal Service.
Ryburn’s naked assertions that supervisor Sean Fleury
implemented an unfair rotation scheme contradicts the available
deposition testimony and employment records. Ryburn was
classified as a Level 5 employee, meaning that she was trained to
key address information from the flat mail on the FSM 1000. The
FSM 1000, however, accommodated only six operators at any given
time, which clearly exceeded the thirteen qualified operators
already employed by the Postal Service when Ryburn began her
position. Fleury implemented a seniority-based rotation scheme
that assigned the FSM 1000 operators to work the AFSM 100 and the
VCS room when there was no available space on the FSM 1000.
According to Ryburn, she should not have been rotated with
part-time and Level 4 employees. She failed, however, to produce
any evidence of how similarly situated Level 5 employees fared
6
After the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for its
action. See Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398,
404 (5th Cir. 1999). If the plaintiff can demonstrate by
substantial evidence that the proffered justification is mere
pretext, then the case should survive summary judgment. Bauer v.
Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Evidence
that the proffered reason is unworthy of credence must be enough
to support a reasonable inference that the proffered reason is
false; a mere shadow of doubt is insufficient.”).
8
any better under the rotation system. See Wyvill v. United
Companies Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 304 (5th Cir. 2000)
(requiring “nearly identical circumstances” of employment to
support a claim of disparate treatment). In order to satisfy her
prima facie burden, Ryburn needed to demonstrate how other Level
5 employees actually received preferential treatment under
Fleury’s rotation system. She has not done so. Moreover,
Ryburn’s arguments do not explain how the ostensibly lateral
transfer from one mail sorting machine to another constituted an
“adverse employment action.” See Hockman v. Westward
Communications, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 331 (5th Cir. 2004) (“A purely
lateral transfer cannot constitute an adverse employment
action.”). A temporary shift from the FSM 1000 to the AFSM 100
or VCS room does not amount to an adverse employment action,
especially where, as here, the jobs entailed essentially the same
benefits, duties, and responsibilities as the old position. Id.
We also find no merit in Ryburn’s allegations concerning her
training and assignments to the VCS room. The record clearly
demonstrates that her request for VCS training was accommodated
during the first available class in March 2002.7 Her lack of
7
An employer is not required to extend any special
treatment to avoid liability for discrimination. See Deloach v.
Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring
only neutral, as opposed to special, treatment in an age
discrimination lawsuit). Thus, even though Ryburn was forced to
wait several months for VCS training, the Postal Service was not
legally obligated to schedule an earlier training session to more
quickly satisfy her request.
9
assignments to the VCS room was not because of any race or gender
discrimination, but rather the result of her successful
intervening bid for a position as an SPBS in February 2002.
Although Ryburn was qualified to work within the VCS room after
her training, her voluntary bid for a different position within
the Postal Service precluded any possible discriminatory motive
on the part of the defendant in the transfer. See, e.g., Stewart
v. Bd. of Trs. of Kemper County Sch. Dist., 585 F.2d 1285, 1286
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a “voluntary transfer” within a
school system cannot constitute the basis for Title VII
violation).
Although Ryburn concedes that the only means of achieving a
promotion to a first-line supervisor is through the ASP, she
insists that denying her more opportunities as a 204(B)
supervisor stifled her “upward mobility” in the Postal Service.
The manifest inconsistency in this argument renders it
unpersuasive. Additionally, the ASP coordinator Patricia
Stonicher, also a Caucasian female, did not evince any
discriminatory intent in her letter to Ryburn that clearly stated
the valid reasons for her disqualification from the program on
account of her attendance records. The objective suitability
benchmarks for attendance were established before Ryburn applied
for the program and were facially neutral in all relevant
10
respects.8 See Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332,
342-43 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a neutrally applied policy
requiring employees to work from the office and use a certain
business method for staffing projects cannot support a prima
facie case of discrimination under Title VII); Davis v. Dallas
Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding no
actionable Title VII denial of promotion where appellants failed
to meet posted requirements for the position).
We also note that Ryburn has not adduced any evidence to
suggest that the employment standards for the ASP operated more
harshly upon members of her protected class than other groups.
See Chance v. Rice Univ., 989 F.2d 179, 180 (5th Cir. 1998)
(noting that a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title
VII requires the plaintiff to show that “facially neutral
employment standards operated more harshly on one group than
another”) (quoting Johnson v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363,
1367 (5th Cir. 1992)). The record does not indicate that other
ASP candidates with similar attendance records to Ryburn received
more favorable treatment. Even assuming that Ryburn offered
proof of unfair treatment to meet her prima facie burden, the
8
Whereas more subjective qualification standards might
raise some suspicion of pretextual determinations, objective
bright-line attendance requirements that are applied in an even-
handed fashion do not entail this danger. See Medina v. Ramsey
Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
11
established attendance requirements for acceptance to the ASP
constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying her
application, which Ryburn has failed to rebut with any additional
evidence. Thus, the Postal Service was entitled to summary
judgment with respect to this claim as well.
Ryburn’s evidence of disparate treatment regarding the
number of opportunities she was given to work as a 204(B)
supervisor similarly fails to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII. Her claim centers around the
allegedly disproportionate number of hours that three African-
American employees were permitted to work as 204(B) supervisors.
Ryburn does not dispute, however, the fact that each employee
receiving additional hours as a 204(B) supervisor had more mail
processing experience than she did.9 The district court
reasonably inferred that such additional training and experience
was taken into account when determining which employees should
fill in for absent supervisors on any given occasion. See, e.g.,
Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1998)
(finding no authority for the proposition that an applicant’s
actual and relevant field experience must be ignored when
reviewing a candidate for promotion). Even if the disparity
9
The Postal Service asserted that the three employees in
question had respectively fourteen, six, and five years of mail
processing work experience. Ryburn, on the other hand, had less
than two years of mail processing experience when she began
working as a 204(B) supervisor.
12
supported a prima facie case, the relevant differences in mail
processing experience demonstrate that Ryburn was not similarly
situated to these employees and deserving of identical treatment
under the law. See Wyvill, 212 F.3d at 305 (holding that
“striking differences” between employees in an age-discrimination
case adequately explained differential treatment).
With respect to the allegedly unprofessional discussion
with her supervisor West on the workroom floor on October 17,
2002, Ryburn’s complaints once again do not rise to the level of
an actionable Title VII violation. It is well settled that,
absent any verifiable and immediate change in employment status,
mere verbal reprimands cannot support a claim of discriminatory
treatment. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708
(5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he verbal threat of being fired, the
reprimand for not being at [one’s] assigned station, a missed pay
increase, and being placed on ‘final warning’, do not constitute
‘adverse employment actions’ because of their lack of
consequence.”). Even if the workroom floor was not the most
appropriate place for the discussion, this court will not lightly
attribute discriminatory motives to a supervisor based on
managerial style. See Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of
N. Tex., P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 539 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
plaintiff must do more than demonstrate that he or she has a
“rude or uncivil boss” to succeed in a harassment suit under
Title VII). Moreover, Ryburn has not alleged any other instances
13
of disciplinary action on the workroom floor to bolster her
claims of unfair treatment. See Hockman, 407 F.3d at 328 (noting
that “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” will not
amount to actionable discriminatory acts under Title VII)
(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)
(citation omitted)). Therefore, the district court appropriately
dismissed Ryburn’s complaint in this respect as well.
C. Ryburn’s Retaliation Claims Under the Rehabilitation Act
Ryburn claims that the Postal Service unlawfully retaliated
against her by delaying the processing of her disability claims
after she filed her EEO complaints. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(2000) (prohibiting disability-based discrimination by the U.S.
Postal Service). Both parties acknowledge that Ryburn suffered a
sprain to her left shoulder, which limited her ability to lift
more than twenty-five pounds and perform fine manipulation,
including, inter alia, the repetitive keying required on the
various SPBS machines. After the injury, the Postal Service
accommodated her medical restrictions with a limited duty
assignment. Ryburn contends, however, that the Postal Service
delayed her request for a particular chair recommended by her
physician and did not lessen her repetitive work to the desired
extent in retaliation for her past EEO complaints. Finding no
merit in these arguments after our de novo review of the record,
we affirm the district court opinion dismissing these
14
allegations.
The Rehabilitation Act adopts the standards applied under
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) to
determine whether there has been a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). The ADA defines
“disability” as, inter alia, “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of [a person’s] major life
activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). The major life
activity involved in this case is the activity of working as a
craft employee at the Post Office. A person is substantially
limited with respect to the activity of working when that person
is
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability
to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2003); see also Sutton v. United Air
Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (citing regulations and
explaining that the phrase “substantially limits” means, “at a
minimum, that [a person is] unable to work in a broad class of
jobs”).
In granting the Postal Service’s motion for summary
judgment, the district court concluded that Ryburn could not show
that the shoulder injury substantially limited a major life
activity. We agree with that conclusion. In making this
15
determination, the district court correctly examined “[t]he
nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term
impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or
resulting from the impairment.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii)). In the instant matter, Ryburn’s
shoulder injury limited her ability only to perform heavy lifting
and repetitive fine manipulation movements. Ryburn’s testimony
confirmed that she was not restricted from sitting, standing,
walking, climbing, kneeling, bending, or stooping. Because these
medical restrictions affect only a narrow range of jobs requiring
fine manipulation and heavy lifting,10 the district court
correctly found that Ryburn was not substantially limited from
the major life activity of working. See Sherrod v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding a heavy
lifting restriction to be insufficient evidence of a substantial
limitation on a major life activity).
We also find little support for the proposition that the
record here reasonably suggests that Ryburn was “regarded as”
disabled in a more general sense by her supervisors at the Postal
10
Indeed, the record of Ryburn’s testimony clearly
indicates that the Postal Service accommodated her medical
restrictions with a seated job sorting mail from a bin. It is
clear that this substitute position did not entail the sort of
heavy lifting and repetitive keying that Ryburn’s rehabilitation
program prohibited.
16
Service.11 Based upon the uncontroverted testimony in the
record, the Postal Service made a genuine effort to transfer
Ryburn to positions that would not further aggravate her shoulder
injury. Thus, the district court correctly found that Ryburn was
not generally “regarded as” disabled and retaliated against on
that basis. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393
(5th Cir. 1993) (“An employer’s belief that an employee is unable
to perform one task . . . does not establish per se that the
employer regards the employee as having a substantial limitation
on his ability to work in general.”).
The summary-judgment record reasonably supports at most an
inference that Ryburn was regarded as unable to perform a
relatively narrow range of tasks associated with the work of
certain craft employees. Ryburn has not presented any direct
evidence to suggest that her shoulder conditions contributed to
her exclusion from the ASP or impeded her from receiving
assignments as a replacement 204(B) supervisor. See Gowesky v.
11
For a plaintiff to successfully establish that she was
“regarded as” disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C), she must
demonstrate that she:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a
covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes
of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or
(2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as
having a substantially limiting impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l); see also Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92
F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996).
17
Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting a “regarded as” disability claim where the employer
“never limited [the plaintiff’s] job duties or hindered [the
plaintiff’s] return to the full range of duties”).
Finally, even if Ryburn successfully established a prima
facie case of retaliation in the untimely processing of her
disability compensation claim after she filed EEO complaints, the
Postal Service has asserted a legitimate, non-retaliatory
explanation for the delay. Specifically, the record indicates
that the disability claim was filed while West was in the midst
of retiring, which might have caused some unforeseen
administrative delays in processing such claims. Moreover, once
the claim form was presented to the new supervisor, it was
completed and signed immediately. Our independent review of the
record amply supports the district court’s reasonable inference
that such an inadvertent delay under the circumstances cannot
survive dismissal under the Rehabilitation Act. See Kelly v.
Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 365-66 (5th Cir.
1995) (rejecting the argument that the Rehabilitation Act is
broad enough to encompass “unknowing, negligent or benign
handicap discrimination that produces a failure to make a
reasonable accommodation”). Furthermore, the Postal Service met
its burden of production under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
leaving Ryburn with the ultimate burden of persuasion to carry
her retaliation claim beyond the summary-judgment stage. Reeves
18
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)
(“Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth
under this framework, ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’”)
(quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981)). Ryburn has offered nothing beyond her own
subjective belief to suggest that this reason was pretextual.
See Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 403 (5th
Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiff must produce “substantial
evidence” of pretext to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion
after the defendant produces legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the challenged action); see also Bauer v. Albemarle
Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that an
employee’s subjective belief of discrimination alone without more
is not sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion).
Since Ryburn failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact
concerning whether she was regarded as disabled in the major life
activity of working, the district court correctly granted the
Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
19