United States v. Chasten ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT March 27, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-40144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LARRY JUNIOR CHASTEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(1:05-CR-546-1)
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Convicted for conspiracy to possess, and possession with
intent to distribute, marijuana, Larry Chasten challenges the
denial of his suppression motion and contends his Sixth Amendment
fair-trial and confrontation rights were violated. AFFIRMED.
I.
After being directed by a paid confidential informant to a
tractor-trailer’s location at a secluded farmhouse, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Agents followed it, observed unusual behavior,
and executed a traffic stop. Chasten was the driver of the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
tractor-trailer. One of the Agents told Chasten he had observed
suspicious activity and asked to search the vehicle. Chasten
agreed. Approximately 48 kilograms of marijuana were found in the
trailer.
Chasten was charged with conspiracy to possess, and possession
with intent to distribute, less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), and 846. His
motions, inter alia, to suppress the marijuana and for disclosure
of the informant’s identity, were denied; for, inter alia,
discovery of exculpatory evidence, granted.
A bench trial was held on stipulated evidence. Chasten was
found guilty of both counts. He was sentenced, inter alia, to 33
months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently.
II.
Chasten challenges the denial of his suppression motion and
claims violation of his constitutional rights. Each contention is
without merit.
A.
A suppression ruling requires a determination of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, based on historical facts, which are
reviewed only for clear error. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 697 (1996); United States v. Pompa, 434 F.3d 800, 803 (5th
Cir. 2005). “[Q]uestions of law, including whether the district
court’s ultimate conclusions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness are
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correct, [are reviewed] de novo”. United States v. Maldonado, 472
F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2006).
Law enforcement officers may conduct a brief investigatory
stop of a vehicle and its occupants when they have reasonable
suspicion “criminal activity may be afoot”. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30 (1968). “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is considerably easier
for the government to establish than probable cause.” United
States v. Tellez, 11 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1993). There need
only be “some minimal level of objective justification for the
officer’s actions, measured in [the] light of the totality of the
circumstances”. United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th
Cir. 1992) (en banc). Based on the totality of the circumstances,
there was objective justification for stopping Chasten’s vehicle.
One of the Agents received a tip from an informant, who had
provided reliable information on numerous prior occasions. See
United States v. De Los Santos, 810 F.2d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir.
1987). According to the informant: a tractor-trailer with out-of-
state license plates had followed another vehicle from a hotel
parking lot through “back roads”; the driver of the second vehicle
parked it and boarded the tractor; and the tractor-trailer then
followed a third vehicle to a secluded farmhouse, where, after some
difficulty, it was parked close to the house. The Agents arrived
in the area and established surveillance. After 30 to 45 minutes,
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the tractor-trailer left the farmhouse with another vehicle
following it.
An Agent testified that, based on his nine years in narcotics
investigation, these circumstances were suspicious due to: an out-
of-state tractor-trailer departing from main roads to an area
without a gas station or truck stop; its taking aboard a passenger;
its difficulty parking, suggesting the driver had not been to the
farmhouse before; its remaining at the farmhouse for a short period
of time, indicating it was loading contraband; and, on departure,
its being accompanied by an escort or lookout vehicle. As stated,
these circumstances provide ample support for the requisite
reasonable-suspicion finding.
B.
Chasten contends his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial
and to confront adverse witnesses were violated by: the
Government’s failure to advise him of relevant facts about the
informant, specifically a theft charge brought, but later dropped,
against him over 20 years earlier; and the denial of his motion for
disclosure of the informant’s identity.
1.
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), “the
government’s failure to disclose evidence to the defense violates
[Chasten]’s due process rights where the evidence is (1) favorable
to the defense; and (2) material to guilt or punishment”. United
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States v. Brown, 303 F.3d 582, 593 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis
added). Evidence is “material to guilt or punishment” if there is
a reasonable probability its disclosure would have resulted in a
different outcome in the proceeding. Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d
641, 649-50 (5th Cir. 1999). “The question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy
of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Brady
claims are reviewed de novo. Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581,
591 (5th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed (16 Mar. 2007) (No.
06-10186).
Disclosure of the informant’s quite distant theft charge was
not favorable to the defense and had little, if any, probability of
resulting in a different outcome. The information could not have
been used to impeach a witness because the informant did not
testify at trial. Furthermore, many of the informant’s
observations were confirmed by the Agents.
2.
Finally, using a three-part inquiry, we review for an abuse of
discretion the denial of Chasten’s motion for disclosure of the
informant’s identity. United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384,
1391 (5th Cir. 1993). The inquiry entails: (1) evaluation of the
level of the informant’s participation in the alleged criminal
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activity; (2) the helpfulness of disclosure to any asserted
defense; and (3) the Government’s interest in nondisclosure.
United States v. Orozco, 982 F.2d 152, 154-55 (5th Cir. 1993).
The district court did not abuse its discretion. First, the
informant’s level of participation was minimal. He did not
participate in the criminal activity but simply observed Chasten’s
activities and communicated his observations and Chasten’s location
to an Agent; Agents established surveillance and, inter alia,
observed the tractor-trailer depart with another vehicle. See id.
at 155 (finding informant’s “very minor role” in criminal
transaction favors nondisclosure). Second, Chasten has not shown
disclosure of the informant’s identity would have significantly
assisted his defense. As noted, the Agents independently attested
to many of the suspicious circumstances. Finally, the Government
had a strong interest in continuing to use the informant, who had
previously provided accurate information as a confidential source
for law enforcement. See De Los Santos, 810 F.2d at 1331.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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