United States v. Diaz-Vela , 224 F. App'x 381 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    REVISED APRIL 10, 2007
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                  April 4, 2007
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 06-40939
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    FRANCISCO JAVIER DIAZ-VELA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:06-CR-28-ALL
    --------------------
    Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Francisco Javier Diaz-Vela appeals his guilty-plea conviction
    and sentence for being unlawfully present in the United States
    following   removal.       The   district   court    enhanced     Diaz-Vela’s
    sentence    based   upon   its   finding    that    his   prior    California
    conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor was a
    conviction for a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
    Diaz-Vela argues that the enhancement was improper because the
    statute under which he was convicted sets the legal age for consent
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 06-40939
    -2-
    to sexual activity at 18 years of age while the Model Penal Code
    and the majority of the states set the legal age of consent for
    sexual activity at 16 years of age of younger.
    Diaz-Vela’s prior conviction was under CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 261.5. Under a common sense approach, Diaz-Vela’s conviction was
    for the enumerated offenses of statutory rape and sexual abuse of
    a   minor   and,     accordingly,     a   crime      of   violence   under
    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).     See § 2L1.2, comment. (n.1(b)(iii)); United
    States v. Izaguirre-Flores, 
    405 F.3d 270
    , 275 (5th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 253
     (2005); see also United States v. Hernandez-
    Castillo, 
    449 F.3d 1127
    , 1131 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 936
     (2007); United States v. Vargas-Garnica, 
    332 F.3d 471
    ,
    474 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2003).
    Diaz-Vela also argues that the felony and aggravated felony
    provisions contained in 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b) are unconstitutional in
    light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000).                This
    constitutional     argument   is   foreclosed   by   Almendarez-Torres   v.
    United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235 (1998).              Although Diaz-Vela
    contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a
    majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in
    light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on
    the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding.              See United
    States v. Garza-Lopez, 
    410 F.3d 268
    , 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    126 S. Ct. 298
     (2005).         Diaz-Vela properly concedes that his
    No. 06-40939
    -3-
    argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit
    precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
    AFFIRMED.