Smith v. Patri , 99 F. App'x 497 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 29, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10583
Summary Calendar
NORMAN DEAN SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEFFREY PATRI, Tarrant County Jailer; ET. AL.,
Defendants,
JEFFREY PATRI, Tarrant County Jailer,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:02-CV-463-A
--------------------
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-appellee Norman Dean Smith, Texas state prisoner
# 631984, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against former Tarrant County Jailer Jeffrey Patri and
another defendant, alleging violation of his rights by filing an
inaccurate report that Smith possessed cocaine in the jail, by
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-10583
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searching him, and by subsequently prosecuting him for this
offense. Patri now appeals the district court’s order denying
his summary-judgment motion insofar as it asserted the defense of
qualified immunity against the federal claims. We REVERSE and
REMAND.
“Government officials acting within their discretionary
authority are immune from civil damages if their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Evett v. Detntff,
330 F.3d 681, 687 (5th Cir. 2003). This court’s “examination of
a claim of qualified immunity is a two-step process.” Harper v.
Harris County, Texas, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1994). “First,
the plaintiff must allege the violation of a clearly established
right. . . . Second, the actions of the officer must be
objectively reasonable under the circumstances, such that a
reasonably competent officer would not have known his actions
violated then-existing clearly established law.” Evett, 300 F.3d
at 687 (citation omitted). The question whether an official’s
conduct was objectively reasonable is a question of law, to be
decided by this court. Harper, 21 F.3d at 600.
Patri clearly falls within the category of persons for whom
qualified immunity was promulgated. First, he was a government
employee. Second, he was performing a discretionary governmental
act, as a sheriff’s employee jailing a suspect. Davis v.
Klevenhagen, 971 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. App. 1998).
No. 03-10583
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Investigations of matters within the official’s purview are also
discretionary acts. See Fowler v. Szostek, 905 S.W.2d 336, 342
(Tex. App. 1995). Thus, the remaining question is whether Patri
should prevail under the two-step analysis.
Patri is entitled to immunity because Smith has not pleaded
or shown a violation of a clearly established constitutional
right. The bases of Smith’s complaint against Patri are that he
filed a “false” report about Smith’s possession of crack cocaine
and that he was improperly searched after Patri discovered the
crack cocaine about his person. R. 1, 2-3. First, there is no
right to a completely accurate police report. Furthermore, Patri
admitted before the jury that his memory of the incident had
faded over the intervening months and that he could not testify
with certainty that Smith dropped the crack cocaine from his
hand.
Also without merit is Smith’s claim that Patri violated his
rights by searching him after Patri saw him drop what he believed
to be crack cocaine. A lawfully arrested prisoner has no right
to be free from searches of his person. Indeed, the notion that
a prisoner when processed into a jail should be free from search
is ridiculous. Such a search is valid as a search incident to a
lawful arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d
838, 846 (5th Cir. 1997). For Patri’s search to have violated
Smith’s rights in this context, this court would have to disavow
No. 03-10583
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law enforcement’s authority to protect itself, the general
public, and other prisoners by searching arrested persons.
The second step of the immunity analysis asks whether
“the actions of the officer [were] objectively reasonable under
the circumstances, such that a reasonably competent officer
would not have known his actions violated then-existing clearly
established law. The question of whether an official’s conduct
was objectively reasonable is a question of law, to be decided
by this Court.” Evett, 330 F.3d at 687 (citations omitted).
Patri’s actions were objectively reasonable, since he was merely
doing his job.
It was Patri’s responsibility as an intake jailer to search
prisoners brought to the Tarrant County Jail. It was especially
important for him to search Smith thoroughly because the
arresting officer felt that he was concealing something and
told Patri that. Undoubtedly there was evidence that Smith
was concealing 15 grams of crack cocaine. Thus Patri’s search
of Smith was objectively reasonable.
Second, Patri’s truthful testimony at Smith’s trial was
objectively reasonable, as shown by the record. Smith does not
contest this, but asks whether “a witness’s honest testimony [is]
a lawful excuse for a fabricated report.” He argues that Patri
No. 03-10583
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is not entitled to qualified immunity because he falsified the
report, which may have induced the jury to convict him.**
This lacks merit because Smith was convicted in spite of the
alleged error in Patri’s report. The jury convicted Smith after
it heard Patri testify that he did not then recall that the drugs
fell from Smith’s hand but instead may have fallen from his belt
or pocket area. See R. 1, 206-09. Thus, the jury convicted
Smith notwithstanding Patri’s uncertainty concerning whence the
drugs fell. Moreover, there was never any question that Patri
recovered the drugs from underneath Smith’s foot after he placed
his foot over them when they hit the floor. Thus, Patri is
entitled to summary judgment on his defense of qualified
immunity. See Evett, 330 F.3d at 686-90.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. It is further ORDERED that Smith’s motion for
damages under FED. R. APP. P. 38 is DENIED.
**
The parties disagree on whether this conviction has
been set aside.