Radiator Specialty Co. v. Pennzoil-Quaker State Co. , 207 F. App'x 361 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    January 30, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    03-20368
    RADIATOR SPECIALTY COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    PENNZOIL-QUAKER STATE COMPANY, formerly known as Pennzoil
    Products Company; PANDORA MANUFACATURING INC., formerly known as
    Snap Products Inc.
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Southern District of Texas
    (01-CV-2205)
    Before DUHÉ, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:1
    Plaintiff Radiator Speciality Co. sued makers of “Fix-a-Flat”
    under   the    Lanham      Act,   alleging     that    false   advertising      of
    Defendants’ product as non-explosive and safe injured Plaintiff in
    marketing     its   own    “Puncture   Seal”    tire    inflator,    which     was
    allegedly truly safe but more expensive. The only issues on appeal
    concern the district court’s holding on summary judgment that
    Radiator’s claim of false advertisement is barred by the equitable
    doctrine of laches.          The court found the facts undisputed that
    1
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    seven years elapsed between the time Radiator first objected to the
    use of the “non-explosive formula” label on the “DME” version of
    Fix-a-Flat and the date Radiator filed this suit.              On motions for
    summary judgment by defendants, Pandora Manufacturing, Inc. and its
    alleged successor-in-interest, Pennzoil-Quaker State Company, the
    district court dismissed based on laches.            We affirm.
    I.
    Laches is an inexcusable delay on the part of the plaintiff
    that results in prejudice to the defendant.           Conan Props., Inc. v.
    Conan’s Pizza, Inc., 
    752 F.2d 145
    , 153 (5th Cir. 1985).                To the
    extent that the relevant facts are undisputed, a district court
    “enjoys considerable discretion in deciding whether to apply the
    doctrine of laches.”   National Ass'n of Gov. Employees v. City Pub.
    Serv. Bd., 
    40 F.3d 698
    , 707 (5th Cir. 1994).           When a district court
    is making an equity determination such as laches, the scope of its
    powers “is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
    equitable remedies.”    Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
    
    402 U.S. 1
    , 15, 
    91 S. Ct. 1267
    , 1276 (1971).              Unless the district
    court   resolved   disputed   issues     of    material    fact   against    the
    nonmovant, “its determination of whether the undisputed facts
    warrant   an   application    of   laches      is   reviewed   for   abuse    of
    discretion.”    National 
    Ass'n, 40 F.3d at 707
    .
    II.
    Plaintiff asserts four errors.           First, Radiator contends that
    the district court ignored its evidence of Pandora’s and Pennzoil’s
    “unclean hands,” which should have precluded them from invoking an
    2
    equitable    defense.     The   district     court   determined     that   the
    undisputed facts did not demonstrate any “willful, egregious, or
    unconscionable conduct or bad faith” on the part of Defendants, as
    discussed in Hot Wax,2 so as to constitute unclean hands.            We agree
    with that assessment.     Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in
    the court’s requirement, in accordance with Hot Wax, that the
    inequitable conduct alleged relate to the equitable issue in the
    case, i.e., the defense of laches.          (On the main demand, Radiator
    is asking for damages, not equitable relief.)           We agree that the
    record demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact on the
    question of Defendants’ “unclean hands” and find no abuse of
    discretion in the district court’s ruling in this regard.
    Radiator’s second assignment of error is that the district
    court improperly calculated the length of delay for Pennzoil, which
    purchased    the   Fix-A-Flat   line   in   November   1997,   by   allowing
    Pennzoil to “tack” onto the delay by Radiator in raising its claim
    against the preceding owner of Fix-A-Flat.           The court considered
    the rationale behind patent and trademark jurisprudence allowing
    “tacking.”    If a sale involves an entire product line along with
    the goodwill, then “the transferee effectively has assumed the
    transferor’s identity,”3 and both the defendant and its predecessor
    2
    Hot Wax, Inc., v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 
    191 F.3d 813
    , 826 (7th
    Cir. 1999).
    3
    R2 Medical Systems, Inc. v. Katecho, Inc., 
    931 F. Supp. 1397
    ,
    1412 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
    3
    have been “lulled into security by plaintiff’s failure to sue.”4
    Because     under    the   undisputed    terms    of     Pennzoil’s   acquisition
    document the goodwill was transferred with the entire product line,
    the court reasoned that Pennzoil similarly effectively assumed the
    transferor’s identity for purposes of laches.                  We discern no abuse
    of discretion or error of law in the district court’s careful
    analysis.
    Radiator’s third and fourth assigned errors are that the
    district court inappropriately resolved factual differences against
    Radiator on the issues of unjustifiable delay and prejudice.                      We
    conclude from our review of the record, however, that the material
    facts are not genuinely disputed.                 The court did not reject
    factually any of the reasons Plaintiff offered for the delay.                     We
    hold that its analysis and conclusions about the insufficiency of
    those reasons are well within its discretion.
    The    court    found   material        evidence    of    prejudice    to    be
    uncontradicted as well, and we agree.             Although the court noted a
    conflicting     affidavit     on   the       availability      of   “many   of    the
    witnesses,” the court found no question of fact regarding the
    unavailability of documents or economic harm.                   The court neither
    improperly resolved any material fact nor abused its discretion in
    finding prejudice.
    III.
    Laches “is not determined by a simple rule of thumb,” but by
    4
    Celastic Corp. v. McClellan Shoe Specialty Co., 
    15 F. Supp. 1048
    , 1050 (D.C. Del. 1936).
    4
    “a close scrutiny of the particular facts and a balancing of the
    respective interests and equities of the parties, as well as the
    general public.”   5 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair
    Competition, § 31:22 (4th ed. 2003).   The district court provided
    a thorough opinion, making its determination to apply laches to
    undisputed facts in precisely that manner.   It did not abuse its
    discretion in so doing.
    AFFIRMED.
    5