Farris v. Johnson ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-20341
VICTOR LYNN FARRIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
GARY L. JOHNSON, Director
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-97-CV-1596)
June 20, 2000
Before GARWOOD, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Victor Lynn Farris, Texas prisoner # 363035, appeals the
denial of his habeas corpus application brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Farris was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape and was
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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sentenced to life imprisonment. See Farris v. State, 712 S.W.2d
512, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Farris’s accomplice, Timothy
Huffman, testified against Farris at trial, describing in detail
Farris’s role in the crime and directly contradicting Farris’s
alibi testimony.
On direct appeal, a Texas intermediate appellate court
reversed Farris’s conviction and ordered a new trial based on
Farris’s due process claim that the State failed to disclose a plea
agreement it had made with Huffman. The court’s decision was based
on new evidence consisting of testimony given by Huffman, his
attorney and the assistant district attorney at a hearing on
Huffman’s successful motion to set aside his guilty plea. The
court stated that the “record demonstrates either that the state
specifically promised Huffman’s attorney a recommendation of a 30-
year sentence in exchange for Huffman’s testimony against [Farris],
or that the State promised at least to notify the court in
Huffman’s case of Huffman’s cooperativeness in prosecuting [Farris]
and to request leniency in that case.” Farris, 676 S.W.2d at 675-
77.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that decision and
remanded, holding that the Court of Appeals had no authority to
supplement the record with testimony from the Huffman hearing. See
Farris, 712 S.W.2d at 514-16. The court noted that Farris still
had a remedy through a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. See
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id. at 516 n.3. On remand for consideration of the remaining
grounds of error, Farris’s conviction was affirmed.
Farris then filed a state habeas corpus application, which was
denied without a written order on the findings of the trial court
after a hearing. The trial court considered the same testimony
from Huffman’s motion for new trial that the intermediate appellate
court had found compelling during Farris’s direct appeal and
concluded that no agreement or promise for a specific number of
years existed, that the jury was apprised of the only agreement
between the State and Huffman, and that notwithstanding Huffman’s
testimony, there was sufficient evidence of Farris’s guilt.2
Farris then filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application. The
district court denied habeas relief and denied Farris a certificate
of appealability (“COA”). This court granted COA on Farris’s
claims that the State failed to disclose evidence of a plea
agreement for leniency with Huffman and presented false evidence
about the nature of its agreement with Huffman to the jury.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of review
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Farris argues that the findings of the trial court at his state
habeas evidentiary hearing are in conflict with a Texas
intermediate appellate court decision in Huffman v. State, 676
S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1984), and the state is
collaterally estopped from continuing to litigate the issue.
Collateral estoppel does not apply against the prosecution in a
criminal case on the basis of an earlier determination in the
criminal case of a different defendant. See Nichols v. Scott, 69
F.3d 1255, 1270 (5th Cir. 1987).
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The determination of factual issues made by the state court
shall be presumed to be correct, and the applicant has the burden
of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
B. Giglio Claim
The State has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the
accused that is material to guilt or punishment. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963). If the reliability of a
witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure
of evidence affecting credibility falls within the general rule of
Brady. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
A promise of leniency made to a key witness in return for his
testimony is impeachment evidence to which a defendant is entitled.
See id. Likewise, a due process violation occurs if the State
knowingly fails to correct false testimony which reasonably could
have affected the judgment of the jury. See Blackmon v. Johnson,
145 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1258
(1999).
There is no dispute that the State made an agreement with
Huffman that may have affected the jury’s view of his credibility
and that the jury was apprised of the existence of an agreement.
Farris’s position is that the State did not disclose the entirety
of the agreement to Farris and allowed Huffman’s testimony that did
not accurately describe the agreement to stand uncorrected in front
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of the jury. We begin by presuming the correctness of the state
court’s determination that the jury was apprised of the only
agreement between the State and Huffman. The question then becomes
whether Farris has rebutted that presumption by clear and
convincing evidence.
Huffman, in response to questions posed by the State and
Farris’s trial counsel, told the jury that, in exchange for his
testimony, he had been offered the opportunity to plead guilty to
the aggravated rape charge, that the State would drop the other two
charges and that the State would tell the sentencing Judge that
Huffman had cooperated but would not recommend a certain number of
years. Farris has presented evidence, in the form of testimony by
Huffman, Huffman’s trial counsel and the assistant district
attorney that the agreement was for the State to “recommend
leniency” in sentencing Huffman in return for Huffman pleading
guilty and testifying against Farris, but that the agreement did
not specify a certain number of years. While the articulation of
the agreement in front of the jury did not include the words
“recommend leniency,” Huffman’s evidence does not clearly and
convincingly rebut the state court’s conclusion that the jury was
apprised of the agreement. Certainly, the jury understood that the
reason the State agreed to advise Huffman’s sentencing judge of his
cooperation with the State during Farris’s trial was to induce
leniency in sentencing. Farris has not presented any evidence
that his jury was deprived of information material to its
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assessment of Huffman’s credibility.
CONCLUSION
Based on the conclusion that Farris has not rebutted the state
court’s determination of facts, we find no due process violation
meriting habeas corpus relief and therefore affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Farris’s claims.
AFFIRMED.
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