Crowe v. Henry ( 1995 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 94-40166
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    Douglas E. Mitchell,
    Plaintiff/Appellant,
    versus
    Bob Owens, Chairman, Pardon &
    Paroles Division,
    Defendant/Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Eastern District of Texas
    (1:94-CV-666)
    _________________________________________________________________
    (May 18, 1995)
    Before JOHNSON, DUHÉ, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.*
    JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:
    Texas prison inmate, acting pro se and in forma pauperis,
    filed a civil rights action against the Chairman of the Texas
    Board of Pardon and Paroles alleging that his constitutional
    rights had been violated by the state's failure to grant him
    parole.   The district court dismissed suit as frivolous and
    inmate appeals.   Because the appeal is frivolous, it is
    DISMISSED.   See Loc.R. 42.2.
    *
    Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
    that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
    cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
    needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
    profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published.
    I.    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Douglas E. Mitchell alleges that he has served the statutory
    minimum required under Texas law for placement on parole.      He
    received an initial interview with a parole counselor, but
    several months passed from the date of that interview without
    Mitchell having received any notice of parole action.      Hence,
    Mitchell brought this action, pro se and in forma pauperis,
    pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     seeking declaratory and injunctive
    relief regarding his parole status.
    The case was referred to a magistrate who determined that
    inmates in the Texas prison system have no protected liberty
    interest in being released on parole.      Thus, the magistrate judge
    recommended that Mitchell's action be dismissed as frivolous.
    Mitchell objected to the Magistrate Judge's Report and
    Recommendation.      In those objections, Mitchell suggested that he
    is seeking to be released on mandatory supervision rather than
    parole.   The district court rejected Mitchell's objections,
    though, finding that Mitchell did not meet the criteria for
    mandatory supervision.      Hence, the district court adopted the
    Magistrate Judge's recommendation and dismissed Mitchell's claims
    as frivolous.      Mitchell now appeals.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    An in forma pauperis complaint may be dismissed as frivolous
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (d) if it has no arguable basis in
    law or fact.    Denton v. Hernandez, 
    504 U.S. 25
    , ___, 
    112 S.Ct. 1728
    , 1733 (1992); Booker v. Koonce, 
    2 F.3d 114
    , 116 (5th Cir.
    2
    1993); Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 
    964 F.2d 465
    , 468 (5th Cir.
    1992).   In making these judgments, district courts are vested
    with broad discretion and this Court will disturb such a
    determination only for an abuse of that discretion.     Green v.
    McKaskle, 
    788 F.2d 1116
    , 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
    To recover under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , a plaintiff must prove
    that he was deprived of a federal right.     See Daniel v. Ferguson,
    
    839 F.2d 1124
    , 1128 (5th Cir. 1988).   The extent of a prisoner's
    liberty interest in parole-release matters is defined by state
    statute.   See Gilbertson v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 
    993 F.2d 74
    , 75 (5th Cir. 1993).   In Gilbertson, this Court held that
    the Texas statute does not create a constitutionally-protected
    interest in a tentative parole date or other parole-release
    matters.   
    Id.
    Because the Texas statute does not create a constitutional
    right in parole matters, Mitchell's arguments regarding his
    eligibility for parole and the propriety of the Board's actions
    do not implicate the denial of a federal right.     See Id.; Tex.
    Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.18 § West Supp. 1994).    Thus, this
    claim was properly dismissed as frivolous.1
    III. CONCLUSION
    The appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous.     See Loc.R. 42.2.
    1
    This Court also concurs with the district court that
    Mitchell has not met, or even alleged that he has met, the
    criteria for release on mandatory supervision. Accordingly, this
    complaint lacks any arguable basis in either fact or law and thus
    was properly dismissed as frivolous.
    3