Morales v. LA State ( 1995 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-30282
Summary Calendar
_____________________
ADAM MORALES, SR., Individually
and on behalf of his minor children
Paula Morales, Jacob Morales and
Trae Morales, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.,
Defendants,
ANTHONY FALTERMAN, Sheriff
and/or District Attorney of
the Parish of Assumption,
Defendant-Appellant,
AUDUBON INSURANCE COMPANY,
Movant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the
Eastern District of Louisiana
(94-1194)
_________________________________________________________________
November 28, 1995
Before JOHNSON, BARKSDALE and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:1
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to this Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
Plaintiff Adam Morales (“Morales”) brought this civil rights
suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against Anthony Falterman, the former
sheriff and present district attorney of Assumption Parish in
Louisiana (“Falterman”). The district court denied Falterman’s
motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons
set forth below, we vacate that order denying dismissal and
remand for conclusions of law.
I. Facts and Procedural History
This case arises out of Falterman’s prosecution of Morales
for two charges of rape against two young girls, Julie Morales and
Sabina Coupel. Morales was acquitted of the charge of raping Julie
Morales on March 23, 1993. The charge that he raped Sabrina Coupel
is still pending in Louisiana state court.
In Morales’ civil rights complaint, he alleges primarily that
Falterman and others conspired to prosecute him despite the fact
that they knew he was innocent. Falterman filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of absolute and/or qualified prosecutorial
immunity, failure to state a conspiracy claim, and limitations.
Additionally Falterman requested dismissal of all pendent state
claims without prejudice. This case was originally assigned to
District Judge Heebe who granted in part Falterman’s motion to
dismiss. As to the claims remaining after the partial dismissal,
Judge Heebe gave Morales fourteen days in which to amend his
complaint so as to plead with specificity the facts giving rise to
his conspiracy claims. Judge Heebe provided extensive findings and
should not be published.
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conclusions along with the order of partial dismissal. Morales
then amended his complaint by alleging several additional
paragraphs of facts with which he apparently intended to support
his conspiracy theories.
Falterman then filed a second FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss based on qualified and/or absolute immunity, failure to
state a legally cognizable claim, and limitations. Falterman again
requested that all of Morales’ pendent state law claims be
dismissed without prejudice.
At this point in the proceedings, the case was reassigned to
Judge Sarah Vance and then again to Judge Okla Jones, II. Judge
Jones denied Falterman’s motion to dismiss the claims against him
alleged in Morales’ amended complaint without setting forth any
written rationale. Additionally, the minute entry does not state
whether Judge Jones stated the reasons for the denial from the
bench. Falterman further states in his brief that his motion to
dismiss was denied “without reasons.” Blue brief at 5. Falterman
now appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss based on his claims
of absolute and/or qualified immunity.
II. Discussion
Before deciding whether the district judge properly denied the
motion to dismiss based upon immunity from suit, we must examine
the basis for our jurisdiction. Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 62
F.3d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1995)(reminding that this Court must
examine the basis for its own subject matter jurisdiction whenever
necessary). Generally, this Court does not have jurisdiction over
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interlocutory pretrial orders because such pretrial orders are not
“final decisions” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See id.
However, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court held that the
denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order
appealable before final judgment, for the essence of absolute
immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to have to answer for
his or her conduct in a civil damages action. 472 U.S. 511, 525
(1985). The denial of a claim of qualified immunity is similarly
appealable, but only on the essentially legal question of whether
the conduct of which the plaintiff complains violates clearly
established law. Id. At 526. A defendant entitled to invoke a
qualified immunity defense may not appeal a district court’s
pretrial order insofar as that order determines whether or not the
pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial. See
Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (1995); Tamez, 62 F.3d at
125.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court noted that if the district court
has denied a summary judgment without indicating its reasons for
doing so, the court of appeals may be forced to undertake a
cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the
district court may have relied on in its denial. Johnson, 115
S. Ct. at 2159. This Court has held that where effective review of
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants is
not feasible without the benefit of the district court’s reasoning,
that such a grant of summary judgment could be vacated and the case
remanded to the district court for written. See, i.e., Farrar v.
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Cain, 642 F.2d 86, 87 (5th Cir. 1981). In Farrar, for example,
this Court vacated a summary judgment and remanded the case for
written findings because the district court’s summary ruling was
most likely predicated on one or more of the theories of immunity
advanced by the defendants. Id.
Like in Farrar, the order in the present case denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss2 was most likely grounded on one or
more theories of immunity advanced by Falterman. Without written
findings this Court does not have benefit of the district court’s
reasoning in order to make the crucial jurisdictional determination
mandated by the Supreme Court in Johnson. A remand of the cause
for written findings and conclusions will facilitate review of the
district court’s ruling since the denial of Falterman’s motion to
dismiss on any grounds other than certain types of immunity is not
immediately appealable of right.3
III. Conclusion
This Court is unable to evaluate its ability to hear this
denial of immunity appeal without further direction as to the
2
The fact that this is an appeal of a denial of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not affect this Court’s action.
This Court is faced with the same jurisdictional dilemma as if this
were a denial of summary judgment. The existence of this dilemma
is set forth in detail in Footnote Number 3.
3
If, for example, the district court denied Falterman’s Rule
12(b)(6) motion on the ground that fact issues existed for trial
precluding a pretrial dismissal as to Falterman’s qualified
immunity on non-prosecutorially related conduct, this Court would
not have jurisdiction under the Johnson analysis. However, if the
denial was based on an erroneous belief by the district court that
as a prosecutor Falterman was not entitled to absolute immunity in
exercising his prosecutorial discretion, Falterman would, of
course, be entitled to immediate review.
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precise basis for that denial. Thus, the district court’s order
denying Falterman’s motion to dismiss is hereby vacated and this
case is remanded for written legal findings relative to Falterman’s
immunity defenses.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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