United States v. Ramos-Garcia ( 1996 )


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  •                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 96-10235
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    VERSUS
    JOSE GERARDO RAMOS-GARCIA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    September 5, 1996
    Before JONES, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant   Jose      Gerardo       Ramos-Garcia      (“Ramos-Garcia”)
    challenges the sentence imposed for his conviction for illegal re-
    entry into the United States after deportation.           Specifically, he
    argues that the district court erred in finding that his Texas
    state conviction for burglary of a vehicle was an aggravated felony
    for purposes of enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.           Finding
    no error, we affirm.
    1
    TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
    Ramos-Garcia was found guilty after a jury trial of one count
    of unlawful re-entry into the United States in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    . At sentencing the district court, applying U.S.S.G.
    § 2L1.2 (“Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States”),
    calculated Ramos-Garcia’s base offense level at 8, enhanced it by
    16 levels because of his previous Texas state court conviction for
    burglary of a vehicle and established his total offense level at
    level 24.    Combined with his criminal history category VI, the
    resultant sentencing range was 100-120 months.1   The district court
    sentenced him to 120 months imprisonment, three years supervised
    release and a $50 special assessment.
    DISCUSSION
    How the Sentencing Guidelines apply to a particular conviction
    is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.      United
    States v. Garcia-Rico, 
    46 F.3d 8
    , 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 
    115 S. Ct. 2596
     (1995).
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 provides a base offense level 8.            The
    guideline then states that:
    If more than one applies, use the greater:
    (1)    If the defendant previously was deported after a
    conviction for a felony, other than a felony
    involving violations of the immigration laws,
    increase by 4 levels.
    (2)    If the defendant previously was deported after a
    conviction for an aggravated felony, increase by 16
    1
    The resulting guideline range extended upward to 125 months.
    However, the statutory maximum for this offense capped the
    sentencing range at 120 months.
    2
    levels.
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(Nov. 1995).
    Ramos-Garcia was convicted in Texas state court on June 30,
    1994 for the offense of Burglary of a Vehicle.            Because the state
    of Texas punished Ramos-Garcia’s burglary conviction by imposing a
    five years probated sentence and because this Court has ruled that
    Burglary of a Vehicle constitutes a crime of violence for purposes
    of guideline sentencing, the district court reasoned that Ramos-
    Garcia was subject to a 16 level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
    2L1.2(b)(2).
    In September 1994, the Texas legislature amended Texas law to
    reflect that burglary of a vehicle was no longer a felony offense
    in Texas.      See TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04 (Vernon 1994).              At
    sentencing, Ramos-Garcia objected to the treatment of his Texas
    burglary conviction as an “aggravated felony” for purposes of
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b), relying on the 1994 change in Texas law.               The
    district    court      overruled   his     objections    and      imposed   the
    enhancement.
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) is silent concerning the effects of
    subsequent reclassification of otherwise valid predicate state
    convictions     when     determining       possible     federal     sentencing
    enhancements.    Ramos-Garcia argues that this silence amounts to an
    ambiguity, and therefore the district court should have applied the
    Rule of Lenity to his sentencing decision and declined to enhance
    the sentence under Guideline § 2L1.2's enhancement provisions.
    We find his argument unpersuasive.           This Court has recently
    3
    held    that   federal    law,     rather      than   state    law,   controls   the
    interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. United States v. Vasquez-
    Balandran, 
    76 F.3d 648
    , 650 (5th Cir. 1996).                    We must therefore
    look to federal law to determine whether Ramos-Garcia’s conviction
    was for an “aggravated felony.”                See 
    id.
    The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)92) defines “aggravated
    felony” as “any crime of violence (as defined in 
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    [])
    for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any
    suspension of such imprisonment) is at least five years.” § 2L1.2,
    comment. (n.7).
    The first inquiry, whether Ramos-Garcia’s conviction was for
    a crime of violence, has been answered by this Court’s ruling in
    United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 
    56 F.3d 18
     (5th Cir. 1995).
    “Crime of violence” is defined as:
    (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
    or threatened use of physical force against the person or
    property of another, or
    (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
    nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
    against the person or property of another may be used in the
    course of committing the offense.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    (a) & (b) (1988).            This Court unequivocally held that
    conviction for burglary of a vehicle under § 30.04 of the pre-1994
    Texas Penal Code is a crime of violence as defined in 
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    (b).
    Second, the term of imprisonment imposed, regardless of any
    suspension,     must     be   at   least    five      years.    Ramos-Garcia     was
    sentenced to five years of probation for his burglary of a vehicle
    conviction.      “Clearly, the Sentencing Commission envisioned [§
    4
    2L1.2's] applicability to extend to those defendants who actually
    are ordered to serve their sentences and also those defendants who
    avoid a determined period of incarceration by a process which
    suspends serving the term of imprisonment.        United States v.
    Vasquez-Balandran, 
    76 F.3d 648
    , 651 (5th Cir. 1996).          Ramos-
    Garcia’s five year probation under Texas’s sentencing procedure
    fulfils the five year “term of imprisonment imposed” requirement.
    See 
    id.
    The change in Texas law reclassifying burglary of a vehicle
    from a felony to a misdemeanor does not change the nature of the
    crime as a crime of violence, nor does it change the five year
    probated sentence.   Therefore, it does not change the fact that
    Ramos-Garcia’s   conviction   meets   the   federal   definition   of
    aggravated felony.   The sentence imposed by the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-10235

Filed Date: 9/13/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014