Clarke v. Stalder ( 1996 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-30515
SUMMARY CALENDAR
CHARLES W. CLARKE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
RICHARD L. STALDER, Secretary at Dep’t of Corrections; ED DAY,
Warden at Washington Correctional Institute; JIMMY MILLER, Asst.
Warden, Washington Correctional Institute; CRAIG THOMAS, Washington
Correctional Institute; MAJOR DUNAWAY, Washington Correctional
Institute; JUDITH RABORN, formerly known as Judith Phelps,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(95-CV-2644)
November 26, 1996
Before WISDOM, KING, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
The plaintiff, Charles W. Clarke, challenges the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants and dismissal
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This court reviews a
district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.1
The plaintiff asserts two claims in the present case. First,
he maintains that he was denied procedural due process because,
during a discliplinary hearing, prison officials relied on
unreliable drug test evidence and did not allow the plaintiff to be
retested. This denial, he asserts, caused him to be transferred to
a working cell block, deprived him of his trusty status, and
deprived him of his job placement. Second, the plaintiff asserts
that, contrary to his experience, two similarly situated inmates
were allowed to take retests. The plaintiff asserts that this
action denied him equal protection under the law, in contravention
of the fourteenth amendment.
A. Due Process
In order to state a claim under § 1983 for violation of the
1
Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir.
1990).
2
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a litigant must
show that he has “asserted a recognized ‘liberty or property’
interest within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
he was intentionally or recklessly deprived of that interest, even
temporarily, under color of state law”.2 In analyzing an alleged
due process violation in a prison context, this court is guided by
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sandin v. Conner.3 There,
the Court held that a prisoner’s liberty interest is “generally
limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the
sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection
by the due process clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life”.4 Sandin determined that
administrative confinement standing alone did not present an
2
Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th. Cir.
1990)(internal citations omitted).
3
515 U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995).
4
Id. at 115 S.Ct. at 2300.
3
"atypical, significant deprivation" which gives rise to a protected
liberty interest.5
In the light of Sandin, the fact that Clarke was placed in
administrative segregation does not entitle him to procedural due
process safeguards. Similarly, his assignment to a working cell
block and loss of a job assignment fall within the expected
parameters of his sentence and do not present the type of atypical,
significant deprivation addressed in Sandin.6 To the extent that
the plaintiff alleges that his disciplinary record will affect his
parole consideration, this allegation is too attenuated to
establish a liberty interest.7
B. Equal Protection
The plaintiff asserts that other inmates similarly situated
5
Id. at 2301.
6
See Bulger v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 49 (5th Cir.
1995) (“prison classification and eligibility for rehabilitation
programs are not directly subject to ‘due process’ protections”)
7
See Sandin, 515 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2301.
4
were retested, while the plaintiff was denied such a retest.
Aside from classifications that disadvantage a “suspect
class”,8 or a quasi-suspect class,9 equal protection claims are
analyzed under the rationality test.10 Under the rationality test,
the state action need bear only a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest to be sustained.11
The defendants do not dispute that the other inmates were
retested. They assert, however, that only inmates whose initial
results were inconclusive receive a retest. Although the plaintiff
asserts that no inconclusive reading is possible, he has failed to
substantiate this claim. Similarly, the plaintiff has offered no
proof of discriminatory intent on the part of prison officials.12
8
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982)
(applying ‘strict scrutiny’).
9
Id. at 218, 102 S.Ct 2382.
10
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540, 547, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
11
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382.
12
See Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1995).
5
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s equal protection argument fails.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
6