Martin v. Schott ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-30986
Summary Calendar
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WILLIE MARTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
UNKNOWN SCHOTT, Captain, et al.,
Defendants,
EDDIE VEAL, Lieutenant; WILLIE WASHINGTON, Lieutenant;
NORRIS BONTON, Sergeant,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(96-CV-3342)
_________________________
September 20, 1999
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and affirm.1
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Willie Martin sued prison employees under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they used excessive
force in violation of the Constitution and
Louisiana tort law. Appellants moved for
dismissal of the state law claims, asserting
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court
denied the motion, and, finding no error, we
* 1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has An order denying Eleventh Amendment
determined that this opinion should not be immunity is immediately appealable under the
published and is not precedent except under the collateral order doctrine, to the extent the order
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. turns on issues of law. See Sherwinski v. Peterson,
47.5.4. 98 F.3d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1996).
may accept, reject, or m odify the
I. recommended decision, receive further
Appellants contend that the court evidence, or recommit the matter to the
erroneously failed to make a de novo review of magistrate judge with instructions.” As stated
objected-to portions of the magistrate judge's in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676
recommendation, as required by 28 U.S.C. (1980), the purpose of the section is to “permit
§ 636(b)(1)(C).2 Although the court used whatever reliance a district judge, in the
unfortunate language in ruling that exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to
“[d]efendants’ [objections] . . . do not require place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and
de novo review,” in context it is evident that recommendations.”
the court complied with the requirements of
§ 636(b)(1)(C) by stating that “[t]he court has The court reviewed the appellants’
carefully considered the petition, the record, objections and all other relevant material and
the law applicable to this action, [and] the made an independent decision to adopt the
[Magistrate’s] Report and Recommendation.” recommendation, in accordance with § 636.
Although the court’s words were somewhat
off the mark, a remand would be a waste and
The text of § 636(b)(1)(C) and the related would result in no change in the result.
rule 72(b) make plain that a court's “de novo”
determination may be based solely on the II.
record and that the court may accept the Appellants contend the Eleventh
magistrate judge’s recommended decision in Amendment bars a Louisiana state law claim
its entirety; for example, rule 72(b) provides brought in federal court against a state
that the district court “shall make a de novo employee in his individual capacity for what
determination upon the record, or after may be found to be wrongful and intentional
additional evidence . . . . The district judge acts. The court rejected this contention, as do
we.
2
The relevant part of § 636(b)(1)(C) provides: This issue was addressed in Reyes v. Sazan,
168 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 1999), in which we
A judge of the court shall make a de novo held that the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar
determination of those portions of the report to a state law claim asserted against a state
or specified proposed findings or employee individually where there is a fact
recommendations to which objection is issue as to whether he will be indemnified by
made. A judge of the court may accept, the state treasury. See id. at 162-63. Under
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the LA. REV. STAT. 13:5108.2(B), a state
magistrate. The judge may also receive employee will not be indemnified if the damage
further evidence or recommit the matter to at issue resulted from his “intentional wrongful
the magistrate with instructions. act or gross negligence.”
Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) states: Plaintiff has alleged that appellants used
excessive force “without any provocation
The district judge to whom the case is whatsoever and for no apparent reason other
assigned shall make a de novo determination than to deliberat ely, maliciously, and
upon the record, or after additional sadistically inflict physical pain and harm.”
evidence, of any portion of the magistrate Thus, there is a fact issue regarding whether
judge’s disposition to which specific written
objection has been made in accordance with the alleged acts occurred, and if so whether
this rule. The district judge may accept, they were committed in a wrongful and
reject, or modify the recommended decision, intentional manner. As in Reyes, “[b]ecause
receive further evidence, or recommit the there is at least a fact issue concerning whether
matter to the magistrate judge with the officers here acted intentionally or with
instructions. gross negligence, the officials might not
2
receive indemnification.” Reyes, 168 F.3d at
163. Therefore, there is no Eleventh
Amendment bar to the state law claims.
AFFIRMED.
3