Miciotto v. United States , 270 F. App'x 301 ( 2008 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 17, 2008
    No. 07-30284                   Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    JOSEPH R MICIOTTO
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
    CORPORATION, also known as Amtrak; CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS
    CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:02-CV-1485
    Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Joseph R. Miciotto appeals from the district court’s determination of his
    damages in a suit brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
    Miciotto argues that the district court misapplied the Louisiana collateral source
    rule in connection with medical expenses paid by Miciotto’s employer and
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-30284
    incorrectly determined the amount of his lost wages. We MODIFY the district
    court’s judgment as to the lost wages award and AFFIRM AS MODIFIED.
    Miciotto was injured when the train on which he was the engineer collided
    with a National Guard truck stalled at a railroad crossing. He suffered a
    shoulder injury and underwent two surgeries. He did not work from August
    2000 to April 2004. Miciotto filed suit against the United States of America; his
    employer, Amtrak; and the owner of the railroad track. The United States was
    determined to be 100% liable for the accident. In a cross-claim against the
    United States, Amtrak was granted summary judgment for reimbursement of
    the medical expenses it paid on Miciotto’s behalf. Miciotto’s medical bills totaled
    approximately $87,000, but Amtrak negotiated a reduced amount and paid
    approximately $52,000.      Following a bench trial to determine Miciotto’s
    damages, the district court determined that Miciotto was not entitled to an
    award for medical expenses. The court awarded Miciotto $147,000 in lost wages.
    Because it determined that Miciotto failed to mitigate his damages during gaps
    in his treatment between his two surgeries, the court omitted lost wages for the
    gap periods.
    We review a district court’s factual determinations, including damages
    amounts, in an FTCA case for clear error. Dickerson ex rel. Dickerson v. United
    States, 
    280 F.3d 470
    , 474 (5th Cir. 2002). We will find clear error only if we have
    a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
    Id. Miciotto argues
    first that the district court misapplied the Louisiana
    collateral source rule by not including medical expenses in his damages. He
    contends that in addition to reimbursing Amtrak for the expenses paid on his
    behalf, the United States should have paid him the difference between the
    amount of the medical bills and the amount that Amtrak negotiated and actually
    paid, or approximately $35,000. The collateral source rule provides that “a
    tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured plaintiff’s tort recovery may not be
    2
    No. 07-30284
    diminished, because of benefits received by the plaintiff from sources
    independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution.” Rogers v. Graves,
    
    959 So. 2d 990
    , 993 (La. Ct. App. 2007). For the rule to apply to “write-off”
    amounts of medical expenses that were billed but not paid because a third-party
    negotiated a lesser amount, the plaintiff must give some consideration for the
    benefit obtained or otherwise suffer a diminution of patrimony. See Bozeman v.
    State, 
    879 So. 2d 692
    , 705–06 (La. 2004) (holding with respect to Medicaid “write-
    offs” that plaintiff could not recover the difference between the amount of
    medical expenses billed and the amount actually paid by Medicaid because
    Medicaid is a free service for which plaintiff had provided no consideration).
    Here, we understand the district court to have found Miciotto gave no
    consideration in return for the medical benefits. We conclude that Miciotto
    failed to show consideration provided for the payment of his medical expenses,
    and the district court did not err by denying him the amount above Amtrak’s
    payment of the medical bills.
    We also agree with the district court that the collateral source rule is
    inapplicable in Louisiana when the employer intervenes in an action for
    reimbursement and that Amtrak’s cross-claim was essentially an intervention.
    See Lee v. Cook, 
    482 So. 2d 760
    , 763–64 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
    Miciotto next challenges the district court’s lost wages award. He contends
    that the district court incorrectly found a failure to mitigate damages during
    gaps in his medical treatment because, he asserts, he was following his doctor’s
    conservative treatment plan.     He also contends that because the parties
    stipulated to his annual earnings the court incorrectly calculated his lost wages
    for the time that it found he could not work and was undergoing medical
    treatment.
    A plaintiff has the duty to exercise reasonable diligence and ordinary care
    to mitigate his damages. Jacobs v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 
    432 So. 2d 843
    ,
    3
    No. 07-30284
    845 (La. 1983).   Mitigation of damages includes the duty to find suitable
    employment if the plaintiff is employable. Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
    Co., 
    661 So. 2d 503
    , 509 (La. Ct. App. 1995). The district court had evidence
    before it that Miciotto had been released to light duty work during the gap
    periods and that there was alternative work available to Miciotto. There was
    also testimony from Miciotto’s treating physician that the doctor would expect
    a symptomatic person to have sought additional treatment much sooner.
    Furthermore, there was evidence from a treating psychiatrist that Miciotto’s
    psychological problems would be permanent and preclude re-employment as an
    engineer, which suggests that Miciotto should have sought other work. An
    independent medical exam by another psychiatrist found that Miciotto was not
    precluded from returning to work but that Miciotto was not motivated to do so.
    Based on the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly
    erred by denying lost wages during the gap periods because Miciotto should have
    either found other work or pursued more consistent medical treatment.
    We reach a different conclusion with respect to the amount of lost wages
    calculated for the non-gap period.       We start by recognizing that pretrial
    stipulations on damages are generally binding “and should be strictly enforced.”
    Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    870 F.2d 982
    , 985 (5th Cir. 1989). We find from
    the parties’ stipulations of Miciotto’s annual earnings that the district court
    incorrectly calculated the lost wages.
    The district court found that the gap in Miciotto’s treatment began on
    December 3, 2001, and ended in July 2003 and that the lost wages award should
    compensate Miciotto for the time that he received active treatment. We agree
    with Miciotto that the court’s finding necessarily means he was entitled to lost
    wages at least from the date of the accident on August 5, 2000, to December 3,
    2001, and from August 1, 2003, to April 19, 2004, when he was released back to
    work after the second surgery. The parties stipulated that the amount of wages
    4
    No. 07-30284
    for 2000 was $31,222 and for 2004 it was $36,164. They also stipulated to what
    Miciotto’s annual earnings would have been for all of 2001 and 2003. Because
    the gaps in Miciotto’s treatment occurred from 2001 to 2003, Miciotto is entitled
    only to a partial award for lost wages in those years. Based on the stipulated
    amount of Miciotto’s earnings, we conclude that the lost wages award should
    have been $183,485.1 This amount is more than the district court’s award of
    $147,000.
    The United States asserted during oral argument that the district court’s
    calculation may have reflected a belief that there were other periods when
    Miciotto could have returned to work because of a release to light duty. The
    district court did not explain how it arrived at its calculation, however, and the
    Government’s speculation is not supported by the district court’s order. The
    court determined that the lost wages award was meant to compensate Miciotto
    for the time that he was not working and was receiving active medical
    treatment, which it determined was from August 5, 2000, to December 3, 2001,
    and from August 1, 2003, to April 19, 2004. We conclude, therefore, that the
    district court’s lost wages award is erroneous, and we modify the judgment to
    reflect a lost wages award of $183,485. See Ferrero v. United States, 
    603 F.2d 510
    , 515 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that circuit court may recompute a damages
    award “if a remand would be mere wasted motion”).
    The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
    1
    We determine this amount by converting the stipulated annual earnings for 2001 and
    2003 to a daily rate, multiplying that rate by the number of days that Miciotto received
    treatment in those years, and adding the stipulated earnings for 2000 and 2001. For 2001 the
    parties stipulated Miciotto’s annual wages would have been $86,250, which is approximately
    $236 per day. From January 1, 2001, to December 3, 2001, is 337 days, which multiplied by
    $236 per day results in a loss of $79,532. The stipulation for earnings in 2003 was $87,353
    per year, which is approximately $239 per day. From August 1, 2003, to December 31, 2003,
    is 153 days, which multiplied by $239 results in lost wages of $36,567. The parties’
    stipulations show that Miciotto’s lost wages for the time that the district court found he was
    unable to work and was actively receiving medical treatment should have been $31,222 (2000)
    + $79,532 (2001) + $36,567 (2003) + $36,164 (2004), or $183,485.
    5