Carroll v. Homecomings Financial Network ( 2008 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 3, 2008
    No. 07-20596                     Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Summary Calendar                           Clerk
    CHARLOTTE CARROLL
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK; OPTION ONE MORTGAGE
    CORPORATION
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    4:07-MC-82
    Before DAVIS, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Charlotte Carroll filed an application for anticipatory relief under the
    Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”). The district court denied Carroll’s
    application, and Carroll now appeals. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM
    the district court’s order.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-20596
    The SCRA gives courts discretion to grant servicemembers relief from
    certain contracts entered into prior to their military service. 50 App. U.S.C. §
    591.   Carroll, an Army reservist, filed an application for relief from her
    obligations under mortgage contracts with Option One Mortgage Corporation
    (“Option One”) and Homecomings Financial Network (“Homecomings”).            The
    district court docketed the filing as an application for “Other Miscellaneous
    Relief” on the miscellaneous docket.
    The district court held an initial hearing with Carroll, during which the
    court instructed Carroll to contact her creditors regarding the application. The
    district court subsequently held four additional conferences and heard
    arguments from Carroll and representatives of Option One and Homecomings.
    During the third conference, the district court instructed Carroll to provide
    previously-requested financial information by the fourth conference on June 29,
    2006, or the court was “going to have to consider a sanction.” Carroll sent the
    financial information on the morning of June 29, 2006. During the fourth
    conference, the court heard arguments on both the timing of the requested
    information and the merits of Carroll’s application, and then advised Carroll
    that the court was “going to have to deny the relief [she was] requesting.” The
    court subsequently entered a “Memorandum and Order” denying Carroll’s
    application for discretionary relief under the SCRA.
    The current dispute centers on the characterization of this final action.
    Carroll contends that the district court dismissed her case via sanctions. As
    such, Carroll contends that the court abused its discretion by not imposing lesser
    sanctions prior to dismissal. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Trinity Marine Group, Inc.,
    
    117 F.3d 894
    , 898 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “dismissal with prejudice is
    an extreme sanction that deprives the litigant of the opportunity to pursue his
    claim”).
    2
    No. 07-20596
    However, Carroll incorrectly characterizes the district court’s action. The
    court’s order did not in fact dismiss Carroll’s case—no case was ever filed.
    Rather, Carroll filed an application for discretionary relief that was set on the
    miscellaneous docket. Matters filed on the miscellaneous docket are “ancillary
    and supplementary proceedings not defined as civil actions.” Matter of Search
    of 4330 North 35th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
    142 F.R.D. 161
    , 163–64 (E.D.
    Wis. 1992) (citations omitted). Moreover, no sanctions were ever imposed. After
    the court mentioned the possibility of sanctions during the third conference,
    sanctions were never discussed again. The Order did identify Carroll’s “prior
    unwillingness to provide financial information” as one factor in the court’s
    decision to deny Carroll’s application, but this was never referred to as a
    sanction.
    Thus, it is incorrect to characterize this matter as a dismissal based on
    sanctions. Although the district court may have contributed to the confusion by
    periodically referring to “dismissal” and unnecessarily entering a subsequent
    “Final Judgment,” the overall posture of the case is clear: Carroll filed a solitary
    application for Other Miscellaneous Relief, which the district court denied
    following several hearings on the merits.         Accordingly, Carroll’s present
    arguments and supporting authorities—which address the extreme sanction of
    dismissal in the context of a civil case—are inapposite. Carroll is in fact
    appealing the denial of her application for discretionary relief.
    Under the anticipatory-relief provision of the SCRA, an applicant is
    entitled to one noticed hearing to show that her ability to meet her obligations
    “has been materially affected by reason of military service.” 50 App. U.S.C. §
    591. The court then has discretion to grant relief. Id. Here, Carroll received at
    least five hearings on the merits, after which the court exercised its discretion
    and denied Carroll’s application. Because Carroll makes no arguments as to
    3
    No. 07-20596
    how the denial of her application was an abuse of discretion, the district court’s
    Memorandum and Order is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-20596

Judges: Davis, Garza, Per Curiam, Prado

Filed Date: 10/3/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024