Rodriguez v. Sabatino , 120 F.3d 589 ( 1997 )


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  •                                    REVISED
    United States Court of Appeals,
    Fifth Circuit.
    No. 96-40883.
    Jesus RODRIGUEZ; Maria Rodriguez;         Jesus Reyes;    Yolanda Reyes,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    Anthony SABATINO; Sonja Sosa; Borg-Warner Protective Services
    Corporation doing business as Wells Fargo Guard Services,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Sept. 3, 1997.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of Texas.
    Before JONES, EMILIO M. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand
    because   it   determined   that    they   had   fraudulently    joined   two
    defendants.    Hence, it had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    §   1332(a).     Subsequently,      the    district   court     granted   the
    defendants' summary judgment motion, dismissing the plaintiffs'
    complaint.     On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district
    court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their case.                  We
    affirm.
    I
    On December 12, 1992, Maria Reyes ("Maria"), Jorge Rodriguez
    ("Jorge"), and Francisco Sanchez went to a quincinera hosted by
    Maria and Mario Mora at the Magnolia Civic Center, a property owned
    by the City of Houston.     The quincinera lasted from about 8:00 p.m.
    1
    until 12:00 a.m. Borg-Warner Protective Services, Inc. d/b/a Wells
    Fargo Guard Services ("Wells Fargo") provided security for the
    event pursuant to a contract between Wells Fargo and the City of
    Houston.    Wells Fargo assigned one of its employees, Sonia Sosa, a
    citizen of Texas, to work as a security guard at the party.               As
    part   of   her   duties,   Sosa   patrolled   the   building    to   prevent
    vandalism and watched over the parking lot to thwart automobile
    thefts.     She did not check the identification of anyone consuming
    alcohol at the party or otherwise monitor the serving of alcohol
    there.
    There was apparently some underage drinking at the quincinera.
    Mario Mora admitted, for instance, that he "sneaked" two cups of
    beer to Sanchez around 10:30 p.m.         At midnight, the party moved
    over to the Mora residence.        Sanchez, Jorge, and others consumed
    alcohol there with Mario Mora.
    After spending a couple of hours at the Mora residence,
    Sanchez, Jorge, Maria, Angelica Aguilar, Oscar J. Medina, and
    Martha Perez left in Sanchez's pickup truck. At approximately 4:24
    a.m., Sanchez's truck jumped the curb, spun up an embankment, and
    smashed into the underside of a highway overpass.               Everyone was
    killed, except for Perez.      Police officers at the scene found beer
    cans in the car and noticed that the vehicle emitted a strong odor
    of alcohol.
    The Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission ("TABC") investigated
    the accident.      It filed charges against Mario Mora for making
    alcohol available to minors but not against Sosa, Wells Fargo, or
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    the City of Houston.
    After the accident, Jorge and Maria's respective parents,
    citizens of Texas, filed a complaint in state court against Wells
    Fargo, Sosa, and, Sosa's supervisor, Anthony Sabatino,1 alleging,
    among other things, that all three were citizens of Texas.       The
    defendants removed the case to federal district court, and then the
    plaintiffs moved to remand.
    The district court determined that Wells Fargo was not a
    citizen of Texas, and that Sabatino and Sosa had been fraudulently
    joined.    Because complete diversity existed, the court denied the
    plaintiffs' motion to remand.   The plaintiffs then filed a writ of
    mandamus in this court, arguing that the district court erred.    We
    denied the writ.     Subsequently, the district court granted the
    defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs'
    complaint.
    On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district court
    erred in determining that they fraudulently joined Sosa and thus in
    concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1332(a).
    II
    We review de novo a denial of remand to state court.    Sid
    1
    Apparently, Sabatino worked in Wells Fargo's Metuchen, New
    Jersey office at the time of the accident. In May 1994—a year and
    a half after the accident—Wells Fargo transferred him to its
    Houston office.
    The plaintiffs do not discuss Sabatino at all in their
    brief. Clearly, he has nothing to do with this case. Thus,
    we will limit our analysis in this opinion to the issue of
    whether the plaintiffs fraudulently joined Sosa.
    3
    Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Resources, Ltd., 
    99 F.3d 746
    , 751 (5th Cir.1996).               A party invoking the removal
    jurisdiction of the federal courts bears a heavy burden.                
    Id. To prove
    that non-diverse parties have been fraudulently joined in
    order to defeat diversity, the removing party must demonstrate
    either    "outright   fraud      in    the     plaintiff's      recitation    of
    jurisdictional facts," Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 
    60 F.3d 213
    ,   217   (5th   Cir.1995),    or       that   "there   is   absolutely    no
    possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of
    action against the in-state defendant in state court."               Cavallini
    v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 
    44 F.3d 256
    , 259 (5th Cir.1995).
    The defendants do not allege outright fraud, so only the second
    rule is at issue here.        In this regard, we "evaluate all of the
    factual allegations in the plaintiff's state court pleadings in the
    light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all contested
    issues of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff" and "examine
    relevant state law and resolve all uncertainties in favor of the
    nonremoving party."     Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 
    707 F.2d 201
    ,
    205-06 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 
    464 U.S. 1039
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 701
    ,
    
    79 L. Ed. 2d 166
    (1984).
    In evaluating a claim of fraudulent joinder, we do not
    determine whether the plaintiff will actually or even probably
    prevail on the merits of the claim, but look only for a possibility
    that the plaintiff may do so.               
    Burden, 60 F.3d at 216
    .          The
    question, then, is simply whether the defendant can show that no
    possibility exists that the plaintiffs have stated a claim against
    4
    Sosa.
    The Texas Supreme Court has stated that common-law negligence
    "consists of three essential elements—a legal duty owed by one
    person to another, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately
    resulting from the breach."     El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 
    732 S.W.2d 306
    , 311 (Tex.1987).    "Duty is the threshold inquiry ...," and the
    "foremost and dominant consideration" in determining whether a duty
    exists is the "foreseeability of the risk."       
    Id. An alcoholic
    beverage licensee, for instance, has a duty not to serve alcohol to
    an intoxicated person whom the licensee knows will probably drive
    a car.    
    Id. Also, a
    person has a duty to take affirmative action to
    control or avoid increasing the danger from another's conduct which
    the actor has at least partially created.      
    Id. The general
    rule,
    though, is that a person is under no duty to control the conduct of
    another, even if he has the practical ability to exercise such
    control.     Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 
    668 S.W.2d 307
    , 309
    (Tex.1983).
    In this case, the evidence indicates that Sanchez had been
    drinking a little at the quincinera and that Mario Mora sneaked him
    two beers there.    In contrast, Sosa was not serving alcohol or even
    checking identification.     While Sosa testified that she observed
    underage drinking and stopped at least one minor from drinking,
    there is no indication that her job required her to prevent such
    conduct.
    In addition, we do not think that the evidence demonstrates
    that Sosa even partially increased the danger that Sanchez would
    5
    crash his truck, killing himself and four others.             First, Mario
    Mora has admitted sneaking Sanchez two beers.           In fact, the TABC
    actually   charged   Mora   with   violating    §   106.06   of    the   Texas
    Alcoholic Beverage Code by giving beers to minors.                Conversely,
    Sosa did nothing to facilitate underage drinking.                 Second, the
    accident did not occur until almost four-and-a-half hours after
    Sanchez left the quincinera, and there is proof that Sanchez was
    drinking at the Mora residence during at least part of this period.
    Given the fact that Sosa locked up the Magnolia Civic Center
    shortly after midnight, effectively ending the quincinera, we do
    not think that she did anything or failed to do anything that
    contributed to the 4:24 a.m.       crash.      Sosa had no common-law or
    other duty to Maria or Jorge, the exercise of which would have
    prevented this tragedy.
    Because Sosa lacked a duty to Maria or Jorge, absolutely no
    possibility exists that the plaintiffs can state a claim against
    Sosa. Therefore, the defendants have shown that the plaintiffs
    fraudulently joined Sosa. Accordingly, there is complete diversity
    in this case and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
    AFFIRMED.
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