United States v. Garrett ( 2001 )

REVISED, January 17, 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 99-10531
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
BOYCE MARK GARRETT; LARRY DON KEITH; KENNETH VERNON
RYDEEN; JIMMY DALE SULLIVAN; MICHAEL DEAN WOODARD;
STEVEN CRAIG FINKLEA; AUSTEEN HARRIS KEITH;
DALE ZANE KEITH; GLENN DALE WILCOX,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
December 29, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, and FISH*, District
Judge.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
In this interlocutory appeal, the government seeks review of
*
District Judge of the Northern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
an order of the district court, which was entered the day of trial
and which excluded 25 of its witnesses in a complex, multi-
defendant conspiracy case involving the alleged adulteration of
milk. The district court itself recognized that exclusion of these
witnesses was tantamount to a dismissal of some of the charges
against the moving defendants. This appeal boils down to one
relatively uncomplicated issue; that is, whether the district court
abused its discretion by imposing the rather draconian sanction of
excluding the government’s witnesses from trial for discovery
violations which the court itself found not to have been made in
bad faith. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the
district court abused its discretion. We, therefore, VACATE the
district court’s sanctions order excluding the government’s
witnesses and REMAND this matter for further proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
The underlying cause of action giving rise to the criminal
indictments in this case involves a complex and massive, long-term
conspiracy in which more than 30 dairy farmers and milk
transporters allegedly added water to milk shipments along various
and overlapping dairy routes in order to increase both the weight
and value of milk shipments. The indictment described how
Associated Milk Producers, Inc. (“AMPI”), which is a marketing
corporation for dairy farmers, operates a milk processing plant in
Sulphur Springs, Texas, to which drivers it hired would bring milk
2
from individual dairy farms along each driver’s specified route.
The route drivers had the responsibility of measuring the quantity
of milk received from each dairy farm and had to take samples of
each shipment received from each farm before commingling the milk
in the tanker truck. Once delivered to the processing plant, the
milk was to be tested under standards put forth by the Milk
Marketing Administration (“MMA”), which is a subdivision of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The government’s theory was that various individuals,
including route drivers, added water to the milk trucks along
delivery routes. To prove its case, the government intended to
rely on both scientific data, that is, sample test composition
reports for the milk tanker trucks, and testimony from cooperating
witnesses. These witnesses were drivers and other AMPI staff
members who knew of or were aware of the defendants’ schemes to
water down the milk. Most of the testifying witnesses whose
testimony was ultimately excluded by the district court were
defendants who pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment in
exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts against them and for
consideration of a downward sentencing departure in light of their
willingness to cooperate and testify truthfully in the government’s
case against the remaining defendants.
Along with substantive violations of specific milk
adulteration statutes, specifically 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 331(a)(2),
the indictments charged substantive mail fraud violations and
3
various conspiracies to: 1) defraud the government by obstructing
milk regulation; 2) violate the milk adulteration statutes; and 3)
commit mail fraud. The initial indictment, entered on July 15,
1998, charged 29 defendants with these various milk adulteration-
related offenses.
The case was initially set for trial on September 28, 1998,
but was rescheduled for November 30, 1998, then for January 11,
1999, and then again for March 15, 1999 (with a February 12th
deadline for discovery).1 On January 13, 1999, a superseding
indictment was returned naming four additional defendants,2 and on
March 3, 1999, a second superseding indictment was returned. Four
days before the March 15th trial date, the district court held a
hearing on various motions, and the following day, March 12th, it
entered an order continuing the trial once again to April 5th. The
1
By November 1998, as a result of numerous guilty pleas, only
five defendants remained in the case (Appellees Garrett, Larry Don
Keith, Rydeen, Sullivan, and Woodard). The original indictment was
returned in July 1998. In August 1998, fourteen defendants pleaded
guilty; in September, four more pleaded guilty; in October, two
more pleaded guilty; in November, three more pleaded guilty; and
one more defendant was dismissed from the indictment by virtue of
his wife having entered a guilty plea. Each of these defendants
agreed to cooperate with the government, and all bargained to have
their sentencing hearings postponed until after dispositions had
been reached with respect to all defendants charged in the
indictments. Each was presumably hoping for a 5K1.1 downward
departure based on substantial assistance.
2
These additional four were Finklea, Austeen and Dale Keith,
and Wilcox. Combined with the five remaining defendants as of
November 1998, those being Garrett, Larry Don Keith, Rydeen,
Sullivan, and Woodard, see supra note 1, we have our nine named
appellees.
4
matters addressed in the March 11th hearing dealt with allegations
that the prosecutor declined to produce letters written to people
who were not expected to testify at trial (“target letters”),
urging them to admit their involvement to get the benefit of
cooperation at sentencing, and that the prosecutor also declined to
provide investigators’ notes of interviews with or questionnaires
as to approximately 125 people, in some of which various defendants
denied any involvement, a position which was inconsistent with
their pleas and which, therefore, constituted impeachment material
that should have been disclosed. In its March 12th order, the
district court directed the government to produce within five days
of that order, copies of “any [target] letters from government
counsel or its agents attempting to secure testimony from or
against any person who will be testifying in the government’s case-
in-chief . . . .” The district court also continued the trial
until April 5th to permit production of these materials. On March
16th and 17th, the government produced some materials in response
to the March 12th order. On March 31st, and in response to a
defense motion that all correspondence with any individuals, not
just correspondence related to testifying witnesses, be produced,
the district court removed the “case-in-chief” limitation of its
March 12th order and ordered that all such target letters be
produced by April 2nd.
On March 23rd, all of the defendants-appellees had also moved
5
jointly for relief under Brady,3 claiming that the government had
withheld numerous categories of exculpatory materials, including
the letters referenced in the March 12th order. On April 1st, the
district court denied the defendants’ motion, noting that none of
the materials cited by the defendants constituted Brady material
for which the government had an affirmative duty to disclose. The
district court did note, however, that the investigators’ notes and
screening questionnaires were to be produced as “Brady impeachment
material” because they revealed potentially inconsistent statements
made by the various defendants. Yet, no defense counsel ever
denied having been been told by the prosecutor about these items
and their content.
Late on April 2nd, the government produced documents to the
defense as directed by the district court’s March 31st modification
of its March 12th order. The government supplemented this
production on the morning of April 5th (the trial date) with a
stack of documents (8 inches thick), a good portion of which was
duplicative of previously provided materials. Defense counsel
complained to the district court about the tardy production, and
while some conceded that a brief continuance would suffice to take
the sting out of the delayed production, others requested a
dismissal based on discovery violations.
On April 5th and 6th, the district court held additional
3
Brady v. Maryland, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
6
hearings on the defendants’ various motions to dismiss or for
sanctions regarding the government’s alleged failure to timely
produce discovery materials, and it ultimately struck 25 of the
government’s witnesses on the afternoon of the 5th. The district
court ordered excluded from trial any witness as to whom a target
letter was required to be produced by the court’s March 12th order
(requiring production by March 17th), but as to which such letter
was tardily produced. The court noted that after the March 11th
hearing, it had determined, and the government should have been
aware that, such target letters were Brady materials which it had
an obligation to produce.4 The district court did not sanction the
government’s failure to timely disclose the materials ordered
produced after April 2nd under the March 31st modification of the
March 12th order (i.e., the addition of any target letters to non-
testifying witnesses and the addition of the investigators’ notes).
A written order to the effect of the sanctions orally ordered was
entered on April 9th, and in it, the district court stated “[t]he
court does not question the government’s good faith.” The district
court went on to state:
4
We note that this is inconsistent with the fact that, in its
April 1st order, the district court explicitly held that the target
letters, as one of the categories of materials for which the
defendants’ decried a failure to disclose, were not Brady
materials. Thus, the government cannot be said to have been on
notice that such letter were even Brady materials until the
district court entered its order on March 12th requiring disclosure
within five days thereafter.
7
even assuming the government’s untimely production
ultimately would not have adversely impacted the
defense’s trial strategy, it nonetheless
unquestionably adversely impacted the organized and
efficient preparation for trial by defense counsel
and, for that matter, the Court. Neither the
defense nor the Court should be forced to continue
to suffer the government’s last-minute production
of documents and the resulting motions and hearings
the untimely productions have caused, particularly
when those untimely productions have come on days
immediately preceding, and even the day of, trial.
The government has timely filed this interlocutory appeal of
the district court’s sanctions order, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing a sanction more severe than
was necessary to effect compliance with discovery orders and by
failing to weigh all of the factors required by this Circuit’s
precedent.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s imposition of sanctions for
discovery violations for an abuse of the district court’s
discretion. See United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir.
1999). The government concedes that the district court’s
discretion is “admittedly broad.” However, notwithstanding this
broad discretion, we have consistently held that a district court,
when considering the imposition of sanctions for discovery
violations, must carefully weigh several factors, and if it decides
such a sanction is in order, it “should impose the least severe
sanction that will accomplish the desired result – prompt and full
8
compliance with the court’s discovery orders.” United States v.
Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); see also Katz,
178 F.3d at 372.
IV. DISCUSSION
As we noted in Sarcinelli and Katz, a district court
exercising its discretion and considering the imposition of
sanctions for discovery violations should consider the following
factors: 1) the reasons why disclosure was not made; 2) the amount
of prejudice to the opposing party; 3) the feasibility of curing
such prejudice with a continuance of the trial; and 4) any other
relevant circumstances. See Katz, 178 F.3d at 371 (citing United
States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1989)). And as
noted above, in fashioning any such sanction, the district court
should impose only that sanction which is the least severe way to
effect compliance with the court’s discovery orders. Id.The government relies heavily on a decision from the Eleventh
Circuit extolling the principles of Sarcinelli, which, though not
controlling, is instructive. In United States v. Euceda-Hernandez,
768 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 1985), the court noted that by suppressing
governmental evidence in lieu of granting a continuance or recess,
“a trial judge may achieve a speedier resolution . . . and reduce
his docket, but he does so at the expense of sacrificing the fair
administration of justice and the accurate determination of guilt
and innocence.” Id. at 1312. In the government’s view, the
9
district court’s striking of 25 of its witnesses, which the
district court itself recognized could have the effect of
eviscerating the criminal indictment, was “tantamount to a
dismissal of charges . . . [and constituted] an undeserved windfall
to parties who were duly indicted based on probable cause to
believe they had committed federal crimes.” The government urges
that if it violated any discovery order at all, it acted in good
faith, and that there was no measurable prejudice to the defendants
which could not have been cured by a short continuance. Finally,
the government urges that less severe sanctions, such as personal
sanctions against the prosecutor, could have achieved the goal of
compliance with discovery orders.
The defendants counter that the district court did not even go
far enough, as some sought dismissal of the indictment as a
sanction. And likewise, the defendants do not feel that any less
severe sanction would suffice to ensure that the government would
comply with the district court’s discovery orders. The defendants
contend that the record shows a pattern of misconduct by the
government that makes the sanctions chosen by the district court
mild, and they further contend that the sanctions were a valid
exercise of the district court’s power to sanction discovery
violations “as a prophylactic and punitive measure.”
To determine whether the district court abused its discretion,
we must evaluate the exercise of discretion in light of our
precedent requiring that the district court fully and thoughtfully
10
addressed each of the Sarcinelli factors noted.
A. Reasons for non-disclosure
We first consider the government’s reason for not timely
producing target letters for the 25 excluded witnesses. The
government explained to the district court that its failure to more
timely provide the target letters resulted from the fact that the
letters were in a separate binder that had been overlooked during
initial disclosures. As noted above, the district court explicitly
noted that the government did not violate its discovery orders in
bad faith and that its late production was the result of an
unintentional mistake. Indeed, no improper motive was attributed
to the government’s tardy production.
The government relies on a decision from the D.C. Circuit in
which the court held that such a severe sanction as suppression of
evidence would rarely be appropriate when the trial court finds the
violation not to have been made in bad faith and where a less
dramatic remedy, such as a continuance, would mitigate any
prejudice. See United States v. Marshall, 132 F.3d 63, 70 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). We note also that in our own decision in Sarcinelli,
we found the prosecutor’s complete failure to provide discovery at
all to be contumacious, but nevertheless, not deserving of the
harsh sanction of exclusion tantamount to a dismissal where a less
11
severe sanction such as jailing the prosecutor or granting a
continuance was available.
The district court’s own finding that the government’s tardy
disclosure was not in bad faith militates against the imposition of
a sanction so severe as to effectuate a dismissal of the charges
against certain defendants, especially where as discussed below,
other, less severe sanctions were available to mitigate against the
minimal prejudice suffered by the defendants in this case.
The defendants rely on what they characterize as a pattern of
disclosure abuses, which indicates that the government’s untimely
disclosure was an intentional move designed to overwhelm the
defendants at the last minute so as to prevent them from being able
to utilize the disclosed target letters. Despite the defendants’
characterization of their 21 separate requests for discovery
throughout the many continuances of this case, the defendants
overlook the abundance of materials that were in fact timely
produced by the government and the fact that, as the district court
noted, the failure to timely provide the target letters as to the
25 witnesses was the result of an unintentional mistake. We
conclude that the district court’s own findings are dispositive of
the good faith issue and that the reason for non-disclosure was a
mistake made in good faith.
12
B. Prejudice to the defendants
The second Sarcinelli factor we must consider is whether the
defendants were unduly prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. The
district court assumed that the late production would not prejudice
the defendants’ trial strategy, but it found that tardy disclosure
so close to the commencement of the trial “adversely impacted the
organized and efficient preparation for trial by defense counsel
and . . . the Court,” because it required the filing of motions and
the scheduling of hearings.
We note that even though trial was set to commence on April
5th, the district court had already scheduled, at one defense
attorney’s request, a recess from Tuesday the 6th until Thursday
the 9th, to accommodate the attorney’s scheduled appearance for
oral argument before this Circuit. The government properly notes
that the prejudice referred to in Sarcinelli is prejudice to the
defendants’ substantial rights, that is, injury to their right to
a fair trial, and that prejudice does not encompass putting trial
preparation into minor disarray. See United States v. Webster, 162
F.3d 308, 336 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 83 (1999);
see also United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1050 (5th Cir. 1994).
As we noted in our decision in United States v. Martinez-Perez, 941
F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1991), the question of prejudice is whether
the defendant had time to put the information to use, not whether
some extra effort was required by defense counsel.
13
Additionally, even if the district court determines that the
information was disclosed too late to be put to effective use, the
court must also determine that the lack of information created a
reasonable probability that the result would have been different.
See Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). In order to
determine in this case whether the result would have been
different, the district court should have considered all of the
materials that were in fact produced to evaluate whether the target
letters would have made a difference; however, when the government
attempted to make a record of the cumulative nature of the target
letters to show that the prejudice, if any, was minimal, the
district refused to grant it an opportunity to do so because of the
government’s “admission” of a discovery violation and the district
court’s assumption that damage to the defendants’ case was not
necessary to support the sanction.5 We have repeatedly held that
no prejudice exists when suppressed or newly discovered evidence is
cumulative. See, e.g., United States v. Lowder, 148 F.3d 548, 551
(5th Cir. 1998); Allridge v. Scott, 41 F.3d 213, 217-18 (5th Cir.
1994).
The precise materials that were deemed to be a discovery
violation in this case were 23 simple target letters to 23
witnesses, a draft immunity agreement with a 24th witness, and a
5
This assumption contravenes the second Sarcinelli factor
requiring a full consideration of actual prejudice.
14
target letter with a proposed offer agreement for a 25th witness.
Among the information already in the hands of the defendants at the
time these materials were tardily produced were the following: as
to 7 of the 25, the defense had other target letters with the same
message; as to those 7 plus 12 more, the defense had threatening
and coercive correspondence following up on target letters; and as
to 21 of the 25, the defense knew that they had pleaded guilty and
struck deals with the government and these 21 defendants' plea
agreements, including the dismissal of charges and the stated
possibility of a § 5K1.1 motion, were known to the defense. Quite
simply, it should have come as no surprise to the defense that the
pleading defendants had previously received target letters
encouraging them to plead guilty. As we noted in Webster, where a
defendant is impeached with his plea agreement and his memorialized
hope for a reduced sentence, additional information regarding
anticipated favors from the government in exchange for cooperation
is cumulative impeachment material that is not prejudicial if
untimely or undisclosed. See Webster, 162 F.3d at 337-38.
We find it highly unlikely that the failure to have the
undisclosed materials would have hindered the defense’s ability to
impeach the 25 excluded witnesses regarding their prior deals with
the government, which deals might call in to question their
motivation for testifying against the remaining defendants. In our
view, the district court completely overlooked the additional
15
evidence that renders the target letters cumulative and, thus, a
minimizing factor of the prejudice suffered by the defendants.
C. Curing prejudice with a continuance
The district court itself acknowledged in its April 1st order
denying the exclusion of various witnesses on Brady grounds that
continued violations of its discovery deadlines and scheduling
orders, in addition to “wreaking havoc” on the defense’s and the
Court’s ability to efficiently prepare for trial, “might require
additional continuances of the trial date.” In doing so, the
district court implicitly recognized that a continuance was a
viable and likely consequence of tardy disclosure.
Additionally, most of the defense attorneys conceded to the
district court that if there was going to be a continuance, it
would only need to be for two or three days. Furthermore, as the
sanctioned materials were scheduled to be produced by 5:00 p.m. on
Friday, April 2nd, only two days prior to the actual disclosure on
Monday the 5th (the scheduled day of trial), and as the district
court had already planned to recess the trial from Tuesday the 6th
through Thursday the 8th, we conclude that a brief continuance of
several days would not have impacted either the district court’s
schedule or the defendants’ ability to efficiently prepare for
trial.
In light of the absence of bad faith on the part of the
government, the minimal amount of substantive prejudice because of
16
the cumulative nature of the tardily disclosed materials, and the
availability of a much less severe sanction than striking witnesses
with the effect of eviscerating the government’s case, we find that
the district court could most certainly have eliminated the minor
prejudice with either a brief delay or a less severe sanction.
D. Other relevant factors
Sarcinelli lastly requires that the district court also
consider those additional matters which are relevant to a
determination of whether sanctions are appropriate. The government
presents one main, but persuasive point regarding this factor,
which is that allowing such a harsh sanction to stand in these
circumstances essentially obliterates its case against individuals
who were duly indicted based upon probable cause to believe they
committed crimes against the government. As we have stated, a
district court “exceeds the proper bounds of its power to order
dismissal of an indictment . . . when it fails to consider whether
less extreme sanctions might maintain the integrity of the court
without punishing the United States for a prosecutor’s misconduct.”
United States v. Welborn, 849 F.2d 980, 985 (5th Cir. 1988)(citing
Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d at 6-7)). Here, we conclude that the
exclusion of these 25 witnesses, with the effect of eliminating or
substantially diminishing the government’s case against the
defendants-appellees, was an excessive sanction and an abuse of the
district court’s discretion, especially where a brief continuance
17
would have cured any prejudice and other sanctions were available
to ensure that the prosecutor would comply with the district
court’s discovery orders.
V. CONCLUSION
Based upon our full consideration of the Sarcinelli factors,
which should have guided the district court’s decision on
sanctions, we conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in excluding 25 of the government’s witnesses. The
government acted not in bad faith, the prejudice to the defendants
was minimal in light of the cumulative nature of the untimely
disclosures, and any prejudice could have been cured with a brief
continuance. For these reasons, we VACATE the district court’s
order of sanctions and REMAND this matter for such further
proceedings as are appropriate.
VACATED and REMANDED.
18
FISH, District Judge, concurring:
Because I believe there were no “discovery” violations in this case, I readily agree with the
majority that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction of excluding twenty-five
witnesses for the government. I am troubled, however, by the majority’s uncritical acceptance of the
parties’ arguments that this is a “disco very” dispute to which the analysis of cases such as United
States v. Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368 (5th Cir.
1999), may be applied. Those cases construct an analytical framework for the imposition of sanctions
under Rule 16, F.R. CRIM. P., which -- by its terms at least -- is not applicable in this situation.1
Rule 16 is entitled “Discovery and Inspection.” If that rule were applicable, the pertinent part
would be subsection (a), which is denominated “Governmental Disclosure of Evidence.” Subsection
(a) in turn is divided into two parts: “(1) Information Subject to Disclosure” and “(2) Information Not
Subject to Disclosure.” The information “subject to disclosure” in part (a)(1) falls into five
categories: “(A) Statement of Defendant”; “(B) Defendant’s Prior Record”; “(C) Documents and
Tangible Objects”; “(D) Reports of Examinations and Tests”; and “(E) Expert Witnesses.” All other
documents in the possession of the government, by virtue of Rule 16(a)(2) (“Information Not Subject
to Disclosure”), are -- except as otherwise required by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 -- non-
discoverable.
The “target” letters here are not described by any of the categories in Rule 16(a)(1). The
defendants, apparently cognizant of this fact, did not seek the letters under the aegis of Rule 16 but
under the principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady and its progeny, however,
arise no t in the context of pretrial criminal discovery but in post-judgment collateral review of
1
Rule 16(d)(2) authorizes the imposition of sanctions for failure “to comply with this rule.”
criminal convictions. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“The rule of Brady v.
Maryland . . . arguably applies in three . . . situations. Each involves the discovery, after trial of
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”) (emphasis
added). The Brady line of cases announces no rule of discovery but the self-executing constitutional
rule that due process requires disclosure by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused that
is material to guilt or punishment. 2
In a subsequent gloss on Brady, the Supreme Court has noted that “[a]n interpretation of
Brady to create a broad, constitutionally required right of discovery would entirely alter the character
and balance of our present system of criminal justice.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675
n.7 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court too has recognized both that
Brady “is not a pretrial remedy,” United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1975), and that
Brady is not “applicable at pre-trial stages.” United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 671 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974). It has also stated that “Brady is not a discovery rule, but
a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation.” United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626,
630 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979).
Rule 16, of course, explicitly requires pretrial discovery and production of the material
described in the rule, while Brady, because it is not a discovery rule, contains no such timing
2
See United States v. Washington, 669 F.Supp. 1447, 1451 (N.D. Ind. 1987):
The constitution requires the prosecution to observe this right [i.e., the right
under Brady to disclosure of exculpatory or mitigating evidence] with
vigilance: a court order is unnecessary since the duty to protect the right
already exists. An order to produce Brady materials makes as little sense as
an order to preserve the accused’s right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.
- 20 -
requirements. United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972),
highlights the importance of this distinction. There, the defendants contended that the prosecution
violated Brady by not producing to them before trial the written statement of government witness
John L. Johnson, who was, in the language of the opinion, a “conspirator-turned-accuser.” 458 F.2d
at 675. The defendants claimed prejudice as a result of the non-product ion because they did not
know the substance of Johnson’s testimony before trial and because there was a conflict between
Johnson’s testimony and that of another government witness regarding the whereabouts of one of the
defendants, thereby raising an issue of Johnson’s credibility. Id. This Court held, however, that there
was no obligation under Brady to produce the statement before trial, since the Jencks Act made it
producible only after Johnson testified. Id. at 675-76. While the statement of the witness in Harris
was surely as valuable to the defense for impeachment as the “target” letters at issue here, this Court
found, as a matter of law, that no Brady violation had occurred.
The distinction between Rule 16 and Brady as the basis of disclosure is also significant
because the question of whether Rule 16 has been violated can be determined before or during trial,
and appropriate sanctions imposed in the manner prescribed by the rule. See Rule 16(d)(2), F.R.
CRIM. P. With the backward-looking focus of Brady, however, whether a Brady violation has
occurred,3 indeed whether the government even had a Brady obligation,4 can only be
3
See United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 261 (3rd Cir. 1984):
We recognize that, generally, it is difficult to analyze, prior to trial, whether
potential impeachment evidence falls within Brady without knowing what role
a certain witness will play in the government’s case.
4
In its latest pronouncement on Brady, Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the Supreme
Court emphasized the discretion of the prosecutor, not the trial judge, in deciding what evidence is
(continued...)
- 21 -
4
(...continued)
producible under Brady:
[T]he Constitution is not violated every time the government fails or chooses
not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense. We have
never held that the Constitution demands an open file policy . . . and the rule
in Bagley [United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), one of Brady’s
progeny] . . . requires less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, which call generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any
evidence tending to exculpate or mitigate.
***
While the definition of Bagley [and hence Brady] materiality in terms of the
cumulative effect of suppression must accordingly be seen as leaving the
government with a degree of discretion, it must also be understood as
imposing a corresponding burden. On the one side, showing that the
prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense
does not amount to a Brady violation, without more. But the prosecution,
which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent
responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence and make
disclosure when the point of “reasonable probability” [i.e., that disclosure of
the evidence would produce a different outcome] is reached.
***
[E]ven if due process were thought to be violated by every failure to disclose
an item of exculpatory or impeachment evidence . . ., the prosecutor would
still be forced to make judgment calls about what would count as favorable
evidence, owing to the very fact that the character of a piece of evidence as
favorable will often turn on the context of the existing or potential evidentiary
record. Since the prosecutor would have to exercise some judgment even if
the State were subject to this most stringent disclosure obligation, it is hard
to find merit in the State’s complaint over the respo nsibility for judgment
under the existing system, which does not tax the prosecutor with error for
any failure to disclose, absent a further showing of materiality.
***
This means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the
wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108(“[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure”).
(continued...)
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determined after the trial is over.5 This is true because disclosure under Brady is required only if the
evidence is material, but materiality can be judged only in hindsight, in the context of all the evidence
presented. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13 (evidence is material if its omission creates a reasonable
doubt that, in light of the record as a whole, did not otherwise exist); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
433-37 (1995) (evidence is material if its omission, when the entire record is considered, “undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial.”); Porretto v. Stalder, 834 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“Omitted evidence is deemed material when, viewed in the context of the entire record, it creates
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt that did not otherwise exist.”).
What we have in this case, therefore, is a sanction against the government for tardily
producing certain “target” letters which, under Brady, the government may have had no obligation
4
(...continued)
Id. at 436-37, 439 (emphasis added) (some citations omitted).
These passages clearly place responsibility on the prosecutor, rather than the trial judge, to
determine not only whether a given piece of evidence should be produced but also when (i.e., “when
the point of ‘reasonable probability’ [of a different outcome] is reached.”).
5
One court has gone so far as to say that “[g]enerally, a defendant must be tried and convicted
before any due process violation [under Brady] becomes of consequence.” Commonwealth of
Northern Marina Islands v. Campbell, 1993 WL 614809 at *3 (Sup. Ct. N. Mariana Isl. July 22,
1993), aff’d, 42 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Other courts, while not going so far, say that the right to
due process is not violated if the Brady material is disclosed in time for the defendant to use it
effectively at trial, even if the material should have been disclosed earlier. United States v. O’Keefe,
128 F.3d 885, 898 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1078 (1998); United States v. Ellender,
947 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 860-61 (5th Cir.
1979). See also United States v. Kubiak, 704 F.2d 1545, 1549-50 (11t h Cir.) (in determining
whether nondisclosure of exculpatory information constituted a denial of due process, “the focus is
not upon the fact of nondisclosure, but upon the impact of the nondisclosure on the jury’s verdict.”),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3rd Cir. 1984) (“No
denial of due process occurs if Brady material is disclosed in time for its effective use at trial.”)
(quoting United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1048(1984)).
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to produce at all. We simply cannot tell, without the benefit of a full trial record, whether the “target”
letters were material within the meaning of Brady. See United States v. Kubiak, 704 F.2d 1545, 1550
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983) (Brady not violated by untimely disclosure of co-
conspirator statement, which was utilized at trial, because the focus of due process violation is “not
upon the fact of nondisclosure, but upon the impact of nondisclosure on the jury’s verdict.”); United
States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3rd Cir. 1984) (since “[t]here can be no violation of Brady
unless the government’s non-disclosure infringes the defendant’s fair trial right,” precluding key
government witness from testifying as sanction for non-disclosure of Brady material was abuse of
discretion). Unless Brady mandated production of these letters, Rule 16(a)(2) made them non-
producible; if the letters were non-producible, the government could hardly be sanctioned for doing
what it was legally entitled to do, i.e., not producing them. Certainly, the government could not be
sanctioned for simply producing the letters late, without any showing of prejudice to the defendants.
I would hold that Brady does not create a right to pretrial discovery in criminal cases and that
the government violated no Brady obligation in this case. Because no sanction, in my opinion, was
appropriate, I agree with the majority that the “draconian” sanction of excluding twenty-five
government witnesses was an abuse of discretion.6
6
Even if some sanction were appropriate, the exclusionary rule fashioned by the district court
was, in my view, too harsh. As noted in the majority opinion, the district court found that the tardy
production here was not the result of bad faith. The Supreme Court has discussed the costs and
benefits of the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations in terms which appear to me to be
equally applicable to this case:
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular
case . . . must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the
use in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently trustworthy . . . evidence
. . ..
(continued...)
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6
(...continued)
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule . . . have long
been a source of concern. Our cases have consistently recognized that
unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of
governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions
of judge and jury. An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference
with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding function is that some guilty
defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable
plea bargains. Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in
objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude
of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of
the criminal justice system. Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary
rule, therefore, may well generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration
of justice.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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