United States v. Otto Martinez-Mier , 566 F. App'x 328 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-50386      Document: 00512615324         Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/01/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 13-50386                                 May 1, 2014
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    OTTO SAUL MARTINEZ-MIER,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:12-CR-1936-1
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Otto Saul Martinez-Mier (Martinez) appeals the sentence imposed
    following his guilty plea conviction for one count of illegal reentry in violation
    of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court sentenced Martinez to 60 months of
    imprisonment and to three years of non-reporting supervised release. On
    appeal, Martinez contends that the district court erred by assigning criminal
    history points to three uncounseled prior state convictions. Martinez further
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    contends that the district court erred in applying a 16-level enhancement
    pursuant to U.S.S.G § 2L1.2 and by not granting his request for a downward
    variance based on his cultural assimilation.
    This court reviews a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de
    novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Rubio, 
    629 F.3d 490
    , 492 (5th Cir. 2010). Under the clear error standard, this court “will uphold
    a finding if it is plausible in the light of the entire record.” 
    Id. A finding
    is
    clearly erroneous if, based on the record, this court is “left with the definite and
    firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 
    Id. (internal citation
    and
    quotation marks omitted).
    A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction used for
    sentencing purposes if the prior conviction was obtained in violation of his
    constitutional right to counsel. Custis v. United States, 
    511 U.S. 485
    , 487, 496
    (1994). It is Martinez’s burden to prove that his prior Colorado convictions
    were constitutionally invalid. United States v. Rubio, 
    629 F.3d 490
    , 492 (5th
    Cir. 2010); United States v. Guerrero-Robledo, 
    565 F.3d 940
    , 944 (5th Cir.
    2009); Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 
    250 P.3d 1248
    , 1255 (Colo. 2011).
    With regard to his 2005 Colorado theft conviction, Martinez argues that
    he was not represented by counsel and that the state court documents are
    unclear whether he validly waived his right to counsel because the form
    advising him of his rights is unsigned; however, the state court documents
    show that he waived his right to counsel in open court. In addition, the theft
    conviction was rendered long after the Supreme Court established the
    constitutional right to counsel for this offense such that a “presumption of
    regularity” attaches to this conviction. See 
    Guerrero-Robledo, 565 F.3d at 943
    -
    44 (discussing Parke v. Raley, 
    506 U.S. 20
    , 31 (1992)). Further, at the time of
    the conviction, Colorado law required that a criminal defendant be informed
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    about his right to counsel. See COLO. R. CRIM. P. 44(a). Given that the state
    documents show that Martinez waived his right to counsel in open court, that
    the right to counsel was well-established, and that Colorado law required
    admonishment about the right to counsel at the time of the theft conviction,
    Martinez has not sustained his burden of showing that the conviction was
    uncounseled. See 
    Guerrero–Robledo, 565 F.3d at 945
    .
    Next, Martinez argues that he was uncounseled in connection with a
    Colorado conviction for harassment and that the state court records are
    unclear whether he validly waived his right to counsel. In that case, Martinez
    was sentenced to probation in 2007, which was later revoked in 2008; a 60-day
    jail sentence was imposed on revocation. Martinez argues that the state court
    documents suggest that he was represented by appointed counsel at the 2008
    revocation hearing but uncounseled in connection with the harassment
    conviction. Because Martinez did not receive a term of imprisonment on the
    harassment conviction, he was not entitled to counsel. See United States v.
    Perez-Macias, 
    335 F.3d 421
    , 427-28 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rios-Cruz,
    
    376 F.3d 303
    , 304-05 (5th Cir. 2004).
    Martinez’s vague and conclusory argument that he was uncounseled on
    a Nevada conviction for petty larceny and that the documents do not show he
    validly waived his right to an attorney is reviewed at most for plain error
    because although he objected in that regard prior to sentencing, he did not
    reurge the objection at sentencing. See United States v. Arviso-Mata, 
    442 F.3d 384
    , 384 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2006). To show plain error, Martinez must show a
    forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affects his substantial rights.
    See Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009). If he makes such a
    showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error, but it will do so only
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    if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings. See 
    id. Questions of
    facts capable of resolution by the district court can never
    constitute plain error. See United States v. Chung, 
    261 F.3d 536
    , 539 (5th Cir.
    2001). Whether Martinez was represented by counsel on a prior conviction is
    a question of fact that could have been resolved at sentencing following a
    proper objection. See 
    id. Because Martinez
    failed to make such an objection
    and obtain a finding by the district court, he cannot show plain error. See 
    id. In addition,
    regardless whether the district court erred by assigning one
    point to the Nevada conviction, any error was harmless. See United States v.
    Scroggins, 
    485 F.3d 824
    , 834-35 (5th Cir. 2007). In particular, if one point is
    deducted from Martinez’s criminal history score of 8, his criminal history
    category and guidelines range remain the same. Consequently, any error in
    scoring the Nevada conviction was harmless because it did not affect the
    sentencing range.
    Next, Martinez asserts that the district court erred by applying a 16-
    level enhancement pursuant to § 2L1.2 as a result of his conviction in Idaho
    for aggravated assault. In support of this assertion, Martinez contends that
    the state court judgment is unclear whether he was convicted of assault or
    aggravated assault; he appears to concede that an Idaho conviction for
    aggravated assault is a crime of violence. Because Martinez did not object in
    the district court on this ground, review is for plain error only. See United
    States v. Gonzalez-Terrazas, 
    529 F.3d 293
    , 296 (5th Cir. 2008). Our review of
    the state court documents confirms that Martinez was convicted of aggravated
    assault. Thus, he has not established error, plain or otherwise, in connection
    with the 16-level enhancement. See 
    Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
    .
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    Finally, Martinez’s argument that the district court erred by failing to
    grant his request for a downward variance based on his cultural assimilation
    is without merit. We review sentences for substantive reasonableness, in light
    of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall
    v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 49-51 (2007). A within-guidelines sentence is
    entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.       United States v. Campos-
    Maldonado, 
    531 F.3d 337
    , 338 (5th Cir. 2008) “The presumption is rebutted
    only upon a showing that the sentence does not account for a factor that should
    receive significant weight, it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or
    improper factor, or it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing
    sentencing factors.” United States v. Cooks, 
    589 F.3d 173
    , 186 (5th Cir. 2009).
    The district court considered Martinez’s request for a downward variance, the
    Government’s argument in favor of a within-guidelines sentence, and the
    § 3553(a) factors. Martinez’s arguments concerning his cultural assimilation
    and personal circumstances fail to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.
    See United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 
    523 F.3d 554
    , 565-66 (5th Cir. 2008).
    AFFIRMED.
    5