Yu v. TX Dept of Trans ( 2003 )


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  •                                                      United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS            April 18, 2003
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-50957
    Summary Calendar
    LI YU, Administrator of Estate of Wei Y. Wu,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    STATE OF TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; CAROLINE A. HERRERA,
    In her Individual Capacity and her Official Capacity, Materials
    and Test Section, Construction Division, Texas Department of
    Transportation; KATHERINE L. HOLTZ, In her Individual Capacity
    and her Official Capacity, Materials and Test Section,
    Construction Division, Texas Department of Transportation,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    (A-01-CV-741-SS)
    Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Li Yu appeals, pro se, the dismissal of her action under the
    Americans With Disabilities Act, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
    Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. §1985 and Texas tort law.          We
    affirm for essentially the reasons stated by the district court in
    its 7 January and 2 August 2002 orders.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Li Yu asserts, for the first time on appeal, default judgment
    should have been entered against Defendants because they failed to
    timely answer her complaint.          No authority need be cited for the
    proposition that our court will not consider contentions made for
    the first time on appeal.           In any event, the Texas Department of
    Transportation (TxDOT) timely filed 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) motions and
    Herrera   and   Holtz   timely       filed    answers       in    response   to   the
    complaint.
    The district court properly held it lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction because TxDOT and Herrera and Holtz, in their official
    capacities, were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
    E.g., Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
    
    531 U.S. 356
       (2001).      While       there    may    be    subject   matter
    jurisdiction for the Title VII claim, the district court properly
    dismissed    that    claim    for    failure     to    exhaust      administrative
    remedies.    Griffin v. City of Dallas, 
    26 F.3d 610
    , 612-13 (5th Cir.
    1994).
    Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    dismissing, for failure to prosecute, the claims against Herrera
    and Holtz, in their individual capacities.              Salinas v. Sun Oil Co.,
    
    819 F.2d 105
    , 106 (5th Cir. 1987).
    AFFIRMED
    2