Heaton v. Monogram Crdt Card ( 2002 )


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  •                           Revised July 22, 2002
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _______________________
    No. 01-30104
    _______________________
    PATRICIA HEATON,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MONOGRAM CREDIT CARD BANK OF GEORGIA,
    Defendant,
    versus
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
    Movant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    _________________________________________________________________
    July 8, 2002
    Before JONES, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
    Like an earlier appeal, Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card
    Bank of Georgia, 
    231 F.3d 994
    (5th Cir. 2000), this appeal is from
    an order remanding this case to state court for lack of subject
    matter   jurisdiction.       The   main     issues   in   this   appeal   are
    (1) whether appellate jurisdiction exists to review the district
    court’s refusal to allow the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    (FDIC) to intervene as of right in the action; (2) if so, whether
    the district court erred in denying intervention; (3) whether this
    court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order;
    and (4) if so, whether the district court erred in remanding.
    Because of the important role that the FDIC plays in enforcing
    federal banking laws, as evidenced by its broad jurisdictional
    statute, we answer all four of these questions in the affirmative
    and reverse the district court’s orders denying the intervention
    motion as moot and remanding to state court.
    BACKGROUND
    Patricia Heaton brought a class action suit against
    Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia in Louisiana state court
    alleging violations of state usury laws. Monogram removed the case
    to federal district court on the ground that Heaton’s claims under
    Louisiana law were completely preempted by section 27 of the
    Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.                  That
    provision authorizes federally insured "State banks" to charge
    certain interest rates and fees and preempts state laws to the
    contrary.    12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a); 
    Heaton, 231 F.3d at 995-96
    .
    According to the FDIC, Monogram is “engaged in the business of
    receiving   deposits”   and   is     thus   a   “State   bank”   pursuant   to
    §   1813(a)(2)   of   the   same    statute.    If   Heaton’s    claims   were
    completely preempted, the district court had federal question
    jurisdiction over the claims and the case as pled.          See, e.g., Hart
    2
    v. Bayer Corp., 
    199 F.3d 239
    , 244 (5th Cir. 2000); McClelland v.
    Gronwaldt, 
    155 F.3d 507
    , 512 & n.12, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1998); Krispin
    v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 
    218 F.3d 919
    , 922 (8th Cir. 2000).1
    Heaton moved to remand, but her motion was initially
    denied.    The case was assigned to another district judge.             Heaton
    amended her complaint to add a claim under the Truth in Lending Act
    (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f. Later, she sought reconsideration
    of the court’s denial of her motion to remand (and moved to dismiss
    the TILA claim).     The FDIC attempted to intervene in the case as a
    party defendant either as of right or permissively pursuant to Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 24(a) or (b).       On the day the FDIC’s motion was filed,
    the district court remanded for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed
    the TILA claim.       Two days later, a magistrate judge denied the
    FDIC’s intervention motion as moot.
    Monogram appealed the remand order to this court, and
    the FDIC participated in the appeal as an amicus curiae.                  This
    court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Monogram’s appeal of
    the remand order, but reinstated Heaton’s TILA claim, holding that
    once the district court remanded the case, it lacked jurisdiction
    to dismiss the claim.      
    Heaton, 231 F.3d at 1000
    & n.6.         This court
    1
    The provisions of § 1831d are quite similar to certain provisions of
    the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 and 86. The courts of appeals are divided
    as to whether §§ 85 and 86 completely preempt state-law usury claims against a
    national bank so as to confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction over such
    claims. Compare Anderson v. H & R Block, Inc., 
    287 F.3d 1038
    (11th Cir. 2002),
    with 
    Krispin, 218 F.3d at 922
    (citing M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Hot
    Springs, 
    930 F.2d 608
    , 611 (8th Cir. 1991)).
    3
    acknowledged that because of its reinstatement of the TILA claim,
    “Monogram may file another petition for removal based on the TILA
    claim once this case is returned to state court.”        
    Id. at 1000
    n.6.
    Within a day of this court’s decision, Monogram again
    removed the case to federal court, and the FDIC immediately filed
    a second motion to intervene.        Unbeknownst to Monogram and the
    FDIC, however, Heaton had already obtained an ex parte state court
    order dismissing her TILA claim.         Consequently, Heaton moved to
    remand;   the   district   court   complied,   stating   that   it   lacked
    jurisdiction.     The court rejected Monogram’s complete preemption
    argument for federal jurisdiction, concluding that Monogram was not
    “engaged in the business of receiving deposits” and thus was not a
    “State bank” within the meaning of § 1813(a)(2).            In its order
    remanding the case, the court stated that it was dismissing as moot
    the FDIC’s motion to intervene.       The FDIC has appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    That the FDIC rather than Monogram has appealed makes all
    the difference on this second run-through.       In the first instance,
    the effective denial of the FDIC’s motion to intervene may be
    reviewed by this court notwithstanding the remand order according
    to City of Waco v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 
    293 U.S. 140
    , 
    55 S. Ct. 6
    (1934).    The district court erred in refusing to allow the
    FDIC to intervene as of right. And while a remand order based on
    lack of jurisdiction cannot normally be appealed from, 28 U.S.C. §
    4
    1447(d), the FDIC is granted a statutory exemption from that
    provision under the circumstances applicable here.                12 U.S.C. §
    1819(b)(2)(C).     Finally, the remand order was wrong because the
    FDIC was entitled to intervene in the case, conferring instant
    federal subject matter jurisdiction under the broad rubric of 12
    U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) (“all suits of a civil nature at common law
    or in equity to which the Corporation, in any capacity, is a party
    shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States”).
    I.
    Under the City of Waco rule, “we may review any aspect of
    a   judgment   containing   a     remand   order   that    is   ‘distinct   and
    separable   from   the   remand    proper’”    even   if   this   court   lacks
    jurisdiction to review the remand order.              First Nat’l Bank v.
    Genina Marine Servs., Inc., 
    136 F.3d 391
    , 394 (5th Cir. 1998)
    (citation omitted).      See Arnold v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,
    
    277 F.3d 772
    , 776-77 (5th Cir. 2001).          According to City of Waco,
    certain “separable” orders that (1) logically precede a remand
    order and (2) are conclusive, in the sense of being functionally
    unreviewable in state courts, can be reviewed on appeal even when
    the remand order cannot be.        
    Arnold, 277 F.3d at 776
    .       These orders
    must also be independently reviewable by means of devices such as
    the collateral order doctrine.        
    Id. Because the
    district court’s
    denial of the intervention motion satisfies these requirements, it
    is reviewable under City of Waco.
    5
    First, the denial of intervention preceded the district
    court’s remand decision in logic and in fact.            The remand decision
    was necessarily predicated on the court’s refusal to consider the
    jurisdictional significance of the motion to intervene.                     This
    court’s decision in FDIC v. Loyd, 
    955 F.2d 316
    (5th Cir. 1992), had
    been cited to the district court to demonstrate that it had subject
    matter    jurisdiction      over     Heaton’s     case    under    12    U.S.C.
    § 1819(b)(2)(A) as soon as the FDIC filed its motion to intervene.2
    Moreover, during a hearing on the remand and intervention motions,
    the   district    court   acknowledged     that   the    two   questions   were
    conceptually intertwined;3 the court also observed that Heaton’s
    motion to remand would become moot if the court granted the FDIC’s
    intervention motion first.         The court went on to make clear that it
    2
    See also Farina v. Mission Inv. Trust, 
    615 F.2d 1068
    , 1075 (5th Cir.
    1980) (regardless of whether district court had (a) treated FDIC’s motion to
    remove case to federal court as motion to intervene and granted it or (b) added
    FDIC on its own motion as party to case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, § 1819
    conferred subject matter jurisdiction on court because FDIC “was properly a party
    to the suit at the time of final judgment”).
    3
    As a general rule, “[a]n existing suit within the court's
    jurisdiction is a prerequisite of an intervention, which is an ancillary
    proceeding in an already instituted suit or action by which a third person is
    permitted to make himself a party, either joining the plaintiff in claiming what
    is sought by the complaint, or uniting with the defendant in resisting the claims
    of the plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them.” Kendrick
    v. Kendrick, 
    16 F.2d 744
    , 745 (5th Cir. 1926).        It is a different matter,
    however, when the issue of the propriety of intervention is intertwined with that
    of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 
    957 F.2d 1199
    , 1202
    n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (electing to address intervention issue before subject matter
    jurisdiction in case where rights and role of intervenor were “inextricably tied”
    to jurisdiction).
    6
    did not favor the intervention motion on the merits.4                  In these
    circumstances, the court’s action effectively denied the motion to
    intervene in a way that preceded its decision on jurisdiction both
    in logic and in fact.5
    Second, the denial of intervention was conclusive.               Our
    precedent     holds    that   decisions     on   joinder     of   a   party   are
    “separable” -- and, therefore, conclusive -- for City for Waco
    purposes.6      A     decision   on   the   propriety   of    intervention    is
    indistinguishable from a joinder decision for these purposes.
    Finally, the denial of intervention was an appealable
    collateral order. Edwards v. City of Houston, 
    78 F.3d 983
    , 992 (5th
    Cir. 1996) (en banc); Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 
    115 F.3d 4
                Any such considerations cannot affect the FDIC’s right, granted by
    Congress, to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts. A district court “has
    no discretionary authority to remand a case over which it has subject matter
    jurisdiction.” Buchner v. FDIC, 
    981 F.2d 816
    , 817 (5th Cir. 1993). Cf. Bank
    One, N.A. v. Boyd, 
    288 F.3d 181
    , 184 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The federal courts have
    a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon
    them.”) (citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
    424 U.S. 800
    , 817, 
    96 S. Ct. 1236
    , 1246 (1976)).
    5
    See Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of
    Grand Rapids, 
    922 F.2d 303
    , 305-06 (6th Cir. 1990) (where district judge delayed
    hearing on motion for intervention until date by which prospective intervenor’s
    interest would have disappeared, delay was practical equivalent to denial of
    motion); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Cent. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 
    753 F.2d 66
    , 68
    (8th Cir. 1985) (“failure to rule on a motion to intervene can be interpreted as
    an implicit denial”).
    6
    
    Arnold, 277 F.3d at 776
    (citing Doleac ex rel. Doleac v. Michalson,
    
    264 F.3d 470
    , 489 (5th Cir. 2001)); 
    Doleac, 264 F.3d at 485-86
    , 489 (where
    consideration of (a) whether to allow amendment adding a party and (b) whether
    to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was “simultaneous and
    intertwined,” binding precedent requires conclusion that issues are separable
    under City of Waco).
    7
    311, 313 (5th Cir. 1997).           In sum, the denial is reviewable on
    appeal.
    II.
    The district court erred on the merits in refusing to
    allow the FDIC to intervene.         A district court’s denial of a motion
    to intervene as a matter of right is reviewed de novo, except that
    the abuse of discretion test is applied to the court’s ruling on
    timeliness of the prospective intervenor’s application.                    John Doe
    No. 1 v. Glickman, 
    256 F.3d 371
    , 375 (5th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club
    v. City of San 
    Antonio, 115 F.3d at 314
    ; 
    Edwards, 78 F.3d at 995
    ,
    999-1000.     Although the district court issued no written findings
    on   the    propriety   of    the    FDIC’s     intervention,    it    made   oral
    statements that seem to bear on the timeliness issue.                      Assuming
    arguendo that this aspect of the court’s decision is reviewed for
    abuse of discretion, we hold that the court abused its discretion.
    Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) is based on
    “four      requirements:     (1)    the    applicant   must     file   a    timely
    application; (2) the applicant must claim an interest in the
    subject matter of the action; (3) the applicant must show that
    disposition of the action may impair or impede the applicant's
    ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest
    must not be adequately represented by existing parties to the
    litigation.”      United States v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 
    47 F.3d 755
    , 756 (5th Cir. 1995). "Federal courts should allow intervention
    8
    where no one would be hurt and the greater justice could be
    attained."    John Doe No. 
    1, 256 F.3d at 375
    (citation omitted).                  In
    this case, the FDIC’s application for intervention satisfies all
    four requirements of Rule 24(a)(2).             
    Edwards, 78 F.3d at 999
    .7
    1. Timeliness.        “The requirement of timeliness is not a
    tool of retribution to punish the tardy would-be intervenor, but
    rather a guard against prejudicing the original parties by the
    failure to apply sooner.”         Sierra Club v. Espy, 
    18 F.3d 1202
    , 1205
    (5th Cir. 1994).     This court considers four factors in determining
    whether a motion to intervene was timely: (1) the length of time
    during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or reasonably
    should have known of its interest in the case before it sought to
    intervene;    (2)    the    prejudice       that    existing      parties   to    the
    litigation may suffer as a result of the would-be intervenor's
    failure to apply for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably
    should have known of its interest in the case; (3) the prejudice
    that the would-be intervenor may suffer if intervention is denied;
    and (4) whether unusual circumstances militate for or against a
    determination     that     the   application       is   timely.     There   are    no
    7
    When a district court has erred in denying a motion for intervention
    as a matter of right, we may reverse the denial without remanding for further
    proceedings in the district court concerning the propriety of intervention. John
    Doe No. 
    1, 256 F.3d at 381
    ; Americans United for Separation of Church and State
    v. City of Grand Rapids, 
    922 F.2d 303
    , 305-06 (6th Cir. 1990). Compare Baker v.
    Wade, 
    769 F.2d 289
    , 291-92 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (this court has power to
    allow intervention); Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 
    275 F.3d 432
    , 437-38,
    443 (5th Cir. 2001).
    9
    absolute measures of timeliness; it is determined from all the
    circumstances.       Id.; 
    Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000
    .
    The first timeliness factor favors the FDIC.            The FDIC’s
    second motion to intervene was filed two business days after this
    court’s decision in the first appeal and one business day after
    Monogram removed the case to federal court.8            The FDIC did not act
    in an untimely fashion when it moved to intervene to protect its
    various interests.9
    Heaton    points    out   that   the   FDIC   did   not    join   in
    Monogram’s appeal from the district court’s first remand order.
    And rather than appeal from the district court’s dismissal of its
    first intervention request as moot, the FDIC participated in the
    first appeal in this case only as an amicus curiae.             These facts do
    not preclude the FDIC from seeking intervention after the second
    8
    As for the FDIC’s first motion to intervene, it was filed about six
    weeks after Heaton moved for reconsideration of the district court’s initial
    denial of her motion to remand and two weeks after the district court heard
    argument on the motion, at which time the district court expressed a willingness
    to grant Heaton’s reconsideration motion and remand. The district court had
    initially denied Heaton’s motion to remand and, in particular, had concluded that
    Monogram was a “State bank” under the FDIA, endorsing the FDIC’s reading of the
    statute. The FDIC reasonably could have believed until at least the filing of
    Heaton’s reconsideration motion that the case was likely to remain in federal
    court; that the court was likely to continue to agree with its construction of
    the FDIA; and thus that intervention was not necessary.
    9
    
    Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000
    -01 (lapses of as much as five months not
    unreasonable) (citing cases); Ozee v. Am. Council on Gift Annuities, Inc., 
    110 F.3d 1082
    , 1095-96 (5th Cir. 1997) (date when prospective intervenor became aware
    of “immediate danger to his interests” is relevant to timeliness determination),
    vacated on other grounds sub nom. Am. Bible Soc. v. Richie, 
    522 U.S. 1011
    , 
    118 S. Ct. 596
    (1997), remanded to 
    143 F.3d 937
    , 941-42 & 941 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998)
    (reversing order denying attorney general’s motion to intervene as of right and
    granting motion; citing original vacated opinion in so doing); Diaz v. Southern
    Drilling Corp., 
    427 F.2d 1118
    , 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1970).
    10
    remand.    The district court had not claimed that it was deciding
    the merits of the FDIC’s first motion to intervene; at the very
    least, the FDIC reasonably could have believed that there was no
    decision on this motion from which the FDIC could appeal and that
    for this reason it was not a party when the district court remanded
    the first time.     Cf. Sierra Club v. 
    Espy, 18 F.3d at 1206
    (“Courts
    should discourage       premature    intervention     that   wastes    judicial
    resources.”).      The FDIC took prompt action to intervene in the
    district court both before and after the first appeal.10 Its second
    intervention motion was not untimely.
    As for the second factor, “prejudice must be measured by
    the delay in seeking intervention, not the inconvenience to the
    existing parties of allowing the intervenor to participate in the
    litigation.”     Sierra Club v. 
    Espy, 18 F.3d at 1206
    .          In this case,
    Heaton has identified, and we are aware of, no prejudice to her
    that could have resulted from the insignificant delay by the FDIC
    in seeking intervention.       John Doe No. 
    1, 256 F.3d at 378
    ; Ass’n of
    Prof’l Flight Attendants v. Gibbs, 
    804 F.2d 318
    , 321 (5th Cir.
    1986).
    The third timeliness factor also favors the FDIC.                 To
    deny intervention would deprive the FDIC of the opportunity to
    exercise “the legal rights associated with formal intervention,
    10
    We note parenthetically that the FDIC sought to intervene in the case
    in state court after the second remand, but that its motion was denied.
    11
    namely the briefing of issues, presentation of evidence, and
    ability to appeal.”      
    Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1003
    (quoting Sierra Club
    v. 
    Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207
    ).          As a substantive matter, an adverse
    ruling in this litigation could significantly affect not only the
    validity of the FDIC’s decision to extend deposit insurance to
    Monogram but its ability to regulate the federal deposit insurance
    system as a whole.      It cannot be assumed that the existing parties
    to   the   litigation   would    protect    the   FDIC’s   and    the   public’s
    interest as to these matters.         
    Ozee, 110 F.3d at 1096
    .
    As for the fourth and final timeliness factor, no unusual
    circumstances bearing on timeliness have been brought to our
    attention.       Compare Sierra Club v. 
    Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207
    .               The
    district    court   abused    its   discretion     in   finding    the   FDIC’s
    intervention untimely.
    2.    Interest of applicant.      The FDIC’s interests in this
    litigation are substantial. Of course, the FDIC has an interest in
    defending its decision to grant deposit insurance to Monogram, a
    decision drawn directly into question by Heaton’s contention that
    Monogram is not a “State bank” for purposes of the FDIA.11               But the
    11
    As a statutory “State bank,” Monogram is deemed eligible for deposit
    insurance and subject to the scheme of regulatory requirements that apply to such
    entities.   See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial
    Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 319, 364-65 & 364 n.103
    (1999) (under 12 U.S.C. § 1813, FDIC insurance, and attendant regulatory
    obligations, is potentially available to "depository institutions,” including
    “State banks”); Meriden Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC, 
    62 F.3d 449
    , 452-53
    (2d Cir. 1995) (because financial institution was “State bank” under 12 U.S.C.
    § 1813(c)(2), it was “insured depository institution” subject to cross-guarantee
    liability under 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)).
    12
    FDIC also has a broader interest in protecting the proper and
    consistent application of the Congressionally designed framework to
    ensure the safety and integrity of the federal deposit insurance
    system.      In this case, the FDIC has argued both that the district
    court’s interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1831d is wrong on the merits
    and that the district court lacked the power even to apply this
    provision by deciding whether a particular financial institution is
    a “State bank” under § 1831d. Taken together, these interests more
    than suffice to meet the requirement of Rule 24.                    See Sierra Club
    v. City of San 
    Antonio, 115 F.3d at 315
    (intervention as of right
    granted    to     state     of      Texas   to     protect   state’s    interests   in
    environmental lawsuit); see also Ceres 
    Gulf, supra
    fn3 (allowing
    intervention         as   of        right   to     Director,    OWCP,    to   protect
    administrative scheme).12
    3.      Whether disposition of the action might impair or
    impede applicant’s ability to protect its interest.                      “[T]he stare
    decisis effect of an adverse judgment constitutes a sufficient
    impairment to compel intervention.”                   Sierra Club v. Glickman, 
    82 F.3d 106
    , 109-10 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Sierra Club
    v.   
    Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207
    ).        The   district   court’s    ruling
    interpreting the FDIA for purposes of its removal jurisdiction will
    12
    FDIC appealed only the denial of intervention as of right, Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 24(a). Based on this court’s above-cited caselaw, we need not address
    the application of permissive intervention, Rule 24(b).
    13
    undoubtedly, unless changed, be relied upon as a precedent in
    future actions involving the FDIC.           
    Glickman, 82 F.3d at 110
    .
    4.    Whether     existing      parties    adequately       protect
    applicant’s interest.        The district court thought, incorrectly,
    that intervention was unnecessary because the FDIC and Monogram
    agreed on the merits of the substantive issues to be litigated.               An
    applicant for intervention, however,          has only a minimal burden as
    to inadequate representation.             All he needs to show is that
    representation by the existing parties may be inadequate. 
    Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1005
    ; Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 
    275 F.3d 432
    , 437-38 (5th Cir. 2001).        Government agencies such as the FDIC
    must represent the public interest, not just the economic interests
    of one industry.       That the FDIC’s interests and Monogram’s may
    diverge in the future, even though, at this moment, they appear to
    share common ground, is enough to meet the FDIC’s burden on this
    issue.13
    The FDIC was, for all these reasons, clearly entitled to
    intervene here.
    III.
    Because    the   FDIC   was    entitled   to   intervene,    it   is
    entitled to appeal the remand order in this case under 12 U.S.C.
    13
    See Sierra Club v. City of San 
    Antonio, 115 F.3d at 315
    (“axiomatic”
    that interests of persons pumping water from aquifer, including local cities and
    government entities, would diverge from those of various state agencies and of
    state qua state and as parens patriae); 
    Ozee, 110 F.3d at 1096
    .
    14
    § 1819(b)(2)(C), which provides that the FDIC “may appeal any order
    of remand entered by any United States district court.”                     This
    provision creates an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s bar on
    appellate review of remand orders. Diaz v. McAllen State Bank, 
    975 F.2d 1145
    , 1147 (5th Cir. 1992). In cases where the FDIC has become
    a party, we have already heard appeals under § 1819(b)(2)(C) where
    the district court remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
    on the ground that the FDIC had not articulated a convincing
    interest in the litigation or was not properly a party before the
    district court.     See NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Fennell, 
    942 F.2d 934
    ,
    935-36 & 935 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversing remand order, holding
    that the FDIC was a party properly before district court); Pernie
    Bailey Drilling Co. v. FDIC, 
    905 F.2d 78
    , 79-80 (5th Cir. 1990) (per
    curiam) (same).      Likewise, this court has jurisdiction to review
    the remand order.14
    14
    It is unnecessary to decide to what extent the “expansive language”
    of § 1819(b)(2)(C), Hellon & Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 
    958 F.2d 295
    ,
    298 (9th Cir. 1992) (construing identical “any order of remand” language in
    statute securing broad removal rights to Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)), may
    allow the FDIC to appeal remand orders in cases to which it has no party status
    and is not entitled to party status. Compare In re Resolution Trust Corp., 
    888 F.2d 57
    , 59 (8th Cir. 1989) (in provision allowing appeal by RTC of remand
    orders, “[o]bviously ‘any’ cannot extend to orders remanding cases removed by
    wholly unrelated parties”), dismissed as moot on reh’g on other grounds sub nom.
    Ward v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
    901 F.2d 694
    (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
    15
    IV.
    Finally, the district court erred in ordering remand for
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction.       12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A)
    provides that, with exceptions not relevant to this case, “all
    suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the
    Corporation, in any capacity, is a party shall be deemed to arise
    under the laws of the United States.”     “The statute indicates that
    where the FDIC is a party, federal question jurisdiction exists,
    except with respect to certain state law claims where the FDIC was
    appointed    receiver   by   the   exclusive   appointment   of   state
    authorities.”    Pernie Bailey Drilling 
    Co., 905 F.2d at 80
    .      As the
    district court acknowledged, allowing the FDIC to intervene in this
    case would have mooted Heaton’s motion to remand.    Because the FDIC
    is entitled to intervene in this case, it is a party for the
    purposes of § 1819(b)(2)(A), which conferred instant subject matter
    jurisdiction over the case.
    Under FDIC v. Loyd, 
    955 F.2d 316
    (5th Cir. 1992), the FDIC
    became a “party,” for purposes of § 1819(b)(2)(A), as soon as it
    filed its motion to intervene.     In Loyd, the only basis for federal
    jurisdiction was the FDIC’s status as a party for purposes of
    § 1819(b)(2)(A); and this court held that the FDIC initially
    attained such status when it filed its motion to intervene in state
    
    court. 955 F.2d at 327
    , 329.     Loyd and other decisions allowing
    the FDIC more latitude than other litigants require some connection
    16
    between the FDIC and the underlying action in order for the FDIC to
    have party status for the purpose of removing a case.15               Although
    Loyd, technically, interpreted “party” in § 1819(b)(2)(A) for
    purposes of gauging the timeliness of FDIC’s subsequent removal of
    a case from state to federal court, it wold seem that Loyd’s
    definition of “party” -- applying that status whenever FDIC moves
    to intervene -- should also apply to FDIC’s motion to intervene in
    federal court. This uniform interpretation comports with the broad
    jurisdictional grant in § 1819(b)(2)(A).
    It might be argued that Loyd is distinguishable because
    the FDIC’s stake in this litigation differs significantly from its
    stake in Loyd.     Here the FDIC does not seek to participate in its
    capacity as receiver or insurer of a failed bank.                 Instead, it
    seeks to intervene to protect its more general interest in ensuring
    the   correct   interpretation     of    a   statute   that   implicates    the
    stability and consistency of the FDIC’s regime of bank regulation.
    This, however, is the ultimate interest intended to be furthered by
    the broad grant of jurisdiction, removal rights, and appeal rights
    in § 1819(b)(2).     But that is not all.       The FDIC’s role as insurer
    15
    “[W]e have never suggested that the FDIC has some cognizable status
    as a party in the state court case unless the FDIC has had at least some contact
    with the state court action. Or, stated another way, we have never suggested
    that the FDIC was a cognizable [28 U.S.C.] § 1446 party in the state court case
    in the absence of some appearance by the FDIC in that proceeding.” 
    Id. at 326-27
    (footnote omitted). See 
    id. at 328
    (“some party-status of the removing party is
    critical”). Compare Bank One Texas Nat’l Ass’n v. Morrison, 
    26 F.3d 544
    , 547
    (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating concern that “federal jurisdiction should
    not be manipulated by the FDIC’s simple intervention in a given case”).
    17
    of bank deposits is immediately relevant to the FDIC’s stake in
    this litigation.      If it proves correct that Monogram is not a
    “State bank” within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (a question we
    do not decide in this appeal), then the validity of the FDIC’s
    extension of deposit insurance to certain deposits at Monogram is
    called   into    question.     The    possible   effect     on    the   FDIC’s
    obligations and rights as insurer of these deposits, coupled with
    the effects on the FDIC’s regulatory interests, reassure us that as
    in Loyd, the FDIC’s attempt to intervene conferred on it sufficient
    “party” status to bring this case within the federal court’s
    jurisdiction under § 1819(b)(2)(A).
    V.
    The FDIC seeks rulings on the amenability to judicial
    review of its decision that Monogram was “engaged in the business
    of   receiving   deposits”   within    the   meaning   of   the   FDIA,   and,
    alternatively, on the merits of this regulatory decision.               We need
    not resolve these questions in order to grant the FDIC the relief
    that it has requested in this appeal.          Instead, we hold that the
    district court erred in refusing to allow the FDIC to intervene in
    the case and in holding that it lacked jurisdiction.              On remand,
    the district court must allow the FDIC to intervene.              See Sierra
    Club v. City of San 
    Antonio, 115 F.3d at 315
    .
    18
    For these reasons, the denial of intervention and the
    remand order are REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    19