Flowers v. So Regn Physn Svcs ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •                            REVISED APRIL 12, 2002
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit
    No. 01-30816
    SANDRA SPRAGIS FLOWERS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    SOUTHERN REGIONAL PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC.
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Middle District of Louisiana
    March 26, 2002
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
    Appellant    Sandra       Spragis   Flowers   won   a     jury   verdict   of
    $100,000   in   damages    for    harassment     under   the    Americans   with
    Disabilities     Act    from    Appellee   Southern      Regional     Physicians
    Services, Inc. (“Southern”).         Southern appealed the damages award.
    While the appeal was pending, Flowers filed a motion for attorney’s
    fees, which was granted by the district court.               Subsequent to the
    awarding of attorney’s fees, this Court vacated the damage award of
    $100,000 and remanded so that nominal damages of $1.00 could be
    awarded.    Southern then filed a motion for relief from judgment
    pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) so that they
    would not have to pay attorney’s fees.     The district court granted
    the motion and Flowers now appeals.
    BACKGROUND
    Flowers commenced suit under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12012,
    against her former employer, Southern, alleging she was harassed
    and fired because of her infection with HIV.       On December 8, 1998,
    the matter went to trial and a jury awarded damages for the
    harassment in the amount of $350,000, which was then reduced to
    $100,000 due to limitations imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.1           On July
    21, 1999,   the   district   court   entered   judgment   on   the   jury’s
    verdict.2   On July 28, 1999, Flowers filed a motion for attorney’s
    fees and costs in excess of $100,000, which Southern opposed.            On
    December 6, 1999, Southern filed a notice of appeal to this Court
    seeking review of the liability findings and damages awards by the
    1
    Apparently, the jury found for Flowers only on her
    harassment claim but not on her claim that her termination was
    motivated by her disability.
    2
    Both parties consented to trial by Magistrate on January
    23, 1998.    The order referring to a Magistrate all further
    proceedings and entry of judgment was entered on January 26, 1998
    by Judge Frank J. Polozola. All references in this opinion to the
    “district judge” or “district court” from the present case,
    therefore, refer to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Riedlinger.
    2
    jury, but did not appeal the awarding of attorney’s fees because no
    judgment on Flowers’ motion had been made yet.
    On February 14, 2000, the district court entered a judgment
    for attorney’s fees in the amount of $52,561.25 plus interest and
    costs.   On March 30, 2001, this Court affirmed the judgment of
    Flowers’ case as to liability but vacated and remanded on the issue
    of damages, instructing the district court to enter a judgment for
    nominal damages of $1.00.         On April 12, 2001, Flowers filed a
    motion for writ of execution seeking execution of the judgment of
    February 14, 2000, for attorney’s fees.              On April 19, 2001,
    Southern filed a motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 60(b)(6).     On June 20, 2001, the district court granted the
    motion for     relief   from   judgment   and   vacated   the   judgment   of
    February 14, 2000, and denied the writ of execution.            In doing so,
    the district court re-styled the motion as one brought under Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) instead of (b)(6).          Flowers now appeals from
    this decision.
    DISCUSSION
    Did the district court err in granting the Rule 60(b) motion
    despite Flowers’ continued standing as a prevailing party?
    In contesting the district court’s decision, Flowers puts
    forward three arguments.        First, Flowers contends that the Rule
    60(b) motion should be viewed as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion for
    excusable neglect and that, as such, it should be denied for being
    3
    untimely.    Second, Flowers contends that because this Court found
    in favor of her as to liability (though not damages), she remains
    the prevailing party.     As such, she asserts that Rule 60(b)(5)
    cannot apply because this Court did not reverse or vacate the
    liability portion of her judgment, which was the basis for awarding
    attorney’s fees.    Finally, she argues that Rule 60(b)(6) also is
    inapplicable because it should only be used in extraordinary
    circumstances.
    Southern counters that Rule 60(b)(1) is inapplicable because
    it was under no duty to appeal the awarding of attorney’s fees
    before the appeal on the issue of damages and liability was
    resolved.    It also asserts that Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) would be
    proper.   It agrees with the district court’s use of (b)(5) because
    the attorney’s fees were awarded based on the damages, not the
    existence of liability, and now that the damages have been vacated,
    that part of the verdict that was the basis of granting attorney’s
    fees has disappeared.     Southern also asserts that equity would
    allow the district court to use (b)(6) anyway.
    This Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or
    deny relief under Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion.    Halicki
    v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 
    151 F.3d 465
    , 470 (5th Cir.
    1998).    Rule 60(b) states, in relevant part:
    (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect;
    Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion
    and upon such terms as are just, the court may
    relieve a party or a party’s legal representative
    4
    from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
    following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
    surprise,   or   excusable   neglect;   (2)   newly
    discovered evidence which by due diligence could
    not have been discovered in time to move for a new
    trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
    heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
    misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
    adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
    judgment   has   been   satisfied,   released,   or
    discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
    based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
    is no longer equitable that the judgment should
    have prospective application; or (6) any other
    reason justifying relief from the operation of the
    judgment.    The motion shall be made within a
    reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3)
    not more than one year after the judgment, order,
    or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under
    this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
    of a judgment or suspend its operation.
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).       Flowers believes that Southern should have
    appealed the awarding of attorney’s fees when granted and that the
    failure to do so should be viewed as “excusable neglect” on the
    part of Southern.       She asks, therefore, that their motion be re-
    styled as one under Rule 60(b)(1).             Such motions must be made
    within one year after the judgment, however, and so if Southern’s
    motion   is    viewed   as   one   under   (b)(1),   then   it   is   untimely.
    Southern does not dispute that a motion under Rule (b)(1) would be
    untimely but points out that they are under no duty to appeal the
    awarding of attorney’s fees and so (b)(1) does not apply.
    Though this Court has never before dealt with the issue of
    whether an appeal of attorney’s fees is required in light of a Rule
    60(b)(5) or (b)(6) motion, other circuits have. As Southern points
    5
    out, both the Ninth and the Seventh Circuits have recognized that
    a party must file a separate appeal only when it challenges some
    aspect of the award itself.   California Med. Assoc. v. Shalala, 
    207 F.3d 575
    , 577 (9th Cir. 2000); Mother Goose Nursery Sch., Inc. v.
    Sendak, 
    770 F.2d 668
    , 676 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Maul v.
    Constan, 
    23 F.3d 143
    , 147 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that it was an
    abuse of discretion for the district court to deny a Rule 60(b)(5)
    motion for relief when the merits judgment was reduced to nominal
    damages on appeal); cf. Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 
    894 F.2d 157
    , 160 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that because no prior judgment
    upon which attorney’s fees was based had been reversed or otherwise
    vacated, Rule (b)(5) was inapplicable on its face).    In   Shalala,
    the Ninth Circuit held that though a separate appeal must be made
    to challenge some aspect of the fee award itself, “Rule 60(b)(5) is
    available if a party seeks relief solely on the ground that the
    underlying merits judgment is reversed.” 
    Shalala, 207 F.3d at 577
    .
    Despite Rule 60(b)(5) appearing to be an appropriate motion in
    such an instance, Flowers argues that it can not apply in the
    present case because the underlying judgment was not reversed or
    vacated. The damages were reduced to nominal but Flowers maintains
    that because this Court did not reverse the liability aspect of the
    jury’s decision, she is still entitled to attorney’s fees as a
    prevailing party.   Flowers argument, however, has no basis in the
    statute or in equity.   Rule 60(b)(5) provides that relief may be
    6
    sought   when    “the   judgment    has      been   satisfied,   released,    or
    discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
    reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
    the judgment should have prospective application.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    60(b)(5) (emphasis added).          Rule 60(b)(5) states nothing about
    relief being denied in favor of a prevailing party.                       As the
    district court in the present case noted, a decision is “based on”
    a prior judgment when it is “a necessary element of the decision,
    giving rise, for example, to the cause of action or a successful
    defense.”    
    Bailey, 894 F.2d at 160
    .         This Court’s opinion as to the
    underlying proceeding states “we VACATE the jury’s damages award
    and REMAND the case for the entry of an award of nominal damages.”
    Flowers v. Southern Reg’l Physician Serv., Inc., 
    247 F.3d 229
    , 239
    (5th Cir. 2001).
    The district court in the present case recognized that its
    awarding of attorney’s fees was based on the amount awarded in
    damages and not on the existence of liability alone.                     Awarding
    attorney’s    fees   based   on    the    damages,    or   degree   of   success
    obtained, is completely in line with the holdings of the Supreme
    Court and this Circuit.       Farrar v. Hobby, 
    506 U.S. 103
    , 114-115
    (1992); Giles v. General Elec. Co., 
    245 F.3d 474
    , 491 n.31 (5th
    Cir. 2001).     In Farrar, the Supreme Court held that though a civil
    rights plaintiff who recovers nominal damages is a “prevailing
    party” for the purposes of the civil rights attorney fee provision,
    7
    the nominal nature of the awards does affect the propriety of the
    fees   awarded,   and   that    when   nominal    fees   are   awarded   it    is
    appropriate for the prevailing party’s attorney to receive no fees
    at all.     
    Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114-15
    .          “When a plaintiff recovers
    only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential
    element of his claim for monetary relief . . . the only reasonable
    fee is usually no fee at all.”             
    Id. at 115
    (internal citations
    omitted).     In the present case, the district judge granted the
    attorney’s fees in light of the damages, which were $100,000. This
    Court vacated the awarding of $100,000 and remanded to the district
    court to enter a judgment of nominal damages in the amount of
    $1.00.    Therefore, that part of the judgment that formed the basis
    of the granting of attorney’s fees was vacated and Rule 60(b)(5)
    was appropriate.
    The Seventh Circuit faced a similar case in 1994 in Maul v.
    Constan, 
    23 F.3d 143
    (7th Cir. 1994).              In Maul, the plaintiff,
    Maul, was an inmate in an Indiana prison who sued for violations of
    his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.             
    Id. at 144.
        After an
    award of damages and subsequent remand, the district court granted
    Maul $22,500 in damages in June, 1991.            
    Id. In August,
    1991 the
    district court granted Maul $18,542.93 in attorney’s fees.                    
    Id. Over a
    year later, in December, 1992, the Seventh Circuit reversed
    the district court’s award of $22,500 because Maul had failed to
    prove actual injury.      
    Id. The Seventh
    Circuit then remanded the
    8
    case to the district court to assess $1.00 in nominal damages
    against the defendants.    
    Id. The award
    of attorney’s fees was not
    part of that appeal.      
    Id. In February,
    1993, after the $1.00
    judgment was entered, the defendants moved under Rule 60(b)(5) for
    a refund of the attorney’s fees.        
    Id. The district
    court denied
    the motion and the defendants appealed.            
    Id. at 144-45.
         The
    Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, relying
    heavily on the reasoning of Farrar to justify its conclusion that
    no attorney’s fees should be awarded.         
    Id. at 145-47.
       The present
    case is distinguishable only in that this Court does not even have
    to overcome the standard of review that acts in favor of the
    district court’s decision as the court in Maul did.            The district
    judge reviewed the Rule 60(b)(5) motion in light of this Court’s
    vacating the damages and concluded that the motion was justified
    and no abuse of discretion should be found.          We hold, therefore,
    that Rule 60(b)(5) was appropriate in the present case.              Having
    reached that conclusion, there is no need to delve into the issue
    of whether Rule 60(b)(6) is also appropriate.
    CONCLUSION
    Having carefully reviewed the record of this case and the
    parties’ respective briefing and for the reasons set forth above,
    we conclude that the district court did not err in granting
    Southern’s Rule 60(b) motion. Southern could not have appealed the
    9
    awarding of attorney’s fees at the time that order was made and
    Rule      60(b)(5)         is   perfectly   designed   to   accommodate   such   a
    situation.             We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s decision.
    AFFIRMED.
    g:\opin\01-30816.opn                        10