Intertan Inc. v. Commissioner ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                   United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                        December 8, 2004
    _______________________                   Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-60225
    _______________________
    INTERTAN INC,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States Tax Court
    9599-02
    Before GARWOOD, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    InterTan,      Inc.   (“InterTan”)    appeals    the    tax    court’s
    assessment     of    an   accuracy-related       penalty    for     substantial
    underpayment of tax liability based on InterTan’s 1993 tax return.
    We AFFIRM the judgment of the Tax Court.
    A determination as to whether a taxpayer acted with
    reasonable reliance and in good faith is reviewed for clear error.
    Srivastava v. Commissioner, 
    220 F.3d 353
    , 367 & n.42 (5th Cir.
    2000).     Whether    substantial    authority     exists   for      treating      a
    transaction in a given manner is a mixed question of law and fact.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Therefore, legal conclusions are subject to de novo review, and
    factual determinations are reviewed for clear error.                   Westbrook v.
    Commissioner, 
    68 F.3d 868
     (5th Cir. 1995).
    An   accuracy-related       penalty     will    not    apply     when   a
    taxpayer, acting in good faith, reasonably relies on professional
    advice   with   respect    to   the    tax     treatment    of     a    particular
    transaction.    TREAS. REG. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).         This inquiry is fact-
    specific and made on a “case-by-case basis.”                     Id.     “The most
    important factor is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to assess
    the taxpayer’s proper tax liability.”          Id. Any reliance on profes-
    sional tax advice also presupposes that the taxpayer gave the
    advisor all information material to the tax return and any key
    transactions. See Westbrook v. Commissioner, 
    68 F.3d 868
    , 881 (5th
    Cir. 1995).
    The Tax Court’s factfindings on the diligence of InterTan
    and the reasonableness of its reliance on PriceWaterhouse are
    supported by the record.        The absence of any documentation that
    PriceWaterhouse    was    aware   of       ITC’s   financial      condition    and
    testimony by a PriceWaterhouse employee at trial demonstrates that
    the accountants were unaware of the arrangement between InterTan
    and the Royal Bank.       The Tax Court’s findings cannot be clearly
    erroneous.
    In the alternative, InterTan asserts, contrary to the Tax
    Court’s decisions, that it had “substantial authority” that the
    transaction was lawful and thus no penalty should have been imposed
    2
    by the Commissioner. See 
    26 U.S.C. §§ 6662
    (d)(1), (2); 
    Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4
    (a), (b), (d)(2).      InterTan relies on two cases as sub-
    stantial authority for its tax treatment of the transaction.            In
    Soreng v. Commissioner, 
    158 F.2d 340
     (7th Cir. 1946) and Crellin’s
    Estate v. Commissioner, 
    203 F.2d 812
     (9th Cir. 1953), courts
    treated distributions to shareholders that were held briefly, with
    the money being returned to the corporation, as dividends for tax
    purposes.      In Soreng, however, the agreement was between a third-
    party lender and the shareholders themselves; the shareholders were
    free to choose their own arrangements, and the overall arrangement
    had an independent business purpose.           In Crellin’s Estate, a
    holding company rescinded a dividend after learning that the tax
    advice triggering the dividend payment was incorrect.          
    203 F.2d at 813
    .        Crellin is readily distinguishable because the company
    undeniably declared a dividend and then later revoked it based on
    an agreement with its shareholders.      The issue whether the payment
    constituted a dividend in the first instance was not before the
    court.       By contrast, in this case, InterTan set up the entire
    transaction and directed the conduct of the other players, all
    subject to the underlying obligation to the Royal Bank.         The cases
    are    so    fundamentally   distinguishable   as   not   to   amount   to
    substantial authority.
    Because InterTan is unable to prevail on either claim of
    error, the judgment of the tax court is AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-60225

Judges: Garwood, Jones, Per Curiam, Prado

Filed Date: 12/13/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024