James Williamson v. County Montgomery ( 2015 )

Case: 14-20285 Document: 00513069952 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/08/2015
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 14-20285 June 8, 2015
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
JAMES C. WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
COUNTY MONTGOMERY,
Defendant-Appellee
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:13-CV-1259
Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
James C. Williamson moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP)
on appeal from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Williamson
claimed that he was unlawfully detained for speeding, subjected to an illegal
search, and not given Miranda 1 warnings upon his arrest for failure to identify.
The district dismissed his complaint based on the immunity of the defendants,
insufficient service of process, and Williamson’s failure to file the suit within
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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No. 14-20285
the applicable statute of limitations. Denying his motion for leave to proceed
IFP on appeal, the district court certified that the appeal was not taken in good
faith.
By moving to proceed IFP, Williamson is challenging the district court’s
certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor,
117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into an appellant’s good faith
“is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits
(and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.
1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We may dismiss the
appeal under 5th Circuit Rule 42.2 if it is frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at
202 n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
Williamson does not challenge sufficiently the district court’s reasons for
dismissing his complaint or denying him leave to proceed IFP on appeal. Pro
se briefs are afforded liberal construction. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225
(5th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, when an appellant fails to identify any error in
the district court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not appealed
that issue. Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744,
748 (5th Cir. 1987).
Williamson asserts, without further explanation, in his opening brief
that the limitations period is four years because his suit is based on fraud and
official oppression by officers. For actions brought pursuant to § 1983, federal
courts borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Texas, that period is two years.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a); Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d
240, 246 (5th Cir. 2002). Williamson’s complaint alleged violations of federal
constitutional rights and thus was subject to the two-year statute of limitations
period. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387. In addition, federal law determines when
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a § 1983 cause of action accrues. See Hitt, 301 F.3d at 246. Under federal law,
the limitations period begins to run “when the plaintiff becomes aware that he
has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been
injured.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Montgomery
County dropped criminal charges against Williamson in May 2010, giving him
until May 2012 to file suit timely. He did not commence proceedings against
the officers and the State until March 2013. Therefore, the district court did
not err in finding his suit time barred by the statute of limitations
Because Williamson has failed to challenge any legal aspect of the
district court’s disposition of his complaint or the certification that his appeal
is not taken in good faith, he has abandoned the critical issues of his appeal.
Brinkmann, 813 F.2d at 748. Thus, the appeal lacks arguable merit and is
frivolous. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 220. Accordingly, Williamson’s motion for
leave to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED as
frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
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