Anderson v. Galveston County District Clerk , 91 F. App'x 925 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 14, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-41010
Summary Calendar
JOHN G. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GALVESTON COUNTY DISTRICT CLERK; 122ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT; STATE OF TEXAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. G-01-CV-144
--------------------
Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
John G. Anderson, Texas prisoner # 558092, appeals the
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(b)(1). He argues that the
district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint as
frivolous pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
because his complaint challenged the length of his pre-trial
detention and not his conviction. He further argues that the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
district court erred in refusing his request to amend his
complaint.
Anderson’s complaint, given its most liberal construction,
sought damages for the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial. A determination that Anderson’s Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial was violated would necessarily implicate
the invalidity of his conviction, and Anderson has not shown that
his conviction has been overturned or otherwise declared invalid.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Consequently, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint as frivolous
given that the damages claim raised therein was Heck-barred and
thus had no arguable merit. See Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191,
193 (5th Cir. 1997). Anderson’s appellate argument that his
excessive pre-trial detention constituted impermissible
“punishment” in violation of his due process rights was not raised
in the district court and is therefore not considered. See
Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir.
1999).
The district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow
Anderson to amend his complaint. See Aguilar v. Texas Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1053 (5th Cir. 1998).
Nevertheless, that error was harmless. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61.
Anderson sought to amend his complaint to support his claim that
his right to access the courts was violated due to his excessive
pre-trial detention, which liberally construed, is a contention
2
that his rights to a speedy trial were violated. As previously
discussed, that claim is Heck-barred. Consequently, the district
court’s refusal to allow him to amend his complaint did not affect
his substantial rights and was therefore harmless error.
AFFIRMED.
3