Onebeacon Insurance v. Don's Building Supply, Inc. ( 2008 )


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  •         IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 23, 2008
    No. 06-10727                 Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    ONEBEACON INSURANCE COMPANY, as Assignee of Potomac Insurance
    Company of Illinois
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    DON’S BUILDING SUPPLY INC
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas
    Before KING, DEMOSS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Plaintiff-appellee OneBeacon Insurance Company (OneBeacon) sought a
    declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, defendant
    appellant Don’s Building Supply, Inc. (DBS), in twenty-two lawsuits that various
    homeowners have filed against DBS and other defendants. DBS requested a
    defense from OneBeacon under three occurrence-based commercial general
    liability insurance policies (CGL policies) issued to DBS by Potomac Insurance
    Company of Illinois and assigned by Potomac to OneBeacon. As we explained
    in our initial consideration of this appeal, the central question before the district
    court was whether the property damage described in the underlying suits is
    alleged to have occurred within the respective policy periods such that
    No. 06-10727
    OneBeacon’s duty to defend DBS was triggered under the CGL policies. See
    OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Don’s Bldg. Supply, Inc., 
    496 F.3d 361
    , 363 (5th Cir. 2007).
    To resolve this question, the court had first to identify the time at which Texas
    law deems property damage to occur for purposes of a CGL policy. The district
    court granted summary judgment to OneBeacon, determining that it was bound
    by Fifth Circuit precedent holding that “property damage ‘occurs’ within the
    meaning of a CGL policy [under Texas law] . . . when the damage becomes
    manifest or identifiable.” Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Azrock Indus. Inc., 
    211 F.3d 239
    , 246-47 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Unitramp Ltd.,
    
    146 F.3d 311
    , 313 (5th Cir. 1998).
    Concluding that this case involved important and determinative questions
    of Texas law as to which there was no controlling Texas Supreme Court
    precedent, we certified two unresolved questions to the Supreme Court of Texas:
    1. When not specified by the relevant policy, what is the
    proper rule under Texas law for determining the time at which
    property damage occurs for purposes of an occurrence-based
    commercial general liability insurance policy?
    2. Under the rule identified in the answer to the first question,
    have the pleadings in lawsuits against an insured alleged that
    property damage occurred within the policy period of an occurrence-
    based commercial general liability insurance policy, such that the
    insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify the insured is triggered,
    when the pleadings allege that actual damage was continuing and
    progressing during the policy period, but remained undiscoverable
    and not readily apparent for purposes of the discovery rule until
    after the policy period ended because the internal damage was
    hidden from view by an undamaged exterior surface?
    
    OneBeacon, 496 F.3d at 366
    . The Supreme Court of Texas has answered the
    certified questions. In response to the first question and addressing the CGL
    policies at issue here, the Supreme Court held that:
    property damage under this policy occurred when actual physical
    damage to the property occurred. The policy says as much, defining
    property damage as “[p]hysical injury to tangible property,” and
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    No. 06-10727
    explicitly stating that coverage is available if and only if “‘property
    damage’ occurs during the policy period.” So in this case, property
    damage occurred when a home that is the subject of an underlying
    suit suffered wood rot or other physical damage. The date that the
    physical damage is or could have been discovered is irrelevant under
    the policy.
    Don’s Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 
    267 S.W.3d 20
    , 24 (Tex. 2008)
    (alteration in original). In response to the second question, the Supreme Court
    held that:
    the insurer’s duty to defend DBS depends on whether the
    homeowners’ pleadings allege property damage that occurred during
    the policy term. Under the actual-injury rule applicable to this
    policy, a plaintiff’s claim against DBS that any amount of physical
    injury to tangible property occurred during the policy period and
    was caused by DBS’s allegedly defective product triggers
    OneBeacon’s duty to defend. This duty is not diminished because
    the property damage was undiscoverable, or not readily apparent or
    “manifest,” until after the policy period ended. Nor does it depend
    on whether DBS has a valid limitations defense.
    
    Id. at 31-32
    (footnote omitted).
    The effect of the answers provided by the Supreme Court of Texas to our
    certified questions is to overrule Unitramp and the relevant portion of Azrock.
    Because the district court relied on Azrock and Unitramp, we REVERSE the
    district court’s judgment and REMAND this case for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion. Costs shall be borne by OneBeacon.
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