Deslatte v. Tidex Incorporated ( 1996 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 94-40810
    _____________________
    MARK J. DESLATTE,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    TIDEX, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Louisiana
    (93-CV-546)
    _________________________________________________________________
    March 18, 1996
    ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
    Before GARWOOD, JOLLY, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:*
    On petition for rehearing, Tidex takes the panel to task for
    deciding the case on a basis different from the rationale and the
    specific findings of the district court.         Notwithstanding the
    petitioner's protestations, however, and to the extent that his
    *
    Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
    point has support, appellate courts may comprehensively canvas the
    record and are free to affirm a district court on any basis that
    the record supports.     Ferguson v. Hill, 
    846 F.2d 20
    , 21 (5th Cir.
    1988); Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 
    814 F.2d 1042
    , 1044 (5th
    Cir), cert. denied, 
    484 U.S. 924
    , 
    108 S. Ct. 286
    (1987).               In
    comparing    the   district   court's   formal   findings   with   other
    information in the record, we can also make assumptions regarding
    what the district court properly could have concluded in reaching
    its decision.      
    Ferguson, 846 F.2d at 21
    ; Thomas v. Express Boat
    Co., Inc., 
    759 F.2d 444
    , 448 (5th Cir. 1985).
    Tidex further argues in its petition for rehearing that we
    engaged in factfinding, which, of course, an appellate court is not
    permitted to do.     Although we did not engage in factfinding, the
    petitioner has pointed out that in certain instances we failed to
    state with accuracy the precise record facts.          We regret each
    error.    Nevertheless, each error ultimately is inconsequential to
    our finding that, on this record, the district court's findings of
    liability and damages are supportable and must be affirmed.           In
    order to correct any mistakes in our reading of the record as
    reflected in our earlier opinion, the panel withdraws the opinion
    that was filed in this appeal on June 23, 1995, and substitutes the
    following.    In all other respects, the petition for rehearing is
    denied.
    -2-
    I
    Tidex, Inc. ("Tidex") appeals the district court's entry of
    judgment against it on Mark Deslatte's ("Deslatte") claims of
    negligence    under     the   Jones    Act,   46    U.S.C.   §   688,    and
    unseaworthiness under general maritime law, the district court's
    apportionment of damages, and the district court's denial of its
    motion for a new trial.       We carefully have reviewed the record and
    the briefs in this case and conclude that the judgment of the
    district court must be affirmed in all respects, save its award for
    "found" damages.
    II
    Because an explanation of the facts will facilitate a better
    understanding of this case, we present them in detail.
    Deslatte   was   injured    during     a    mooring   operation   on
    December 15, 1990, while he was working for Tidex on its supply
    vessel, the M/V O'NEIL TIDE. Deslatte, age twenty-six at the time,
    was serving as the chief engineer on the vessel and had been
    working for Tidex almost four years when the accident occurred.
    The accident occurred when the O'NEIL TIDE was delivering
    supplies to a drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico.                The supply
    vessel’s captain, Ernest LeBouef, had never been to this drilling
    rig.    Because the currents were strong that day, Captain LeBouef
    decided to tie the O'NEIL TIDE's bow to a mooring buoy, which was
    -3-
    approximately one-fourth mile from the drilling platform, and back
    the stern of the supply vessel to the rig.         Once on location, the
    drilling rig was to lower mooring lines to be secured to the
    vessel's stern bitts.
    Before commencing the operation, the captain met with Deslatte
    and part of the crew to discuss the method of securing the vessel
    to the buoy.    Captain LeBouef ordered Deslatte to man the bow line
    and three other crew members to handle the stern lines, while the
    captain would attempt to execute the backdown maneuver using the
    stern controls of the vessel.        Positioned at the stern controls,
    the   captain   would   have   no   means   of   seeing    Deslatte    or    of
    communicating with him during the procedure.              The one remaining
    crew member was permitted to sleep through the procedure.
    Captain LeBouef decided to use a bridle setup to secure the
    O'NEIL TIDE to the anchor buoy because it provided more stability
    than the alternative single line setup.          Under the bridle setup,
    one end of the line is tied to the portside bitt on the bow.                The
    other end is then placed through a shackle attached to the anchor
    buoy line and then tied to the starboard side bitt on the bow.
    With only 300 feet of bow line available, the use of this method
    effectively reduced the available bow line by one-half.               Captain
    LeBouef chose this procedure even though he was uncertain of the
    length of the buoy line.
    -4-
    Deslatte's job was to monitor the bow line at the starboard
    side bitt as the vessel backed toward the rig.   When more line was
    needed, Deslatte was to take a wrap off the bitt.       If the line
    began to surge, Deslatte was to put the wrap back on the bitt.   If
    the line began to surge uncontrollably, the captain instructed
    Deslatte to drop the rope and try to get away.
    As the operation proceeded, Deslatte paid out the bow line on
    two different occasions, without incident. The operation proceeded
    uneventfully until the vessel moved into position to receive the
    mooring lines from the rig.      When the vessel reached the rig,
    Deslatte decided to let out the line a third time, without looking
    to see whether enough rope remained on deck.   As he was doing this,
    the line surged suddenly and uncontrollably through his hands.
    Deslatte dropped the line and attempted to step back, but as the
    line surged, the end of it whipped around the bitt and struck his
    right leg just below the knee.   Deslatte sustained a fractured leg
    and severe damage to his right knee.   Deslatte admitted that had he
    checked, he would have seen that the end of the line was at his
    feet, and he would not have let out more line.        Despite three
    surgical procedures, including reconstructive surgery, the injury
    to his right knee remains disabling.
    III
    -5-
    Deslatte brought a seaman's action for damages against his
    employer, Tidex, under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general
    maritime law.    Following a two-day bench trial, during which the
    parties presented neither expert witnesses nor evidence of industry
    standards, the court found the defendant negligent and its vessel
    unseaworthy.    The judge predicated a finding of negligence on the
    captain's failure to insure proper communication and visual contact
    with crew members, and found that the accident might have been
    avoided had the defendant awakened a sleeping crew member to serve
    as lookout for Deslatte.           The court further found inadequate
    communication   between   the   stern      controls   and   the   bow,   thus,
    constituting    an   unseaworthy    condition    that   caused    Deslatte's
    injuries.   From the facts presented, the judge found that Deslatte
    was 15% contributorily negligent.            The court awarded Deslatte
    $100,000 in general damages and $270,083.42 for economic losses,
    subject to a reduction for his contributory negligence.
    Tidex filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court
    denied without a hearing.       Tidex timely filed its appeal.             The
    defendant asks this court to reverse the district court's judgment,
    or, in the alternative, to remand for further articulation of the
    legal and factual basis for apportionment of fault.           The defendant
    also requests a modification of the found award.
    IV
    -6-
    Tidex presents several arguments on appeal. The company first
    argues that the trial judge erred by imposing liability on it for
    the claims of negligence and unseaworthiness because there was
    insufficient evidence on which to base this determination.                       In the
    alternative, Tidex argues that the trial court's findings on
    Deslatte's      contributory       negligence    are    insufficient       to    permit
    meaningful review, thus, requiring the case to be remanded for
    further findings.          Finally, Tidex argues that the trial court
    erroneously calculated the damage award by giving Deslatte double
    recovery in the form of damages for both maintenance and found.1
    We now direct our attention to these issues, and hold that the
    district court's judgment should be affirmed, with the exception of
    the award for found.
    Very      important      to   the   conclusion     we   reach   today      is   the
    standard of review under which this case is judged.                    We review a
    trial       judge's   findings     of    fact   under   the    clearly     erroneous
    standard,      whereas   we    review     his   conclusions     of   law    de   novo.
    Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 
    946 F.2d 350
    , 354 (5th Cir. 1991).                       Under
    the Jones Act, the defendant "'must bear the responsibility for any
    negligence, however slight, that played a part in producing'"
    Deslatte's injury.         Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, 
    980 F.2d 287
    ,
    1
    Found refers to damages awarded as recovery for offshore
    living expenses, including lost offshore meals.
    -7-
    289 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
    113 S. Ct. 2999
    (1993)(quoting In
    re Cooper/T. Smith, 
    929 F.2d 1073
    , 1076-77 (5th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    112 S. Ct. 190
    (1991)).     Indeed, under the Jones Act, the
    burden of proving causation between the negligent conduct and the
    injury is "featherweight."   
    Id. We must
    keep in mind, furthermore, that in admiralty cases
    questions of negligence are considered as factual issues and,
    therefore, are examined under the clearly erroneous standard.
    Zapata 
    Haynie, 980 F.2d at 289
    .    As we have stated,
    [a] factual finding is clearly erroneous when although
    there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
    the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been committed. If the
    district court's account of the evidence is plausible in
    light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of
    appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had
    it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
    weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two
    permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's
    choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
    
    Id. (citations omitted)(quotations
    omitted) (emphasis added).    The
    clearly erroneous standard also applies to the district court's
    apportionment of the blame, which this court will not overturn if
    it appears at least roughly correct.      
    Thomas, 759 F.2d at 447
    ;
    Flowers Transp., Inc. v. M/V PEANUT HOLLINGER, 
    664 F.2d 112
    , 114
    (5th Cir. 1981).   With these standards in mind, we turn to the
    -8-
    evidence to determine whether the record, viewed in its entirety,
    supports Deslatte's Jones Act claim.2
    After a thorough review of the record in its entirety, we
    cannot say that the district court was clearly erroneous in its
    determination that Tidex was liable for Deslatte's injuries under
    the Jones Act.        The record that supports the district court's
    finding of liability under the Jones Act includes the following
    circumstances and evidence.       This was Captain LeBouef's first time
    to unload at this drilling rig, and he did not know the length of
    the buoy line.       The captain testified at trial that, nonetheless,
    he had knowledge that this particular buoy line was shorter than
    normal.      Yet, the captain used a bow line, 300 feet in length, with
    a bridle configuration that effectively halved the length of the
    line.       Admitting his ignorance of the length of the buoy line, the
    captain testified that he did not really know whether there was
    enough line to use the bridle setup and whether it would suffice to
    reach the rig.        The captain further testified that he knew that
    there was a chance that they might run out of line before reaching
    the rig and that the line, under pressure, might shoot out rapidly
    from the side of the vessel.        He admitted never discussing this
    danger with Deslatte.
    2
    Because of our disposition of Deslatte's Jones Act claim,
    there is no need for us to reach his unseaworthiness arguments
    under general maritime law.
    -9-
    In comparing the district court's finding of liability with
    the record as a whole, the record clearly supports a conclusion
    that the danger facing Deslatte under these circumstances was
    foreseeable to the captain.   As chief engineer, Deslatte's primary
    responsibility aboard the vessel was to maintain the efficient
    working condition of the machinery and engineering plant, although
    he assisted sometimes with mooring duties.   The captain testified
    at trial that he knew that most of Deslatte's experience had been
    as an oiler or an engineer and that he did not know whether
    Deslatte had ever paid out a line under pressure.    Regarding his
    difficulty with paying out the line, Deslatte testified that,
    because of the tension in the rope and its unpredictability, it
    would have been dangerous to take his eyes off it to look at the
    remaining rope.   Captain LeBouef's trial testimony indicates an
    awareness of this potential dilemma because the captain confirmed
    that, in mooring operations, a crew member is supposed to keep his
    eye on the rope as it is going around the bitt.          From this
    evidence, coupled with the captain's failure to discuss potential
    dangers with Deslatte and his failure to ascertain the engineer's
    inexperience in paying out line, the factfinder could infer that
    Deslatte's inattention to the remaining rope and the resulting
    injury were reasonably foreseeable to the captain.
    -10-
    Notwithstanding these risks, the captain directed Deslatte to
    man the bow line and three other crew members to handle the stern
    lines, while he attempted to execute the backdown maneuver using
    the vessel's stern controls.     The defendant permitted one crew
    member to sleep through this procedure.          While at the stern
    controls, the captain had no means of seeing Deslatte or of
    communicating with him.      Once the situation got out of hand,
    Deslatte's calls for help went unanswered simply because the
    captain could not see or hear him.     The captain, in performing this
    task under procedures that he had established, had allowed himself
    to be so out-of-communication with a crucial operation on his
    vessel, that he was not aware of Deslatte's injuries until Deslatte
    managed to climb up to the wheelhouse and alert the captain.       In
    short, the defendant was fully apprised of conditions that should
    have heightened its concerns for safety in this situation, yet the
    defendant took inadequate steps to establish a readily available
    means of communication for which there was an evident need.        In
    other words, the record supports a finding of some negligence in
    executing the task of backing down to the drilling rig and this
    negligence has a causal connection to the accident that resulted in
    Deslatte's injuries.3   For these reasons, we hold that the district
    3
    Tidex suggests that the effect of our affirming the district
    court is to require two persons to perform the task at hand--one to
    perform the primary task and the second to serve as a lookout--when
    -11-
    court was not clearly erroneous in its ruling in favor of Deslatte,
    and its judgment of liability is affirmed.
    With respect to the allocation of contributory negligence,
    Tidex challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
    district court's finding of 15% negligence on the part of Deslatte.
    As explained above, we will not overturn the district court's
    apportionment of the blame so long as it appears at least roughly
    correct.   
    Thomas, 759 F.2d at 447
    .         Our review of the whole record
    leads us to conclude that sufficient evidence supports the district
    court's allocation of fault.         We are guided in our conclusion by
    the clear law in this circuit that, although the seaman has a duty
    to use reasonable care, the duty to provide for a safe course of
    conduct lies primarily with the vessel owner.           E.g., Ceja v. Mike
    Hooks, Inc., 
    690 F.2d 1191
    , 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1982).           We note that
    the   district   court   expressly    considered    Deslatte's      degree   of
    responsibility    for    his   injuries      and   attempted   to    quantify
    Deslatte's fault based on the evidence presented at trial.                   In
    accord with our controlling standard of review, we find the
    allocation of fault by the district court adequately supported by
    the record evidence and thus not clearly erroneous.
    there is neither testimony regarding industry standards nor expert
    testimony indicating that this job required more than one person.
    Our ruling today has no such effect because we are deciding this
    case and this case only. We are affirming on the totality of the
    conduct under the circumstances and not on any single failing of
    the defendant.
    -12-
    Consequently, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED in all
    respects, save one.       Tidex argues that the damages for found, or
    lost offshore meals, must be recalculated so that Deslatte is not
    awarded a double recovery.            The record is unclear whether the
    district court's award for found was double recovery.                 Thus, we
    REMAND this issue to the district court to ensure that Deslatte has
    not been awarded both maintenance and found for the same time
    period.4
    V
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in the light of the
    totality    of   the   circumstances,      the   district   court's   judgment
    finding     Tidex   85%   negligent    and   Deslatte   15%   contributorily
    negligent is not clearly erroneous.          We remand on the issue of the
    found award, however, so that the district court can ensure that
    Deslatte does not receive double recovery for lost offshore meals.
    The district court's judgment is therefore
    AFFIRMED and REMANDED.5
    4
    A recovery of "found" should preclude recovery of maintenance
    for the same period of time in a subsequent maintenance and cure
    action, and vice versa. See Alexandervich v. Gallagher Bros. Sand
    & Gravel Corp., 
    298 F.2d 918
    , 920 (2d Cir. 1961); see also
    Richardson v. St. Charles-St. John the Baptist Bridge and Ferry
    Auth., 
    284 F. Supp. 709
    , 713 (E.D. La. 1968).
    5
    No member of this panel nor judge in regular active service
    on the court having requested that the court be polled on rehearing
    en banc, (FRAP and Local Rule 35) the suggestion for rehearing en
    banc is also DENIED.
    -13-