Butler v. Barnhart , 99 F. App'x 559 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS               June 2, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-31052
    Summary Calendar
    GREGORY BUTLER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 02-CV-1805
    --------------------
    Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Gregory Butler appeals the district court’s judgment affirming
    the       Commissioner's   decision       denying      his      application
    for   Supplemental   Security   Income    ("SSI").     In    reviewing     the
    Commissioner’s decision to deny SSI, this court must determine
    whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support it
    and whether the proper legal standards were used in evaluating the
    evidence.      Greenspan v. Shalala, 
    38 F.3d 232
    , 236 (5th Cir.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    1994).
    Butler argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) failed
    to consider the opinions of the state consulting physician that he
    could perform only sedentary work or the evidence that he could not
    stand or walk for six hours in an eight-hour work day.               He argues
    that there was not substantial evidence to support the finding that
    he could perform a full range of light work or his past relevant
    work as a dishwasher.
    “[A]dministrative      law   judges    must   consider     findings   of
    State agency medical . . . consultants . . . as opinion evidence.”
    See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(i).          In determining disability, the
    ALJ   must   also   accord    considerable     weight    to    the   opinions,
    diagnoses, and medical evidence of a treating physician who is
    familiar with the claimant’s injuries, treatments, and responses.
    Loza v. Apfel, 
    219 F.3d 378
    , 395 (5th Cir. 2000).             An ALJ may not
    reject a medical opinion without explanation and must show good
    cause for doing so.     
    Loza, 219 F.3d at 395
    ; Myers v. Apfel, 
    238 F.3d 617
    , 621 (5th Cir. 2001).
    The ALJ failed to show good cause for rejecting the opinions
    of all the physicians who treated and/or examined Butler with
    respect to his residual functional capacity.            There was no medical
    opinion or evidence submitted reflecting that, after Butler had two
    and one-half toes amputated from his left foot,            he could perform
    work requiring standing or walking for six-hour periods during an
    eight-hour work day.         Thus, there was not substantial medical
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    evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that
    Butler could perform a full range of light work or his past
    relevant work as a dishwasher.           See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
    404.1567(b); Lawler v. Heckler, 
    761 F.2d 195
    , 198 (5th Cir. 1985).
    The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is
    REMANDED to the district court with instructions to return the case
    to   the   Commissioner   for   reconsideration   of   Butler’s   residual
    functional capacity and a determination whether there are jobs
    existing in the economy that Butler has the residual functional
    capacity to perform.
    Butler’s argument that his mental impairment should have been
    considered by the ALJ in determining whether he was disabled was
    not raised in his appeal presented to the Appeals Council.             The
    court will not review a claim that has not been administratively
    exhausted.     See McQueen v. Apfel, 
    168 F.3d 152
    , 155 (5th Cir.
    1999).
    Butler’s argument that there was no evidence that the ALJ
    considered Butler’s ability to work on a sustained basis was not
    raised in the district court.       Thus, this argument is not subject
    to review.    Chaparro v. Bowen, 
    815 F.2d 1008
    , 1011 (5th Cir. 1987).
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    3