United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP ( 2004 )


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  •                                                          United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    REVISED June 24, 2004
    June 16, 2004
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                     Clerk
    No. 02-21200
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ARTHUR ANDERSEN, LLP,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    Before REAVLEY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
    Today we decide one of the many cases arising from the rubble
    of Enron Corporation, which fell from its lofty corporate perch in
    2001 wreaking financial ruin upon thousands of investors, creditors,
    and employees.    Like a falling giant redwood, it took down with it
    many members of its supporting cast.     Our present focus is upon one
    of those, Arthur Andersen, LLP, then one of the largest accounting
    and consulting firms in the world.
    Arthur Andersen appeals from a judgment of conviction entered
    in the Southern District of Texas upon a jury verdict finding it
    guilty of obstructing an official proceeding of the Securities and
    Exchange Commission, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2). The
    indictment leading to the conviction was returned on March 7, 2002,
    charging Andersen in a single count of corruptly persuading one or
    more Andersen personnel to withhold, alter, destroy, or conceal
    documents with the intent to impair their availability in an
    official proceeding.   That proceeding, which the government said
    Andersen knew was imminent and inevitable, was an investigation by
    the SEC into the relationship between Enron and Andersen, from whom
    Enron obtained accounting, auditing, and consulting services.
    Trial commenced on May 6, 2002, and the verdict was returned
    on June 15, 2002.   Writ large, the government says that Andersen,
    in an effort to protect itself and its largest single account,
    ordered a mass destruction of documents to keep them from the hands
    of the SEC.
    Andersen asks this court to reverse its conviction, urging
    errors in four evidentiary rulings, misconduct by the prosecutor in
    his rebuttal jury summation, and two legal contentions regarding the
    required proof under § 1512(b)(2).   The evidentiary rulings include
    admitting extensive evidence regarding two unrelated SEC enforcement
    actions against Andersen, excluding evidence of the volume of
    documents Andersen did not destroy, and excluding impeachment
    evidence. Regarding the proof required by § 1512(b)(2), Andersen
    urges that given its element of “corruption,” the government had to
    2
    prove more than that it acted with an intent to impede the SEC.
    Finally, Andersen asserts that the government had to prove that
    Andersen intended to interfere with a “particular” proceeding.
    We   are   not   persuaded   that   this    conviction   is   flawed   by
    reversible error and we affirm the judgment of conviction.
    I
    During the 1990's, Enron transformed itself from a natural gas
    pipeline operator into a trading and investment conglomerate with
    a large volume of trading in the energy business.             Andersen both
    audited Enron’s publicly filed financial statements and provided
    internal audit and consulting services.              By the late 1990's,
    Andersen’s “engagement team” for its Enron account included more
    than 100 people, a significant number of which worked exclusively
    in Enron quarters in Houston, Texas.            From 1997 through 2001 the
    engagement team’s leader was David Duncan.          He was in turn subject
    to certain managing partners and accounting experts in Andersen’s
    Chicago office. Enron was a valued client producing 58 million
    dollars in revenue in 2000 for Andersen with projections of 100
    million for the next year. Enron’s Chief Accounting Officer and
    Treasurer throughout this period came to the employ of Enron from
    the accounting staffs of Andersen, as did dozens of others.             This
    was a close relationship. Indeed, the jury heard evidence that
    Andersen removed at Enron’s request at least one accountant from his
    assignment with Enron after Enron disagreed with his accounting
    advice.
    3
    With Enron’s move to energy trading and rapid growth came
    aggressive   accounting,   pushing       Generally    Accepted   Accounting
    Principles to its advantage.    Part of this picture included Enron’s
    use of “special purpose entities,” SPEs.         These were “surrogate”
    companies whose purpose was to engage in business activity with no
    obligation to account for the activity on Enron’s balance sheet.
    Four of these SPEs - called Raptors - play a large role in this
    story.   They were created in 1999 and 2001, with the assistance of
    Andersen, largely capitalized with Enron stock. The Raptors engaged
    in transactions with “LJM,” an entity run by Andrew Fastow, Enron’s
    Chief Financial Officer.    By late 2000 and early 2001, the traded
    price of Enron’s stock was dropping and some of the Raptor’s
    investments were also turning downward. Some of the SPEs were
    profitable and some were experiencing sharp losses.         But aggregated
    they reflected a positive return to Enron.           GAAP would not permit
    such an aggregation of the four entities and Andersen’s Chicago
    office told David Duncan that it would not - that it was a “black
    and white” violation.   That advice was ignored and the losses were
    buried under the profits of the group in the public reporting for
    the first quarter 2001.        The slide of Enron stock continued,
    dropping some 50% from January to August 2001.
    The summer of 2001 brought problems to Andersen on other
    fronts, and these “unrelated” events later become important to the
    issues before us.   In June 2001 Andersen settled a dispute with the
    SEC regarding Andersen’s accounting and auditing work for Waste
    4
    Management Corporation.        Andersen was required to pay some $7
    million, the largest monetary settlement ever exacted by the SEC,
    and Andersen suffered censure under SEC Rule 102(e).            Then in July
    2001, the SEC sued five officers of Sunbeam Corporation and the lead
    Andersen partner on its audit.
    Meanwhile, events at Enron began to accelerate. On August 14,
    2001, Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s CEO, resigned, pushing Enron stock
    further downward. Within days, Sherron Watkins, a senior accountant
    at Enron, formerly at Andersen, warned Enron’s Chairman, Kenneth
    Lay, that Enron “could implode in a wave of accounting scandals.”
    She also warned David Duncan and Michael Odom, an Andersen partner
    in Houston who had oversight responsibility for Duncan.              Chairman
    Lay promptly asked Enron’s principal outside legal counsel to
    examine the accused transactions.         And by early September, senior
    Andersen officials and members of its legal department formed a
    “crisis-response” group, including, among others, its top risk
    manager and Nancy Temple, an in-house lawyer in Chicago assigned to
    Enron matters on September 28, 2001.
    Possible proceedings became a reality on November 8, 2001, when
    Andersen received an SEC subpoena.        The time line between September
    28 and November 8, from a possibility of a proceeding to fact, is
    important and we turn briefly to that narrative.1
    1
    The indictment alleged that the acts of obstruction took place between
    October 16 and November 9, 2001.
    5
    On October 8, Andersen contacted a litigation partner at Davis,
    Polk and Wardwell in New York regarding representation of Andersen.
    The following day, Nancy Temple discussed the problem of Enron with
    senior in-house counsel at Andersen.       Her notes from this meeting
    refer to an SEC investigation as “highly probable” and to a
    “reasonable possibility” of a restatement of earnings.           Her notes
    also recorded, “without PSG agreement, restatement and probability
    of charge of violating cease and desist in Waste Management.”           Two
    days later, on October 10, Michael Odom urged Andersen personnel to
    comply with the document retention policy, noting “if it’s destroyed
    in the course of normal policy and litigation is filed the next day,
    that’s great . . . we’ve followed our own policy and whatever there
    was that might have been of interest to somebody is gone and
    irretrievable.”
    On October 12, Temple entered the Enron crisis into Andersen’s
    internal tracking system for legal matters, labeling it “government
    regulatory investigation,” and asked Odom if the engagement team was
    in compliance with Andersen’s document policy.         Odom forwarded the
    email to Duncan in Houston.
    Meanwhile, Enron was facing an October 16 date for announcing
    its third quarter results.       That release had to disclose a $1.01
    billion charge to earnings and, to correct an accounting error, a
    $1.2 billion reduction in shareholder equity.         Enron’s draft of the
    proposed   release   described    the   charge   to   earnings   as   “non-
    recurring.”   Andersen’s Chicago personnel advised that this phrase
    6
    was misleading, but Enron did not change it.         With one exception,
    Andersen took no action when its advice was not followed: Temple
    suggested that Andersen’s characterization of the draft release as
    misleading be deleted from the email exchanges.
    An SEC letter to Enron quickly followed the releases of October
    16.   In the letter the SEC advised that it had opened an informal
    investigation in August and an additional accounting letter would
    follow.   Andersen received a copy of the letter on Friday, October
    19.   A Saturday morning conference of Andersen’s Enron crisis group
    followed.    While the meeting traversed a range of issues, Temple
    again reminded all “to make sure to follow the policy.”                The
    following Tuesday, October 23, Enron had a telephone conference with
    security analysts.    At the same time, Duncan scheduled an “urgent”
    and “mandatory” meeting in Houston at which, following lengthy
    discussion   of   technical   accounting   issues,     he   directed   the
    engagement team to comply with Andersen’s records retention policy.
    On October 26, a senior partner at Andersen circulated an
    article from the New York Times discussing the SEC’s response to
    Enron.    In an email, he commented that “the problems are just
    beginning and we will be in the cross-hairs.         The marketplace is
    going to keep the pressure on this and it’s going to force the SEC
    to be tough.”     Evidence that this prediction of SEC toughness was
    sound came quickly.     On October 30, the SEC sent Enron a second
    letter requesting accounting documents - a letter signed by the two
    7
    top enforcement division officials.
    Throughout this period Andersen’s Houston office shredded
    documents.    Government witnesses detailed the steady shredding and
    deletion of documents and the quantity of paper trucked away from
    the Houston office.        Almost two tons of paper were shipped to
    Andersen’s main office in Houston for shredding.             The government
    produced an exhibit at trial charting the time and quantity of the
    carted waste paper from January 2001 through December of that year.
    The pounds carted remained fairly steady at a rate under 500 pounds,
    but spiked on October 25 to just under 2500 pounds.           The shredding
    continued until the SEC served its subpoena for records on November
    8.   Temple advised Duncan that the subpoenae had been served.            The
    next day Duncan’s assistant advised the Houston team: “Per DAVE –
    No more shredding. . . . We have been officially served for our
    documents.”
    Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.         The following
    April, David Duncan pleaded guilty to obstructing the SEC.
    II
    We   turn   first   to   Andersen’s   claims   of   error   in   certain
    evidentiary rulings at trial.
    1
    The first such contention urges error in the district court’s
    exclusion of Andersen’s evidence of the volume of documents retained
    by the engagement team that were either not deleted or recaptured
    and produced to the SEC.          This evidence was relevant, Andersen
    8
    argues,      because   it   is   inconsistent        with    the   charge    that   its
    personnel were “corruptly persuaded” to destroy documents and delete
    emails to keep them from the SEC.              Andersen’s explanation for the
    shredding and deleting, at least for the upward spike on October 23,
    was that personnel in its Houston office were attempting to clean
    up their files in anticipation of their examination by Chicago
    supervising personnel, and that the presence of multiple copies of
    significant documents was evidence that there was “no systematic
    attempt to root out embarrassing materials.” The argument continues
    that the district court misunderstood the issue.                   Pointing to an in
    limine    order,    Andersen     argues   that       Judge   Harmon    believed     the
    proffered evidence inadmissible as an attempt to offer evidence that
    “on other occasions the defendant acted innocently,” when the true
    thrust of the evidence was to negate the evidence that any person
    acting for Andersen acted corruptly and with the intent necessary
    to commit the charged crime.
    The government replies that refusing to admit the documents
    into evidence was simply the court’s enforcement of its pretrial
    ruling on discovery – that the defendant could not offer documents
    in trial that it had not produced for examination by the prosecution
    before trial; that Andersen never authenticated the documents nor
    by a proper predicate demonstrated that the documents not destroyed,
    to   which    it   wanted   to   point,       were   relevant      Enron    documents.
    Relatedly, the government notes that other evidence was before the
    jury demonstrating that not all of the documents were destroyed.
    9
    Finally,    it    argues   that   the    evidence     supporting   Andersen’s
    conviction is so powerful, that any error was not reversible error.
    The government relied on the volume of documents destroyed as
    evidence of Andersen’s intent.          It follows that competent evidence
    countering the government’s proof of the volume of shredding, as
    well as its timing, undeniably had some relevance. To put the issue
    in perspective, Andersen did not attempt to deny that it shredded
    large numbers of documents and for sustained periods, leaving the
    government’s assertion to this extent largely unchallenged.                 Nor
    does Andersen’s principal argument claim error in the exclusion of
    specific documents alleged to have been destroyed. In sum, that all
    documents were not destroyed and that large numbers of documents
    were produced to the SEC by Andersen was not challenged.2              Some 21
    boxes of Duncan’s preserved desk files were introduced by Andersen
    and   displayed    to   the   jury.      Andersen’s    explanation    for   the
    undeniable surge in shredding and the persistent and uncustomary
    reminders to employees to abide Andersen’s retention policy was that
    it wanted to leave only the work papers of auditing efforts, and
    that Duncan did not want his superiors in Chicago to face his
    unkempt files.     That explanation pointed to the upsurge in papers
    trucked away shortly after he learned of his superior’s planned
    visit to Houston.       The jury was free to evaluate this testimony.
    2
    There was a misstatement by a prosecutor regarding an email he
    represented to the jury was deleted and not produced by Andersen. That was
    corrected on the objection of the defense. We describe this event later in Part
    IV while addressing Andersen’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
    10
    Andersen maintained at trial that it was not offering the
    specific documents into evidence and hence its proffer of documents
    not identified to the prosecution as trial exhibits before trial did
    not violate the pretrial order entered by the trial judge; that it
    wanted to place into perspective the government’s evidence of the
    amount of paper carted away by proof of the large amount of
    documents produced for the SEC.   The government responded at trial
    that the evidence would not be relevant without the predicate proof
    of what the documents were and that proof, if forthcoming, would put
    the proffer in the teeth of the pretrial preclusion order.     Fine
    point it is, but we cannot conclude that the trial judge abused her
    discretion in this ruling.
    Regardless, even if there was a sufficient showing that these
    documents were relevant to the SEC proceeding, it is clear that
    Andersen was denied only this particular method of demonstrating
    that it produced a large number of documents; that it otherwise made
    this showing at trial is not seriously challenged.     The district
    court observed that there was “ample evidence already in the record
    that all the documents were not destroyed” and that “Andersen does
    not need to introduce evidence of 1660 boxes of remaining desk files
    to make this point.”   Any error was not reversible error.
    In sum, we are not persuaded that the district court committed
    reversible error in its rulings regarding the evidence of the volume
    of documents destroyed or retained.
    2
    11
    We turn next to Andersen’s contention that the district court
    erred in allowing the government to offer evidence of two SEC
    proceedings filed against it arising out of Andersen’s work with
    Sunbeam Corp and Waste Management, Inc.                 Andersen argues that the
    evidence of these charges of its misconduct and their settlement was
    not relevant in that there was no evidence that they were connected
    to any “corrupt persuader,” or that any partner at Andersen involved
    in work at Sunbeam or Waste Management was also involved with its
    Enron account.             It concedes that while the fact of these two
    difficulties with the SEC offers at least “a small kernel” of
    relevant evidence that “could have been thought relevant,” far too
    much       detail     of   the   unproved    accusations      and   settlements   were
    admitted.       This excess was such that the jury could not be expected
    to   cabin      its    consideration        to   Andersen’s    motive   in   shredding
    documents.          Rather, the argument goes, the government was allowed
    to prove that Andersen was “a bad corporate actor and should be
    found guilty for that reason alone.”
    Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion allowing proof of prior bad
    acts of a defendant when the acts are relevant to an issue other
    than the defendant’s character, such as “motive, opportunity,
    intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
    mistake or accident.”3            When the relevance of an issue is shown, the
    inquiry turns to Rule 403, which requires the exclusion of the
    3
    FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
    12
    evidence if its relevance is substantially outweighed by the danger
    of unfair prejudice.4           There must be a “genuine risk that the
    emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational behavior,” and
    the risk must be “disproportionate to the probative value of the
    offered evidence.”5          We will reverse only on a clear showing of a
    prejudicial abuse of discretion.6
    The government opened its case with the testimony of Thomas
    Newkirk,    one   of   four     associate   directors    in   the   Division   of
    Enforcement of the SEC.           He explained (1) the structure of the
    Agency; (2) the difference between a matter under investigation or
    MUI and a formal inquiry; (3) that a 102(e) proceeding is directed
    at professionals engaged in misconduct in their practice before the
    commission, such as lawyers or accountants; and (4) that this
    proceeding could result in both a prohibition of practice before the
    SEC and censure for unprofessional conduct.             He also explained that
    “almost without fail” a restatement of earnings by a Fortune 500
    company will prompt a formal investigation and that documents for
    the investigation are obtained by subpoena.
    Newkirk’s attention was then drawn to prior proceedings by the
    SEC against Andersen.          He explained to the jury that Sunbeam was a
    4
    FED R. EVID. 403.
    5
    United States v. Beechum, 
    582 F.2d 898
    , 915 n.20 (5th Cir. 1978)
    (quoting Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L.
    REV. 385, 410 (1952)).
    6
    United States. v. Davis, 
    546 F.2d 583
    , 592 (5th Cir. 1977).
    13
    public company whose stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange
    in the 1990's.      Andersen was its auditor when in November 1998
    Sunbeam filed a restatement of its earnings, reducing its earnings
    for two previous quarters by $60 million, nearly 30 percent of its
    earnings for that period. Under his supervision, the SEC on May 12,
    1998, launched an investigation into Sunbeam’s financial statements.
    He explained the course of the investigation, including Andersen’s
    production of documents under an SEC subpoena and the filing of a
    complaint in the United States District Court in Florida.                  The
    complaint, also admitted into evidence, charged five officers from
    Sunbeam and the Andersen engagement partner with fraud.           An amended
    complaint was filed on July 11, 2001.7
    Newkirk then outlined the SEC action taken against Andersen and
    Waste Management.     As he explained it, Waste Management, a Fortune
    500 Company whose stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange,
    filed a restatement of earnings for the years 1992 through the first
    three quarters of 1997 of more than $1.7 billion, the largest
    restatement in history, prompting a formal investigation. There had
    been an informal investigation, but on the filing of the formal
    investigation, the SEC promptly issued a subpoena for Andersen
    documents.    Then on June 19, 2001, the SEC filed a complaint in the
    Federal District Court in Washington, D.C.           Andersen consented to
    a decree enjoining it from future violations of the Securities Laws.
    7
    At this juncture Judge Harmon instructed the jury that these documents
    were only evidence of the SEC’s statements, not the truth of the statements.
    14
    The Federal Court also imposed a fine of $7 million against Andersen
    and fines of from 30 to 50 thousand dollars against three Andersen
    partners sued in that case. This was the largest fine against a Big
    Five firm sought and obtained by the SEC.   Finally, the government
    offered through Newkirk the censure of Andersen for issuing false
    and misleading statements that its audit of Waste Management had
    been conducted in accordance with generally accepted accounting
    principles.
    Andersen’s contention that the evidence of its difficulties
    with the SEC in the Sunbeam and Waste Management cases was not
    relevant is not persuasive.    The district court carefully examined
    this question in a written ruling before trial to which she adhered
    in trial.
    The defense of Andersen faced three large realities. First,
    David Duncan, its partner in charge of the Enron account, pleaded
    guilty to a criminal charge of obstruction, confessing intent to
    impede the SEC investigation by shredding documents. Second, it
    could hardly deny that Andersen engaged in massive shredding and
    deletion of files as a part of senior management’s investigation of
    its handling of Enron, including difficulties with the accuracy of
    Enron’s financial statement.     Third, it must have known that a
    restatement of earnings of any appreciable size by a Fortunate 500
    company would prompt a formal SEC investigation and subpoena for its
    documents.    A contrary contention was a hard sell, at best.
    15
    As for Duncan, Andersen’s able trial counsel suggested in his
    cross examination that Duncan was innocent, despite his plea of
    guilty.   The large shredding was said to be an effort to catch up
    with the cleaning of files that had been put aside, contrary to
    Andersen’s records retention policy and to get the files in order
    for review by Andersen’s Chicago-based supervisors.   It was not to
    frustrate an SEC investigation.
    Under the court’s charge, the government had the burden of
    proving that the shredding was done with the intent to subvert,
    undermine, or impede an official proceeding, including proceedings
    before the SEC.   In confronting that burden, the government urged
    that Andersen’s difficulty with the SEC in other matters was the
    backdrop to Andersen’s destruction of documents in its internal
    investigation of its work for Enron.   Specifically, the government
    noted that the trouble at Enron came within months of Andersen being
    hit in the Waste Management case with the largest fine ever imposed
    by the SEC upon a Big Five accounting firm, accompanied by censure
    and a consent to an injunction not to mislead in violation of the
    securities laws, and that this blow was quickly followed by the
    filing of an amended complaint in the SEC’s Sunbeam suit which
    leveled charges of fraud against Sunbeam officials and the Andersen
    partner in charge of that account.       This backdrop, with its
    attendant press, includes the quickly following sudden resignation
    of Skilling, Enron’s CEO, in August 2001.    That is, trouble with
    Enron, Andersen’s largest account, came into view less than 90 days
    16
    from these large developments in Andersen’s difficulties with the
    SEC regarding its work with both Sunbeam and Waste Management.
    These “prior” acts were indisputably relevant to the question
    of Andersen’s intent in its destruction of Enron-related documents.
    This was evidence of Andersen’s actual experience with restating
    earnings and the inevitability of an SEC subpoena.            It was evidence
    that Andersen knew its audit work would be at issue.              Moreover, it
    was a powerful rebuttal of the testimony of Andersen’s SEC expert,
    John Riley, that no SEC subpoena was expected until the end of the
    first week in November.
    Andersen urges that evidence about Sunbeam and Waste Management
    could not be relevant, absent proof that the facts offered were
    known by a single person, a corrupt persuader.              It urges that it
    cannot be charged with the collective knowledge of all its agents.
    The government replies that the law is to the contrary, pointing to
    decisions of courts of appeals.8         We need not resolve that debate.
    The notes of Nancy Temple, an in-house lawyer, make clear that she
    was keenly aware of the cease and desist order and the 102(e)
    censure proceedings in Waste Management, and that she viewed Waste
    Management and Sunbeam as a “model” for the Enron difficulties.
    There is much more.         On November 6, Lawrence Rieger, a senior
    partner, sent an email to Temple with press accounts of the press
    releases by Sunbeam and Waste Management.           He included an Andersen
    8
    United States v. Bank of New England, 
    821 F.2d 844
    , 856 (1st Cir. 1987);
    Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 
    330 F.2d 719
    , 724 (5th Cir. 1963).
    17
    memorandum entitled “Action Steps in Response to Indications of
    Possible Restatement of Financial Statement.”               That document had
    been distributed to all U.S. partners.               Goolsby, an Andersen
    partner, and John Riley had extensive knowledge of the proceedings
    in both Waste Management and Sunbeam and participated in conference
    calls    with   Andersen   personnel    addressing    the    Enron   “crisis.”
    Goolsby had signed the court papers in Waste Management. David
    Duncan, who had never worked on either Waste Management or Sunbeam
    matters, knew about those cases.           It defies common sense to assert
    that partners in Andersen would not be informed about both of these
    cases.    At the least, a jury could reasonably so conclude.
    Andersen retreats to the contention that in any event there was
    too much detail about unproved charges, detail that was unnecessary
    and prejudicial.     It points out that its offer to stipulate to the
    fact of the prior occurrences was not accepted. We are unpersuaded.
    The government was not required to accept a sterile recitation of
    the prior events.     Rather, it was entitled to leave the clothes on
    these events, so recent.      The district court carefully instructed
    the jury regarding the limits upon the evidence.                 Many of the
    documents were redacted before being sent into the jury room, and
    counsel had full opportunity to place the events in perspective
    through cross examination and closing argument.              We find no abuse
    of discretion in the trial judge’s weighing of the probative value
    of the evidence and the risk of collateral prejudice.
    3
    18
    Andersen    next   contends    that    the   district    court    erred   in
    excluding evidence of statements made by Kathy Agnew during an
    interview with the FBI.       According to Andersen, these statements
    would have enabled Andersen to impeach one of the government’s key
    pieces of evidence suggesting a link between Andersen’s decision to
    destroy documents and its concern over an SEC investigation of
    Enron.
    During the testimony of Agent Sullivan, the agent supervising
    the FBI’s investigation of Andersen, the government introduced notes
    taken by Agnew of an October 23, 2001, meeting with Andersen partner
    Thomas Bauer. In these notes, Agnew wrote: “Clean up documentation.
    SEC voluntary request.      Two suits, more on the way.”          Andersen did
    not   challenge   the    admission   of     Agnew’s   notes,   attack    Agnew’s
    credibility, or attempt to introduce evidence of other statements
    made by Agnew while Agent Sullivan was on the stand.             Several weeks
    later, however, the day before closing arguments, Andersen attempted
    to introduce an FBI report written by Agent Sullivan summarizing
    statements Agnew made about the October meeting.                   The report
    indicates that Agnew did not specifically remember the October 23
    meeting, but she recalled that their goal was to ensure that the
    work papers were complete.
    Andersen claims that the statements recorded in Sullivan’s
    report were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 806 to impeach
    the out-of-court statements in her notes.             We disagree.      Rule 806
    allows a party to attack the credibility of a declarant when a
    19
    hearsay statement or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D),
    or (E) has been admitted.9        Rule 806 does not apply in this case,
    however, because the Agnew notes were not hearsay: the government
    did not admit them to prove the truth of the statements contained
    in them.    The statements were instead admitted only to show that
    they were made and that Andersen knew that it was subject to SEC
    investigation.     Because the statements were not hearsay, Rule 806
    does not apply.
    Indeed, Andersen effectively concedes this point in its reply
    brief, insisting that the notes were admitted for the truth of the
    proposition they “implicitly” advanced -- that Andersen personnel
    were instructed to destroy documents because the SEC was conducting
    an inquiry.      That the notes may have suggested a link between
    Andersen’s document destruction and the SEC, however, does not alter
    the fact that the statements in the notes were not admitted for
    their truth.
    Nonetheless, Andersen urges that Agnew’s notes were admitted
    into evidence only under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and that Rule 806 should,
    by its terms, allow for the admission of the FBI report. Andersen’s
    argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.                First, despite
    Andersen’s claim, it is not apparent from the record that the
    9
    FED. R. EVID. 806. Rule 806 provides in pertinent part: “When a hearsay
    statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), has been
    admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if
    attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those
    purposes if declarant had testified as a witness.”
    20
    district court relied on Rule 801(d)(2)(D) in admitting the notes
    because Andersen made no objection to their admission and the court
    did not address the matter directly.              Since the notes were readily
    admissible      as    non-hearsay     statements       without    regard   to   Rule
    801(d)(2)(D), we will not presume that Rule 801(d)(2)(D) was the
    sole basis for their admission.                 Moreover, Andersen appears to
    assume that Rule 806 applies whenever a statement might have been
    admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), even if it was in fact admitted
    on other grounds.            We do not read Rule 806 so broadly.            As the
    Advisory Committee notes make clear, the purpose of Rule 806 was to
    allow for the impeachment of a hearsay declarant.10                     Because the
    statements in Agnew’s notes were not hearsay at all, Rule 806 simply
    does not apply.
    We conclude that the district court did not commit reversible
    error by refusing to admit the FBI reports of an interview with
    Agnew.
    III
    Andersen contends that the jury instructions were flawed in
    three     ways:      first    in   explaining    the    meaning    of    “corruptly
    persuades,” then in misstating the element of “official proceeding,”
    and finally in not instructing the jury that the government had to
    prove that Andersen knew that its destruction of records was
    unlawful.
    10
    See FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee’s notes.
    21
    “We review the rejection of a requested jury instruction for
    abuse of discretion, ‘affording the trial judge substantial latitude
    in tailoring [the] instructions.’”11          Reversal is required only if
    the requested instruction "1) is substantively correct; 2) was not
    substantively covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury;
    and 3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure
    to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to effectively
    present a defense."12        No error results from a court’s refusal to
    give an instruction that is not substantially correct in its
    statement of the law.13
    1
    Andersen was convicted of obstructing justice under what has
    come to be known as the “corrupt persuasion” prong of 18 U.S.C.
    § 1512(b)(2)(A)&(B).        It provides:
    Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or
    corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so,
    or engages in misleading conduct toward another person,
    with intent to . . . cause or induce any person to (A)
    . . . withhold a record, document, or other object, from
    an official proceeding; [or] (B) alter, destroy,
    mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the
    object's integrity or availability for use in an official
    proceeding . . . shall be fined under this title or
    imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
    In this case, the charge read in relevant part:
    11
    United States v. Morales, 
    272 F.3d 284
    , 289 (5th Cir. 2001).
    12
    
    Id. 13 Id.;
    United States v. Dixon, 
    185 F.3d 393
    , 402-03 (5th Cir. 1999).
    22
    To “persuade” is to engage in any non-coercive attempt to
    induce another person to engage in certain conduct. The
    word “corruptly” means having an improper purpose. An
    improper purpose, for this case, is an intent to subvert,
    undermine, or impede the fact-finding ability of an
    official proceeding.
    Andersen’s principal argument is that the district court’s
    definition of the term “corruptly” in § 1512(b)(2) renders the term
    superfluous.       Andersen argues that, since § 1512(b)(2) explicitly
    requires that the accused act with the intent to withhold materials
    from an official proceeding, the term “corruptly” has no meaning
    under      the   district   court’s   definition.       Andersen    urges   that
    “corruptly persuades” requires more than an intent to withhold
    documents.        Andersen contends that the term should be read to
    require      either   proof   that    the    person   persuaded    violated   an
    independent duty or that the person engaged in inherently culpable
    conduct, such as bribery.
    The government challenges Andersen’s basic contention that the
    term “corruptly” would have no independent meaning if defined as “an
    improper purpose.”          The government relies on the term’s plain
    meaning, its definition in closely related statutes, the statute’s
    structure, and legislative history.            Specifically, the government
    notes that courts have routinely defined the term “corruptly” in
    companion statutes like §§ 1503 and 150514 to require “an improper
    14
    18 U.S.C. § 1505 criminalizes, in relevant part, anyone who “corruptly
    . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
    impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending
    proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or
    . . . being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint
    committee of the Congress.”
    23
    purpose.”15      In United States v. Reeves, for example, we defined the
    term to be an intent to “secur[e] improper benefits or advantages
    for    one’s    self     or    for   others.”16        The   majority    of   circuits
    interpreting the term as used in § 1512(b) have reached a similar
    result, defining “corruptly” in terms of improper purpose despite
    the dim light it casts upon its meaning, its circularity aside.17
    We     find     Andersen’s       surplusage       argument       unpersuasive.
    Andersen’s argument relies heavily on the Third Circuit’s decision
    in    United    States    v.    Farrell.18        In   Farrell,   a   divided    panel
    15
    See United States v. Haas, 
    583 F.2d 216
    , 220 (5th Cir. 1978) (defining
    “corruptly” as “for an improper purpose” or “an evil or wicked purpose”); United
    States v. Partin, 
    552 F.2d 621
    , 641-42 (5th Cir. 1977).
    16
    
    752 F.2d 995
    , 1002 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting “corruptly endeavor”
    as related to obstructing the due administration of the tax laws).
    17
    United States v. Shotts, 
    145 F.3d 1289
    , 1300-01 (11th Cir. 1998) (“It
    is reasonable to attribute to the ‘corruptly persuade’ language in Section
    1512(b), the same well-established meaning already attributed by the courts to
    the comparable language in Section 1503(a), i.e., motivated by an improper
    purpose. We are unwilling to follow the Third Circuit’s lead in imposing a
    requirement for an additional level of culpability on Section 1512(b) in the
    absence of any indication that Congress so intended and in the face of persuasive
    evidence that it did not.”); United States v. Thompson, 
    76 F.3d 442
    , 452 (2d Cir.
    1996) (finding § 1512(b) not to be unconstitutionally overbroad or vague because
    “Section 1512(b) does not prohibit all persuasion but only that which is
    ‘corrupt[ ],’” and “[t]he inclusion of the qualifying term ‘corrupt[ ]’ means
    that the government must prove that the defendant’s attempts to persuade were
    motivated by an improper purpose”); see also United States v. Khatami, 
    280 F.3d 907
    , 911-12 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Synthesizing these various definitions of ‘corrupt’
    and ‘persuade,’ we note the statute strongly suggests that one who attempts to
    ‘corruptly persuade’ another is, given the pejorative plain meaning of the root
    adjective ‘corrupt,’ motivated by an inappropriate or improper purpose to
    convince another to engage in a course of behavior--such as impeding an ongoing
    criminal investigation.”). But see United States v. Farrell, 
    126 F.3d 484
    , 490
    (3d Cir. 1997) (“[B]ecause the ‘improper purposes’ that justify the application
    of § 1512(b) are already expressly described in the statute, construing
    ‘corruptly’ to mean merely ‘for an improper purpose’ (including those described
    in the statute) renders the term surplusage, a result that we have been
    admonished to avoid.”).
    18
    
    126 F.3d 484
    (3d Cir. 1997).
    24
    concluded that the term “corruptly persuades” in § 1512(b) did not
    proscribe “a noncoercive attempt to persuade a coconspirator who
    enjoys a Fifth Amendment right not to disclose self-incriminating
    information . . . from volunteering information to investigators.”19
    In reaching its decision, the court specifically rejected the notion
    that the term could mean “persuades with the intent to hinder
    communication to law enforcement,” concluding that such a definition
    “would render the word ‘corruptly’ meaningless.”20                 The panel also
    dismissed the relevance of court decisions interpreting the term
    “corruptly” in companion statutes like § 1503.21                   Although these
    decisions had routinely defined the term to mean “with an improper
    purpose,” the court found these decisions unpersuasive because of
    the differences between § 1512 and § 1503.22                 Unlike § 1512(b), §
    1503    does     not      include   any   mens   rea   element   except   the   term
    “corruptly.”         Section 1512(b), by contrast, expressly requires a
    specific intent to withhold documents from investigators. With this
    in mind, Andersen asserts that a definition which makes sense in §
    1503 becomes surplusage when applied to § 1512(b).23
    19
    
    Id. at 488.
           20
    
    Id. at 487.
          21
    18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hoever . . .
    corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
    obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as
    provided in subsection (b).”
    22
    
    Farrell, 126 F.3d at 489-90
    .
    23
    
    Id. at 490.
    25
    The Third Circuit, however, did not define the term “corruptly”
    to require the violation of an independent legal duty, as Andersen
    claims.24    Rather, it held the converse, that encouraging another to
    exercise a constitutional right is not corrupt.25          The Farrell court
    specifically declined to define the term in any detail or to give
    substantive content to the term.           Rather, the decision can fairly
    be read more narrowly: that a person who persuades someone to invoke
    his Fifth Amendment right does not violate the statute.
    Andersen is incorrect, moreover, in its contention that the
    court’s definition of “corruptly” rendered the term superfluous.
    The court defined “corruptly” to mean “an intent to subvert,
    undermine     or   impede   the   fact-finding   ability   of   an   official
    proceeding.” Andersen contends that “corruptly” has no independent
    meaning under this definition because § 1512(b) already           separately
    requires an intent to impede the fact-finding ability of an official
    proceeding. Section 1512(b), however, requires an “intent to impair
    the . . . integrity or availability [of an object] for use in an
    official proceeding”; it does not focus on undermining an agency’s
    24
    
    Id. at 488
    (“[W]e are hesitant to define in more abstract terms the
    boundaries of the conduct punishable under the somewhat ambiguous ‘corruptly
    persuades’ clause. However, we do not think it necessary to provide such a
    definition here because we are similarly confident that the ‘culpable conduct’
    that violates § 1512(b)(3)’s ‘corruptly persuades’ clause does not include a
    noncoercive attempt to persuade a coconspirator who enjoys a Fifth Amendment
    right not to disclose self-incriminating information about the conspiracy to
    refrain, in accordance with that right, from volunteering information to
    investigators.”).
    25
    
    Id. at 488
    -89.
    26
    fact-finding ability. In short, as defined by the court, “corruptly”
    was not a mirror of § 1512(b)’s intent requirement.
    This point becomes more apparent when the charge is read in
    full.      The district court instructed that “[a]n improper purpose,
    for this case, is an intent to subvert, undermine, or impede the
    fact-finding ability of an official proceeding,” including “subvert”
    and “undermine” as urged by Andersen.26           Acting with an intent to
    “subvert, undermine, or impede” an investigation narrowed the reach
    of the statute, insisting upon a degree of culpability beyond an
    intent to prevent a document from being available at a later
    proceeding.      A routine document retention policy, for example,
    evidences an intent to prevent a document from being available in
    any proceeding.        But it does not alone evidence an intent to
    “subvert,     undermine,    or   impede”    an   official   proceeding.        In
    narrowing the statute’s potential reach, the district judge rejected
    the government’s argument that the jury should be charged on the
    bare bones of the statute and shaped the charge to the facts of the
    case.      It also gave meaning to “corruptly persuades.”             “Subvert”
    means “to overturn or overthrow from the foundation, ruin” or “to
    pervert or corrupt by an undermining of morals, allegiance, or
    faith.”     The most relevant definition of “undermine” is “to subvert
    or weaken insidiously or secretly.” Impede means “to interfere with
    26
    The limiting words “for this case” were included at Andersen’s urging.
    The word “impede” was requested by the government and included over the objection
    of Andersen.
    27
    or get in the way of,” to “hold up.”            Each of these terms implies
    a degree of personal culpability beyond a mere intent to make
    documents unavailable.
    The legislative history of § 1512(b), explored by the dissent
    in Farrell, further persuades us that the district court’s charge
    was correct.27       Section 1512(b) was enacted to replace and expand
    the witness protection provisions incorporated in § 1503.                     As
    initially      drafted,    §   1512(b)   did   not   bar   noncoercive   conduct
    performed with an intent to hide information from investigators; one
    could violate the statute only through intimidation, use of physical
    force, threats, or misleading conduct.               Congress added the term
    “corruptly persuades” in 1988 to “include in section 1512 the same
    protection of witnesses from non-coercive influence that was (and
    is) found in section 1503.” Congress knew that courts had uniformly
    defined “corruptly” in § 1503 as “motivated by an improper purpose,”
    and it is logical to give the word “corruptly” in § 1512 the same
    meaning that it has in § 1503.           At the very least, this legislative
    history – and its clear intent to criminalize non-coercive conduct
    – deflates Andersen’s “structural” argument that § 1512 targets
    certain means used to obstruct justice and not just motive.28
    27
    
    Farrell, 126 F.3d at 491-93
    (Campbell, J., dissenting).
    28
    Andersen argued that the structure of the statute required the
    definition of “corruptly persuades” to be based on the means of persuasion used
    rather than the persuader’s motive or intent. It points out that, before the
    statute was amended to include “corrupt persuasion,” the statute criminalized
    only certain behaviors – namely, the use of intimidation or physical force,
    threats, and misleading conduct. Andersen argued that it would be anomalous to
    construe the term “corruptly persuades” differently; it must also be interpreted
    28
    We are persuaded that defining “corruptly” as “motivated by an
    improper purpose” comports easily with the legislative history.
    Congress intended that § 1512(b) have the same substantive scope as
    former § 1503.     Since § 1503 proscribed conduct undertaken “with an
    improper purpose,” § 1512(b) should also do so.
    Andersen requested that the jury be instructed that the only
    way corrupt persuasion may be found is by an improper method or a
    violation of an independent legal duty.            We find no court that has
    come to this conclusion.        Andersen bases its argument on Farrell,
    but Andersen’s description of the holding is an incomplete statement
    of the Third Circuit’s viewpoint.                Farrell made clear that a
    violation of an independent legal duty is sufficient to prove
    corrupt persuasion, and it refused to define “corruptly persuade”
    as acting with an improper purpose, but it did not hold that
    violating an independent legal duty or persuading by an improper
    method was the only way to establish a § 1512(b) violation.29                The
    statute itself has no such requirement.
    Andersen, moreover, gives no explanation why “improper purpose”
    should require unlawful conduct.              Under the caselaw, “corruptly”
    to require similarly culpable actions.
    29
    
    Farrell, 126 F.3d at 488-90
    (explaining that it was “hesitant to define
    in more abstract terms the boundaries of the conduct punishable under the
    somewhat ambiguous ‘corruptly persuades’ clause,” and finding it unnecessary to
    do so because   the conduct at issue - “a noncoercive attempt to persuade a
    coconspirator who enjoys a Fifth Amendment           right   not   to   disclose
    self-incriminating information about the conspiracy to refrain, in accordance
    with that right, from volunteering information to investigators” - could not
    satisfy the statute).
    29
    requires an improper purpose, not improper means,30 and Andersen
    offers     no     explanation      why   “improper   purpose”      should    require
    “improper means.”          Indeed, the means used would seem to be relevant
    only to the extent that they shed light on whether the purpose was
    improper.        Moreover, the only examples of “unlawful conduct” that
    Andersen gives are bribery and counseling a witness to lie.                      The
    statute would have little independent reach, however, if it could
    be violated only through bribery or suborning perjury because such
    conduct is to a large extent criminalized in other provisions of the
    criminal        code.31     Yet    Andersen     offers   no   other   examples      of
    “culpable” or “unlawful” conduct sufficient, under its test, to
    trigger the statute.              We cannot lightly conclude that Congress
    intended for the statute to do only work already done by the
    criminal code.
    Finally,        even    ignoring     Andersen’s     failure    to    request   a
    substantially        correct      instruction,     the   submitted       instruction
    survives harmless error review.             Trial error is harmless unless it
    had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
    the jury’s verdict,” or leaves us in “grave doubt” as to whether it
    such an effect.           On the facts of this case, that the jury was not
    required to find a violation of an independent legal duty did not
    30
    See, e.g., U.S. v. Khatami, 
    280 F.3d 907
    , 911-12 (9th Cir. 2002); U.S.
    v. Shotts, 
    145 F.3d 1289
    , 1301 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Thompson, 
    76 F.3d 442
    , 452-53 (2d Cir. 1996).
    31
    18 U.S.C. § 1622, for example, criminalizes subornation of perjury.
    30
    have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.                         The jury
    was instructed that to corruptly persuade another, Andersen must
    have acted with an intent to subvert, undermine, or impede the fact-
    finding ability of an official proceeding.                 Contrary to Andersen’s
    assertions, this instruction does not read “corruptly persuade” out
    of the statute.      Acting with an intent to withhold a record from an
    official proceeding casts a wider net than acting with an intent to
    subvert, undermine, or impede the entire fact-finding ability of the
    proceeding.     There is nothing improper about following a document
    retention     policy     when      there    is    no    threat      of     an   official
    investigation, even though one purpose of such a policy may be to
    withhold documents from unknown, future litigation.                         A company’s
    sudden     instruction      to    institute      or    energize     a    lazy   document
    retention policy when it sees the investigators around the corner,
    on   the   other    hand,    is   more     easily     viewed   as       improper.    The
    instruction’s requirement of an improper purpose in withholding the
    documents ensures that the jury found a level of culpability over
    and above the mere intent to withhold a document from an official
    proceeding.        We cannot say that the error had a substantial and
    injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.
    The court narrowed the reach of the statute at the urging of
    Andersen.     Any error that occurred did not have a substantial and
    injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.
    31
    2
    Andersen argues that the jury instructions were also flawed in
    their explanation of an “official proceeding.”32           The contention is
    that while § 1512(b)(2) provides that the proceeding “need not be
    pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,”33 it
    does not offer guidance as to the concreteness of the             defendant’s
    expectation of a proceeding.
    Andersen first contends that it was entitled to have the jury
    instructed that an “official proceeding” had to be “ongoing or
    . . . scheduled to be commenced in the future.”              Resting on this
    court’s decision in United States v. Shively,34 the argument is that
    there must be proof of “intent to affect . . . some particular
    federal proceeding that is ongoing or is scheduled to be commenced
    32
    The jury charge instructed:
    An “official proceeding” is a proceeding before a
    federal court, judge, or agency. In this regard, you
    are instructed that the Securities and Exchange
    Commission, otherwise known as the “SEC,” is a federal
    agency, and that an “official proceeding,” for this
    case, is a proceeding before a federal agency, such as
    the SEC. A proceeding before a federal agency includes
    all of the steps and stages in the agency’s performance
    of its governmental functions, and it extends to
    administrative as well as investigative functions, both
    formal and informal. For purposes of this case a civil
    law suit brought by private litigants is not an official
    proceeding.
    The charge goes on to explain that “[t]he government need prove only that
    Andersen acted corruptly and with the intent to withhold an object or impair an
    object’s availability for use in an official proceeding, that is, a regulatory
    proceeding or investigation whether or not that proceeding had begun or whether
    or not a subpoena had been served.”
    33
    18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1).
    34
    
    927 F.2d 804
    , 812-13 (5th Cir. 1991).
    32
    in the future.”35     The government argues, and we agree, that this
    statement was dicta, it having already concluded that the government
    failed to prove that the defendant intended to affect an official
    proceeding.     This reconciles Shively with the plain language of the
    statute, an accommodation that we should prefer over a reading that
    defies the statutory provision that an official proceeding “need not
    be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.”
    Andersen next maintains that it was entitled to an instruction
    to the jury that it could not be found guilty unless at the time of
    the obstructing act it “had in mind a particular proceeding that it
    sought to obstruct.”          In addition to its reliance upon Shively,
    Andersen argues that Congress could not have intended to criminalize
    the widespread use of records retention programs, all of which have
    a general purpose of not retaining documents that might be helpful
    to some later appearing adversary - that this court should read the
    statute to insist upon proof that a defendant intended to impede a
    particular      proceeding.    The   argument    anticipates   a   government
    argument that this is fanciful, pointing out that the prosecution
    argued just that in ascribing criminal intent to Michael Odom’s
    statement in a videotaped meeting with employees that the records
    retention policy should be followed because it would make records
    unavailable in possible future litigation — even though it asserts
    his remarks were unrelated to Enron.            Indeed, it argues, the jury
    35
    
    Id. 33 asked
    to see the video during its deliberations.              This, it urges,
    makes clear that the jury was allowed to convict for acts that do
    not violate the statute.
    This contention is not without force, but it fails here.
    Andersen’s     requested     instruction     is     in   tension     with   the
    congressionally detailed reach of the statute.                It ignores the
    statutory language, which does not require a defendant to know that
    the proceeding is pending or about to be initiated.36              Its stronger
    argument is that without insisting that a defendant’s intent to
    impede a proceeding have some limiting sights, companies could be
    convicted for maintaining records retention programs which were
    adopted with no proceeding in mind.         The answer here may lie with
    the sound application of the elements of corrupt purpose and intent.
    That case is not before us.
    Ultimately,      we   find   no   reversible    error.     Wherever    the
    permissible reach of this statute may be finally drawn, it is beyond
    this case. This case was tried on the theory that Andersen intended
    to undermine, subvert, or impede a proceeding of the SEC.                   The
    government did not suggest that a records retention program violated
    the Act. Rather, it argued that Andersen used that policy as a code
    to shred - to subvert, undermine, or impede a government proceeding
    it knew was imminent.      There was no risk of conviction for innocent
    maintenance of a records program.           That the SEC was the feared
    36
    See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), (f).
    34
    opponent and initiator of a proceeding and not some other shadowy
    opponent was clear at every step.             That is how the case was tried
    and the jury charged.         Prosecutor Matthew Freidrich in the first
    opening statement of the government told the jury:
    They knew that the SEC was coming . . . they knew what
    that could mean to the firm . . . and the reason that
    they knew that was because Andersen – at the time these
    events that are set out in the indictment happened,
    Andersen was already under a form of probation with the
    SEC . . . if Andersen was found to, again, have violated
    securities laws, they could have their ticket pulled,
    meaning they could be debarred. They could be stopped
    from practicing accounting in front of the SEC, and that
    would have meant the end of the practice. . . . [T]his
    case is all about a group of partners at Andersen who
    knew that the law was coming and did what they could
    . . . to hinder the law. And at the end of the trial, we
    will ask you to find them guilty of that.
    This case, as charged37 and tried, was well within the statute.
    We cannot find reversible error in the trial court’s rejection of
    Andersen’s    request    to   add   to    the   definition   of   an   official
    proceeding that it be a particular proceeding.
    3
    Finally, Andersen argues that the district court erroneously
    charged the jury by not instructing that “a conviction under section
    1512(b)(2) is permissible only if the defendant is shown to have
    known that its conduct was wrongful.”               It asserts that because
    persuading another to withhold documents from an official proceeding
    37
    The indictment alleged, “In the summer and fall of 2001, a series of
    significant developments led to ANDERSEN’s foreseeing imminent civil litigation
    against, and government investigation of, Enron and ANDERSEN.” The jury was
    instructed in the court’s final charge that “for purposes of this case a civil
    law suit brought by private litigants is not an official proceeding.”
    35
    is not necessarily culpable conduct, Congress must have intended
    “corruptly” to shield those who act without knowledge of their
    unlawful conduct from culpability.
    The government responds, and we agree, that the jury was
    properly instructed because knowledge of one’s violation is not an
    element of § 1512(b)(2).         The general rule, of course, is that
    ignorance of the law is no defense.38        When Congress wishes to avoid
    the general rule, it usually does so by requiring that a defendant
    act willfully or with specific intent to violate the law.39            Section
    1512(b)(2) does not require that the defendant act willfully, and
    does not provide that a defendant may be convicted only if the
    defendant knows his conduct is unlawful. Andersen’s argument misses
    the import of the jury’s finding that it acted with an improper
    purpose; one could act with an improper purpose even if one did not
    know that the actions were unlawful.         The instructions required the
    jury to find the appropriate mental states for a § 1512(b)(2)
    violation: the jury could convict Andersen only if it found that
    Andersen intended to subvert, undermine, or impede the fact-finding
    ability of an official proceeding.         The district court did not err
    by refusing to give an “ignorance of the law” instruction.
    38
    Ratzlaf v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 135
    , 149 (1994).
    39
    
    Id. at 143-46;
    Cheek v. United States, 
    498 U.S. 192
    , 199-200 (1991).
    36
    IV
    Andersen challenges two additional rulings of the district
    court involving the cross-examination of David Duncan and remarks
    made by the prosecutor in his closing argument.                   We find no
    reversible error.
    1
    Inappropriate and harmful comments made during closing argument
    may constitute reversible error.40          When reviewing alleged improper
    comments, we first determine whether the comments were improper and
    then decide whether they caused harm.41           “Improper argument harms
    the defendant if it affects his substantial rights.”42           Finally, “it
    is necessary to look at [the challenged remarks] in context.”43
    The comments at issue here involve an email written by Rodney
    Faldyn demonstrating Andersen’s adoption of a previously rejected
    accounting practice that allowed Enron to avoid a restatement of
    earnings.     At least one copy of the email was deleted during the
    document destruction, but copies of the email survived.            During its
    opening statement, the prosecution said, “you won’t find another
    copy of this [email] anywhere in evidence.             Do you think the SEC
    would have wanted to see this document?”            At a bench conference,
    40
    United States v. Simpson, 
    901 F.2d 1223
    , 1227 (5th Cir. 1990).
    41
    United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 
    185 F.3d 307
    , 320 (5th Cir. 1999).
    42
    
    Simpson, 901 F.2d at 1227
    .
    43
    
    Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d at 320
    .
    37
    Andersen informed the court that a copy of the email was in fact
    produced to the SEC.    The prosecution told the court that it would
    not have made the statement if it knew that a copy was produced, and
    the court found that the prosecution acted in good faith.   To cure
    any confusion, the district court instructed the jury that despite
    the government’s good faith belief, “an undeleted copy of the
    document exists and [] it was produced to the SEC pursuant to the
    subpoena. . . . [Y]ou are not to consider any arguments regarding
    whether or not another copy of that document was preserved.”
    During rebuttal summation, the government again referred to the
    Faldyn email as evidence of Andersen’s change of accounting practice
    in relation to Enron.    In response to Andersen’s argument that it
    destroyed only unimportant documents, the government noted that the
    Faldyn email was deleted and said, “ask yourselves, the SEC, would
    you want this?”   Andersen objected, asserting that the prosecutor’s
    argument ignored the court’s previous instruction to the jury that
    the SEC received a copy of the email.      The court overruled the
    objection, and the prosecutor went on to explain to the jury that
    even if copies of the email survived and were produced, one deletion
    alone was significant. That some Andersen employees “didn’t get the
    message” to destroy documents, the argument goes, does not indicate
    that Andersen was not attempting to destroy important documents.
    The government argued further that the destruction of a copy of an
    important document is significant because a copy could indicate who
    38
    had the document, when the person received it, and whether the
    person destroyed it.
    Andersen moved for a mistrial after closing arguments, and the
    court denied the motion.       The court disagreed with Andersen’s
    contention that the prosecution simply repeated its confusing
    remarks   from   opening   statements,   noting   that    the   prosecutor
    indicated that there were other copies of the email and “never said
    this was the only document”; rather, the prosecutor asked, “wouldn’t
    the SEC have liked to have seen that.”
    Andersen asserts that the rebuttal comments “created the
    incorrect impression that Andersen had deleted all copies of the
    email.”   Andersen views the rebuttal comments as misleading and
    misstating the evidence, and contends that because the discussion
    of the Faldyn email was a significant portion of the government’s
    rebuttal, a new trial is warranted.
    We find no prosecutorial misconduct here.       The comments made
    during rebuttal were different from the remarks made during opening
    statement.   The opening statement remark that no copy of the email
    would be found in evidence could have confused the jury by implying
    that all copies of the email were destroyed.             In contrast, the
    rebuttal comments highlighted the email’s importance, asserted that
    the SEC would want to see it, and noted that at least one copy of
    it was deleted. The prosecutor did not claim that all copies of the
    email were destroyed or that no copy of the email was received by
    the SEC; rather, the prosecutor argued that destruction of one copy
    39
    alone     demonstrates       the   document’s         incriminating       nature   and
    Andersen’s intent to keep it from the SEC, even if other copies
    eventually were produced.           The court did not err in finding that
    these comments were not improper and denying Andersen’s request for
    a mistrial.
    2
    Andersen       asserts    that      the    district    court   “prejudicially
    handicapped [its case] by undermining the cross-examination of David
    Duncan.”     It claims that the basis of its cross-examination of
    Duncan was four summaries of interview sessions (“FD-302 forms”)
    between    Duncan    and     the   FBI   drafted      by   FBI   agents    after   the
    interviews. During his cross-examination, Duncan said that the four
    FD-302s forms contained various inaccuracies and misstatements. The
    court sustained the government’s objection to Andersen’s attempt to
    cross-examine       Duncan    regarding         the   discrepancies   between      his
    recollection and the summaries.            Andersen requested an evidentiary
    hearing to determine the nature of the inaccuracies, and the
    government explained that Duncan marked his own copies of the
    summaries, highlighting portions he felt were inaccurate. The court
    conducted an in camera review of three of Duncan’s copies of the
    summaries, finding that none of the inconsistencies were material.
    Rather, the court found that Duncan’s notations referred to specific
    words or phrases, making it “more likely that Duncan, a precise
    accountant, meant by his highlighting that the agent failed to
    40
    capture in his prose the precise flavor of what Duncan recalled as
    his actual statement.”          The court accordingly denied Andersen’s
    motion for an evidentiary hearing.
    Based on these events, Andersen presents two claims of error:
    (1) the district court exerted insufficient effort to determine the
    materiality of misstatements in the FD-302 forms, and (2) the
    court’s   failure   to    provide   the    marked   FD-302    forms    crippled
    Andersen’s ability to effectively cross-examine David Duncan.
    Andersen provides no authority to justify reversal of the
    jury’s verdict, and we find none.            To the contrary, Andersen’s
    various assertions are belied by the underlying events.               First, the
    facts   demonstrate      that   Andersen   had   everything    it   needed   to
    effectively cross examine Duncan. Duncan’s cross-examination lasted
    three days and covered a wide range of topics.         Andersen could have
    questioned Duncan about his statements to the FBI and then compared
    his statements to the summaries drafted by the FBI agent.              Andersen
    then could have highlighted to the jury any inconsistencies between
    his testimony and the summaries, and could have called the FBI agent
    who drafted the summary to explore the discrepancies.            Andersen did
    not take these opportunities below, perhaps because impeaching
    Duncan’s credibility would undermine its admitted strategy of using
    Duncan’s testimony to support its own defense.
    Second, Andersen did not present to the court below one of its
    primary complaints - that the court could not adequately determine
    the materiality of the inconsistencies because the court reviewed
    41
    only three of the four summaries marked by Duncan. Andersen did not
    complain   to   the   district   court   that   the   court’s    review   was
    insufficient by failing to review the fourth summary.           Furthermore,
    it was Duncan’s attorney, not the government, who possessed and
    provided the marked summaries, but Andersen did not inquire as to
    why the fourth summary was not provided.
    Given that Andersen provides no authority explaining why the
    court’s actions and findings require reversal, and that the facts
    undermine its assertion that it could not effectively cross-examine
    Duncan, we find no reversible error.
    V
    For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of conviction.
    42