Arnolie v. Orleans School Board ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-30415
Summary Calendar
LAWRENCE ARNOLIE
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
ORLEANS SCHOOL BOARD; CAROL CHANCE; CAROL CHRISTEN
Defendants - Appellees
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans
USDC No. 01-CV-2984-S
--------------------
September 17, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-appellant Lawrence Arnolie appeals from the
district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings to the
defendants-appellees on Arnolie’s Title VII race discrimination
and retaliation claims.
Arnolie’s initial EEOC complaint alleged that he was given
unsatisfactory performance evaluations based on his race. Though
Arnolie received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, he did not
file suit within ninety days. Arnolie subsequently filed a
second EEOC charge alleging that his supervisor, defendant Dr.
Carol Chance, retaliated against him for filing his first EEOC
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-30415
-2-
charge. The EEOC issued Arnolie another right-to-sue letter, and
Arnolie filed the instant suit within ninety days of the issuance
of that letter. Defendants filed an unopposed motion for
judgment on the pleadings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), arguing that
(1) Arnolie’s race discrimination claims against the Orleans
Parish School Board (the subject of his first EEOC complaint)
were time-barred; (2) Arnolie had not alleged a prima facie case
of retaliation because he did not suffer an adverse employment
action; and (3) Arnolie could not recover on his claims against
the individual defendants (Carol Chance and Carol Christen)
because they were not Arnolie’s “employers” as a matter of law.
The district court granted the motion without giving reasons.
On appeal, Arnolie argues first that the individual
defendants are representatives of the Orleans Parish School Board
and cannot be separated from their employer. The defendants
correctly point out that the law in this circuit is clear that
Title VII imposes liability on the employer only, and does not
impose individual liability for a Title VII claim. See Indest v.
Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999).
Arnolie argues next that the activities that he complains of
as retaliatory do constitute adverse employment actions. While
we can understand that assignment to the basement and unfavorable
evaluations certainly feel like adverse employment actions, this
court has determined that only “ultimate employment decisions”
constitute the “adverse employment actions” required for a prima
facie case of retaliation. See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777,
781-82 (5th Cir. 1995).
No. 02-30415
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Finally, the district court was correct when it implicitly
ruled that the subjects of his first EEOC complaint were time
barred.
The right to a jury trial is not absolute. To survive a
Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and thereby get
to a jury, the plaintiff must plead causes of action that have
some basis in law for survival. Arnolie has not done that here.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.