Austin v. Harrison County TX , 328 F.3d 204 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the April 25, 2003
United States Court of AppealsCharles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 02-41137
Summary Calendar
_______________
DAVID AUSTIN,
INDIVIDUALLY AND NEXT FRIEND OF “JOHN E”, A MINOR;
SANDRA AUSTIN,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF “JOHN E”, A MINOR,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
VERSUS
PATRICK A. JOHNSON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
CLERAN GIPSON,
DRILL INSTRUCTOR, STAR BOOT CAMP, HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
_________________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and On June 26, 1999, the date of the camp, the
CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. Austins dropped John E off at a local high
school at 5:30 a.m. Though permitted to stay
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: and observe, the Austins left, planning to re-
turn twelve hours later when the camp was
“John E,” a minor,1 was caught stealing a scheduled to end. In the morning, John E and
candy bar and, as punishment, was ordered to the other children performed exercises,
attend a one-day boot camp, where he suffered including push-ups, sit-ups, side straddle hops,
severe symptoms from heat stroke. John E’s and jogging. One exercise required John E to
parents sued the camp operator, Harrison carry a ruck sack weighing between 57 and 70
County, the camp director, and a camp work- pounds. He complained to Johnson that the
er, alleging, inter alia, the violation of his ruck sack straps dug into his shoulders and
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment that he was having difficulty performing the
rights. The district court granted plaintiffs’ exercises. Johnson stated that he felt John E
partial motion for summary judgment denying was lazy or had an attitude problem.
the defendant camp directors the defenses of
qualified and official immunity. We affirm in At lunch, John E drank two cups of Gator-
part, reverse in part, and remand. ade but did not finish his meal. During the
afternoon march, he complained to Johnson
I. that he felt sick, but was told to continue.
A justice of the peace found John E guilty John E collapsed several times before he was
of taking candy from a concession stand at taken into the school building between 2:00
school and sentenced him to three months’ and 4:00 p.m. The activity log kept by
probation, a $30 fine, and a one-day boot defendant Cleran Gipson, a drill instructor,
camp of his choosing. Sandra Austin, John states that John E became dehydrated and “fell
E’s mother, and David Austin, his stepfather, out” at 3:00 p.m.2 Johnson rendered first aid,
selected the “Strength Through Academics and but at some point, John E vomited and became
Respect,” or STAR, boot camp conducted by unconscious. An ambulance was called at
the Harrison County Juvenile Probation 4:42 p.m.
Department. The Austins met with the camp
director, Sergeant Major Patrick Johnson, who John E suffered from serious conditions
explained that John E would be required to such as hyperpyrexia3 and acute rhabdomyoly-
perform physical exercises and should bring sis4 resulting from heat stroke; he was
Gatorade. John E received a required physical admitted to a local hospital, where his
examination at which the doctor found him temperature was 107.9º Fahrenheit, and later
capable of engaging “in military style training was transferred to Children’s Hospital in
and exercise.”
2
Gipson testified that “fell out” means to be-
come unconscious.
1
After plaintiffs sued in 2001, John E reached
the age of majority and asserts claims in his own 3
An exceptionally high fever.
capacity; his parents continue their claims for med-
4
ical expenses. The destruction of skeletal muscle cells.
2
Dallas, where he remained for over two evidence as to whether the alleged conduct
weeks, suffering from acute renal failure, acute occurred. Pelletier, 516 U.S. at 312-13.
hepatitis, and pancreatitis. He has since made
a full recovery without permanent damage. III.
Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to
Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs stand trial or face the other burdens of
contend that Johnson and Gipson inflicted litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
cruel and unusual punishment and failed to 526 (1985). The initial question is whether,
summon needed medical care in violation of “taken in the light most favorable to the party
John E’s Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show
rights. They also assert Texas state law claims the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
for negligence, gross negligence, fraud, and right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
breach of fiduciary duty.5 Plaintiffs filed a par- (2001). We cannot pretermit whether a
tial motion for summary judgment that John- constitutional violation is properly alleged.
son and Gipson are not entitled to the defense Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
of qualified immunity and official immunity. In
turn, Johnson and Gipson filed a cross-motion Second, even where the officer violated
for summary judgment based on the same constitutional rights, we ask whether “the con-
defenses. The district court considered both tours of the constitutional right in question
motions and granted plaintiffs’ partial motion were sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer
for summary judgment. would understand that what he is doing vio-
lates that right.” Estep v. Dallas County,
II. Texas, 310 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2002)
The “denial of a claim of qualified (citation omitted). Although there does not
immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue have to be a case directly on point, Petta v. Ri-
of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within vera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1998), the
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291 plaintiff should seek to identify “cases of con-
notwithstanding the absence of a final trolling authority in [the] jurisdiction at the
judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, time of the incident which clearly establish the
526 (1985); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 rule on which they seek to rely,” or “a
U.S. 299, 313 (1996). By granting plaintiffs’ consensus of cases of persuasive authority
motion for partial summary judgment such that a reasonable officer could not have
preventing defendants’ use of a qualified and believed that his actions were lawful.” Wilson
official immunity defense, the court denied v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Qualified
defendants’ cross-motion for summary immunity protects “all but the plainly
judgment. We have jurisdiction, because the incompetent or those who knowingly violate
court determined plaintiff’s allegations made the law.” Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211
out the violation of a clearly established F.3d 913, 918-19 (5th Cir. 2000). An
constitutional right; the denial of qualified official’s conduct is therefore objectively
immunity did not rest on the sufficiency of reasonable unless “all reasonable officials
would have realized the particular challenged
conduct violated the constitutional provisions
5
The fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims sued on.” Id.were brought only against Johnson.
3
At summary judgment, all inferences are obvious case of unnecessary and wanton in-
typically drawn in favor of the nonmoving par- fliction of pain totally without penological
ty. Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., justification.” As for the deprivation of John
784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court E’s medical needs, the court summarily found
followed Saucier, which states that in a that, taking the facts in a light most favorable
qualified immunity determination, the facts to plaintiffs, “deliberate indifference to a pri-
should be construed in the light most favorable soner’s serious medical needs constitutes the
to the party asserting the injury. 533 U.S. at unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
201 (emphasis added); Felton v. Polles, 315
F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2002). Though the A.
court granted plaintiffs’ motion to deny State defendants do not incur Eighth
defendants use of qualified immunity, it also Amendment liability unless “the individual was
considered, and implicitly denied, defendants’ being held in custody after criminal
cross-motion for summary judgment. Because conviction.” Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61
the court drew all reasonable inferences in F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation
favor of plaintiffs, we will do the same, omitted). Defendants do not deny that John E
treating this as defendants’ motion for was convicted of a crime or that his one-day of
summary judgment on the basis of qualified boot camp served as punishment. Rather, they
immunity. contend that John E was not incarcerated,
noting that he was free to select the date and
IV. location of his punishment, and that his parents
Plaintiffs assert two Eighth Amendment could (but decli ned to) observe his
claims: that the STAR camp constituted cruel participation.
and unusual punishment and that defendants
were deliberately indifferent to John E’s med- In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669-
ical needs. The court concluded that plaintiffs 70 (1977), the Court found the Eighth
alleged a violation of both, without even de- Amendment inapplicable to corporal
ciding whether the Eighth Amendment applies punishment in schools, observing that
to a one-day boot camp.6 It stated that “[t]he schoolchildren have little need for the
use of the heavy weighted ruck sacks which amendment’s protection because schools are
cause pain and injury, along with the forced open institutions where children may leave
run in the hot sun which endangers health is an without physical restraint. A prisoner’s
incarceration, by contrast, “deprives him of the
freedom to be with family and friends and to
6
form the other enduring attachments of normal
Plaintiffs state that Johnson and Gipson never life.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
raised this argument in the district court and there-
citations omitted). The Court found that the
fore are barred from arguing it on appeal. This ig-
nores the fact that the plaintiff has the burden to
Eighth Amendment is implicated once the state
rebut a qualified immunity defense “by establishing “has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in
that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct accordance with due process of law.” Id. at
violated clearly established law.” Pierce v. Smith, 671.
117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. A judge found John E guilty, and while at
1992)).
4
STAR he was in the custody of the state fol- The Constitution “does not mandate
lowing a due process hearing. Though a one- adoption of any one penological theory.”
day youth offender camp can hardly be equat- Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1201
ed to incarceration in a penitentiary, John E (2003) (citation omitted). In fact, a “sentence
was not free to leave; he was a prisoner. can have a variety of justifications, such as
Campers were threatened with jail time if they incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or
did not comply with the physical exercise reg- rehabilitation.” Id. The exercises apparently
imen; Gipson deposed that any camper who were designed so that anyone, regardless of
failed to comply was loaded into an awaiting physical fitness level, could complete them.
van and taken to jail. All of this confirms the Requiring youthful offenders to perform mili-
custodial nature of John E’s punishment, so tary-styled exercises for one day is neither
we conclude that the Eighth Amendment cruel nor unusual; it is a deliberate policy
applies.7 choice to instill much-needed discipline.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379
B. (1962). Jogging and carrying a weighted sack
The court erred, however, in concluding at a Texas high school cannot be cruel and un-
that the camp regimen violated the propor- usual punishment one day and an accepted
tionality principle of the Eighth Amendment. form of athletic conditioning the next.
An individual judge “must not apply his own
subjective view of what is cruel and unusual. The Eighth Amendment proportionality
Rather, his judgment ‘should be informed by principle applies to noncapital sentences and
objective factors to the maximum possible ex- contains four principlesSS”the primacy of the
tent.’” Sampson v. King, 693 F.2d 556, 569 legislature, the variety of legitimate
(5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Under a penological schemes, the nature of our federal
“totality of conditions test,” conditions of con- system, and the requirement that
finement must not impose the wanton and un- proportionality review be guided by objective
necessary infliction of pain. Howard v. King, factors.” Ewing, 123 S. Ct. 1186 (quoting
707 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1983). In How- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997
ard, for example, inmates stated an Eighth (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Strict
Amendment claim where they were forced to proportionality between the crime and
perform hard labor fifty-six hours a week for sentence is unnecessary. Id.over a year.8 Id. at 220.
After concluding that the exercise regimen
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the
7
We do not decide whether an individual is district court summarily found that the
protected by the Eighth Amendment while punishment was disproportionate to the crime.
subjected to other “non-prison” forms of We disagree, emphasizing the reasonable
punishment such as community service or drug
rehabilitation.
8 8
See also Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, (...continued)
1245-46 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a prison in- previous medical condition). Though John E had
mate established an Eighth Amendment claim seen a doctor the previous week to treat a viral
where he alleged that hard labor had aggravated a infection, defendants were not notified of his
(continued...) condition.
5
flexibility that should be accorded local Cir. 2001). Viewing the evidence in a light
authorities to deal with wayward youths. favorable to plaintiffs, John E fell several times
Cases that have found disproportionate during the afternoon march and was left
sentences involve long-term imprisonment, so behind. He was taken inside the school
the nominal punishment of a one-day boot sometime after 2:00 p.m., where, according to
camp cannot pass muster.9 Johnson and Gipson, he began vomiting. Gip-
son’s official report states that at 3:00 p.m.
C. John E became “dehydrated and fell out.”
Plaintiffs also contend that Johnson and Gipson testified that the term “fell out” means
Gipson were deliberately indifferent to John to become unconscious. An ambulance was
E’s medical needs.10 Deliberate indifference not called, however, until 4:42 p.m.
requires that Johnson and Gipson “both knew
of and disregarded an excessive risk” to John Defendants do not dispute the accuracy of
E’s health or safety. Domino v. Texas Dep’t Gipson’s log, nor its literal interpretation. Be-
of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th fore 3:00 p.m., defendants’ conduct was per-
haps only negligent, but their failure to call an
ambulance for almost two hours while John E
9
See e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 lay unconscious and vomiting rises to the level
(1983) (finding disproportionate a life sentence of deliberate indifference. Since Estelle v.
without the possibility of parole for writing a no- Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), state
account check for $100 following several prior officers have been on notice that deliberate
convictions); Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
1363, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (remanding needs violates the Eighth Amendment.
for determination of whether a life sentence is dis-
Defendants’ contention that no case has
proportionate to the offense of drug distribution).
specifically proscribed the withholding of med-
10
Though it is not apparent from their fourth ical treatment for boot camp attendees reads
amended complaint, plaintiffs bring a separate due the right too narrowly; officers need only have
process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, “fair warning” that their conduct is unlawful.
contending that John E’s right to bodily integrity Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 678 (2002).
was violated. The Eighth Amendment, however, Given the serious medical consequences of
“serves as the primary source of substantive pro- dehydration, a reasonable person would not
tection to convicted prisoners.” Whitley v. Albers, have waited nearly two hours to call an
475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). Although both the ambulance once John E became unconscious.11
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the
safety and bodily integrity of prisoners, the legal
standards are virtually identical. Berry v. City of
Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1494 n.6 (10th Cir.
11
1990). Because the Eighth Amendment, as “an ex- The court did not determine whether
plicit textual source of constitutional protection,” defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on
defines the limits of government action, it controls either plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment or supervisory
over “the more generalized notion of substantive liability claims, so we decline to rule. White v.
due process.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, Walker, 950 F.2d 972, 977 (5th Cir. 1992). We
395 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). We note, however, that the gravamen of neither claim
therefore construe plaintiffs’ complaint as raising is apparent from plaintiffs’ brief or fourth amended
a claim under only the Eighth Amendment. complaint.
6
V. they known he would be forced to jog with a
The court denied defendants official weighted ruck sack; they do not deny,
immunity for negligence, gross negligence, however, that, before the camp, Johnson met
breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.12 Texas with them and explained that rigorous physical
law grants official immunity to an officer who exercise would be involved and that John E
was (1) performing discretionary duties; (2) in should bring Gatorade.
good faith; and (3) while acting within the
scope of his authority. City of Lancaster v. Further, plaintiffs do not dispute signing a
Chambers, 833 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). “Prevention Bootcamp Procedures” form stat-
The good faith element is “substantially” the ing that the camp would consist of various
same as the federal test for qualified immunity, types of physical exercises including a march
inquiring whether “a reasonable official could with weighted ruck sacks. The document also
have believed his or her conduct to be lawful states that campers will perform calisthenics
in light of clearly established law and the for up to one and one-half hours with rest
information possessed by the official at the breaks. Sandra Austin deposed that she did
time the conduct occurred.” Id. at 656; see not believe Johnson made any false statements
also Cantu v. Rocha 77 F.3d 795, 804 (5th about the program; she wishes she had asked
Cir. 1996). As with qualified immunity, sum- more questions.
mary judgment is the appropriate vehicle for
deciding official immunity. Albright v. Dep’t Johnson acted with “objective legal
of Human Servs., 859 S.W.2d 575, 579 & n.1 reasonableness” by meeting with the Austins,
(Tex. App.SSHouston [1st Dist.] 1993, no having them sign a document explaining camp
writ). procedures, and verbally explaining that John
E would be required to perform physical
Drawing all inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, exercises. Roe, 299 F.3d at 413. Even after
defendants’ reckless indifference to John E’s drawing all reasonable inferences in their
medical needs precludes official immunity for favor, plaintiffs produce no evidence of a
the negligence and gross negligence claims. material misrepresentation by Johnson, so he is
Plaintiffs’ fraud and breach of fiduciary duty entitled to official immunity on the fraud and
claims center on Johnson’s alleged failure to breach of fiduciary duty claims.
“disclose all material facts regarding the risk
and dangers of the boot camp, as well as the The order denying qualified immunity is
physical regiment [sic] inflicted upon the chil- REVERSED with respect to plaintiffs’
dren.” The Austins contend they would not constitutional claim of disproportionate
have let John E attend the STAR camp had punishment and state law claims for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty, and AFFIRMED in
all other respects. The matter is REMANDED
12
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of
for further proceedings, as appropriate, in
official immunity, because Texas’s official accordance with this opinion.
immunity doctrine, like the federal doctrine,
relieves state officials of the burden of suit and
liability for damages. Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 413
(5th Cir. 2002).
7