McCarty v. Silva ( 2002 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-31315
    Summary Calendar
    ANTHONY BO MCCARTY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    M. D. DAVIS; POLICE DEPARTMENT OF SHREVEPORT,
    Jump Out Crew and Narcotics Unit; J. J. SILVA,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 00-CV-2096
    --------------------
    November 7, 2002
    Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Anthony Bo McCarty, Louisiana prisoner # 105523, appeals the
    district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment and    dismissing    his    42   U.S.C.   §   1983   complaint   with
    prejudice.
    McCarty argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
    excessive force claims against Officers M.D. Davis and J.J. Silva
    because, contrary to their contentions, he did not attempt to flee
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 01-31315
    -2-
    from police or resist arrest, thereby justifying the use of some
    force in order to effectuate his arrest.                 In support of their
    summary judgment motion, the defendants submitted affidavits from
    Officers Davis and Silva, who stated that McCarty fled from police
    and had to be tackled from behind by Officer Silva.               Officer Davis
    alleged that he was not personally involved in the arrest because
    it was his responsibility to remain with the arrest van.                  Finally,
    Chief of Police Roberts submitted an affidavit stating that there
    is no policy or custom authorizing the use of excessive force in
    his   department    and   that    the   use   of   excessive      force    is   not
    tolerated.
    After the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation,
    McCarty submitted an affidavit that contained facts contrary to
    those alleged by the officers.             In addition to this competent
    summary judgment evidence, McCarty had also filed a verified
    complaint and a sworn opposition to the magistrate judge’s report
    and recommendation.        In his affidavit, McCarty stated that he
    immediately complied with the officers’ orders to lie face down on
    the   ground.      He   averred    that,   once    he   obeyed,   the     officers
    handcuffed his hands behind his back and then began to beat him.
    McCarty’s affidavit raises a genuine issue of material fact with
    regard to whether he resisted arrest, such that the use of some
    force would be justified.         Accordingly, the district court’s order
    granting summary judgment in favor of Officers Davis and Silva on
    this claim is vacated and the matter is remanded for further
    No. 01-31315
    -3-
    proceedings.     FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).   However, McCarty has presented
    no competent summary judgment evidence to support his claims
    against   the   Shreveport    Police   Department.     Accordingly,   the
    district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the
    Shreveport Police Department on this claim is affirmed.         See id.;
    see also Williams v. Bramer, 
    180 F.3d 699
    , 703, clarified on reh’g,
    
    186 F.3d 633
    , 634 (5th Cir. 1999); Piotrowski v. City of Houston,
    
    51 F.3d 512
    , 517 (5th Cir. 1995).
    McCarty also argues that the district court erred in granting
    the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his claim that he
    was denied adequate medical treatment.          The record reveals that
    McCarty was taken to the hospital and that he received treatment
    for minor injuries, within seven hours of his arrest.            Because
    McCarty failed to show that the defendants were deliberately
    indifferent to his serious medical needs and that the delay in
    treatment resulted in substantial harm, the district court did not
    err in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
    this claim.     See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 
    989 F.2d 191
    , 195 (5th Cir.
    1993).
    Additionally, McCarty argues that the district court erred in
    dismissing      his   claim   that     the    defendants   violated   his
    constitutional rights by the use of racist language.        The evidence
    in this case is conflicting with regard to whether the officers
    used racially offensive language. Nevertheless, McCarty has failed
    to allege an arguable equal protection claim.          See Williams, 180
    No. 01-31315
    -4-
    F.3d at 706.       Accordingly, the district court’s order granting
    summary judgment as to this claim is affirmed.
    McCarty next argues that the district court erred in denying
    his   repeated    requests    for   a   copy    of    the    transcript     of   his
    preliminary hearing in state court, which he alleges would support
    his excessive force claims against Silva.               McCarty has not cited
    any authority for the proposition that an indigent litigant is
    entitled to a free transcript of a state court proceeding in order
    to prosecute a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.              Accordingly, the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying this request.
    McCarty has filed a motion asking this court to order the
    state   district    court    to   provide   McCarty         with   copies   of   the
    transcript of his preliminary examination hearing and his guilty
    plea waiver.     McCarty’s motion, which the court considers to be an
    application for mandamus, is DENIED.             See Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb
    County Superior Court, 
    474 F.2d 1275
    , 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973).
    Finally, McCarty has filed a motion for appointment of counsel
    on appeal.       McCarty has adequately presented his arguments on
    appeal.   Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, his motion for
    appointment of counsel is DENIED.              See Richardson v. Henry, 
    902 F.2d 414
    , 417 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Ulmer v. Chancellor, 
    691 F.2d 209
    , 212 (5th Cir. 1982).
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART; MOTIONS
    DENIED.